The Indonesia-Papua New Guinea Border: Irianese Nationalism and Small State Diplomacy by May,�Ronald J.
THE INDONESIA - PAPUA NEW GUINEA BORDER: 
IRIANESE NATIONALISM AND SMALL STATE DIPLOMACY 
R.J. May (Ed.) 
Working Paper No 2 
Department of Political and Social Change 
Research School of Pacific Studies 
Australian National University 
August 1979 

National Library o f  Australia 
Cataloguing-in-publication entry 
The Indonesia - Papua New Guinea border 
(Working paper ; no . 2) 
Includes bibliographical re ferences 
ISBN 0 908160 33 x 
1. Indonesia - Foreign relations - Papua 
New Guinea . 2. Papua New Guinea - Forei gn 
relations - Indone sia . I .  May , Ronald J . , 
ed . ( Serie s : Australian National University ,  
Canberra . Research School o f  Paci fic Studies . 
Dept . of  Pol i tical and Social Change . Working 
paper ; no . 2 ISSN 0157-2776) 
327'.598'095 

C 0 N T E N T S 
Pref ace 
A historical perspective 
Peter Hastings 
Problems of international borders wi th particular 
reference to the current re-negotiation of  the 
Indonesia - Papua New Guinea agreement conce rning 
admini s trative border arrangements 
J . R .V .  Pre scott 
The ' Jusuf Line' : beginnings of  a more fruit ful phase? 
Rex Mortimer 
Does Indonesia have expansionis t  designs on Papua New 
Guinea? J .A . C . Mackie 
Papua New Guinea perceptions on the border ; i nternal 
pressures and policies .  Kwas i  Nyamekye and 
Ra lph Premdas 
Living wi th a lion . 
feelings 
Border deve lopment : 
Public at_ti tudes and private 
R . J . May 
a ' politi cal nec e s s i ty' again 
J . M .  Herlihy 
Appendix I Agreement between the government of  
Aus tralia ( acti ng on i ts own beha l f  and on 
beha l f  of  the government o f  Papua New Guinea ) 
and the government of Indonesia concerning 
admini strative border arrangements as to the 
border between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia 
Appendix I I  
view 
Re ference s  
Contributors 
Wes t  Papua National i sm� an inside 
i 
1 
12 
33 
42 
65 
80 
108 
125 
131 
140 
142 
Figures 
1 The border area 
Mari time boundari es southwe s t  of the 
I ndonesia-Papua New Gui nea border 
3 Maritime boundaries north o f  the 
I ndonesia-Papua New Guinea border 
4 Australia-Indonesian boundary agreement 
o f  19 7 3  
5 The Fly River 
6 Meanders on the F ly River 
Pho tographs 
Jacob Prai and West Papuan freedom 
fighters . 
I rianese re fugees about to return to 
I ndone sia 
Camp for Irianese re fugees at Oksapmin 
page 
facing 1 
17 
20 
2 3  
2 5 
26 
between 64-65 
PREFACE 
In 19 7 7 , roughly coinci dent wi th I ndonesia ' s  national elections , 
a resurgence o f  West Papuan nationa l i s t  activi ty in I rian Jaya resulted 
1 in an esca lati ng series o f  confrontations between OPM supporters and 
Indonesian authoriti e s , and a sub s tantial movement o f  I ri anese 
re fugees into Papua New Guinea . It  i s  impossible to veri fy the 
conflicting reports of what happened i n  I rian Jaya in thi s  period but 
i t  seems certain that several hundred Irianese , and some I ndone sian 
troops , were killed;  many more I ri anese fled their vil lage s , seeking 
temporary or permanent asylum in Papua New Guinea . 
Although the Papua New Guinea government s tood fi rmly by i ts 
acceptance of I ndonesian sovereignty i n  I rian Jaya , border incursions 
by I ndonesian troops , Papua New Guinea ' s  acceptance of I rianese 
refugees , and I ndone sian sugge s tions that Papua New Guinea was 
adopting a double s tandard on the I rian Jaya question , a l l  placed 
s trains on the relations between the two countrie s. Also , growing 
popular support among Papua New Guineans for their Me lane sian brothers 
increased the sa lience o f  West Papuan nationa l i sm in Papua New Guinea's 
dome s ti c  poli ti c s; government policies wi th respect to I rian Jaya 
became a campai gn i s sue in Papua New Guinea's national e lections in 
1 9 7 7  and continued to be a source o f  contention in the early months 
of the second parliament. 
Towards the end o f  1978  there was a scaling down o f  I ndonesian 
mi li tary ope rations and subsequent announcement o f  a more conci liatory 
policy towards the Irianese di ssidents . Soon a fter, the I ndonesian 
and Papua New Guinea governments succe s s fully comp leted di scussions 
prelimina ry to the renegotiation of the 1 9 7 3  agreement on administrative 
border arrangements. 
Against thi s background, a group of people wi th some knowledge of 
the Irian Jaya i ssue was brought together wi thin the Australian 
1 Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement ) . Throughout thi s 
volume , unle s s  otherwise s tated , ' OPM" i s  used broadly to describe 
the various factions of the Wes t  Papua na tionalist movement . 
i i  
National Universi ty to review recent events and attempt an a s s e s sment 
of future prospect s . Seven of the eight papers presented to the two 
day seminar are reproduced here with only minor edi torial change s . 
The other , on the the OPM ,  was not ava i lable for publication at the 
time this volume went to pres s; however we have i nc luded , a s  appendix 
I I , a document on West Papua nationa l i sm circ ulated by the Paci fic 
People ' s  Action Front (a fac tion o f  the OPM) in 1 9 7 6 . 
We are grate ful to Jan Grocott , Virginia Mathe son , Hans Gunther 
and the Aus tralian Nationa l Uni versity SOCPAC Printery for their 
contributions to the publication of this set o f  papers and to Mark 
Baker and Wantok Publications I nc . for permi s sion to reproduce the 
photographs i ncluded betwe en page s 64 and 65 . 
R . J .  May 
Abbreviations 
HAD - House of Assembly Debate s (Papua New Guinea ) 
(prior to 19 7 5 ) 
NPD - National Parliamentary Debate s ( Papua New Guinea ) 
OPM - Organisasi Papua Merdeka ( see footnote p . i )  
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Figure 1 .  The border area . 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Peter Hastings 
With the recent deportation o f  OPM leader , Jacob Prai , and 
three other Irianese diss idents to Sweden , the succe ssful vi sit of 
Indonesia ' s  Foreign Mini ster Dr Mochtar Kusumaatmadj a  to Port 
Moresby and the more recent low keyed vi sit of President Suharto 
himse l f , most of the heat ha s gone out of the situation whi ch 
exi sted between Papua New Guinea and I ndone sia over OPM operations 
and Indonesian pol ice actions along the rnrthern border area . In  
fact the commitment of Papua New Guinea and I ndonesia , announced 
in the j oint comrnunique
1 
to draw up a new border treaty later thi s  
1 
The text of the communique , as  reproduced in Department o f  Foreign 
Affairs, Canberra Backgrounder 190 , 1 3  June 197 9 , i s  as  fol lows : 
President Soeharto of I ndonesia paid his first vi sit to Papua 
New Guinea from 4-6 June . Thi s was in response to an invitation 
is sued by Pr ime Mini ster Somare when he had vis ited Indonesia in 
January 19 7 7 . 
The two di scussed a wide range of bi lateral and regional i s sues 
and noted the growing nature o f  their bi lateral relations . 
Among the main points ari s i ng from the vi sit were the expres sed 
intention of both sides to conclude a new border administration 
agreement , which it is hoped wi ll be finali sed thi s year , and 
agreement to consult in future on development programs in the 
common border area to improve conditions for the local population .  
Another major development wa s agreement by Indonesia to co­
operate to ensure the succe s s ful establ ishment and operation of 
the proposed OK Tedi copper mine in PNG by al lowi ng those 
channels o f  the Fly River controlled by I ndonesia to be used by 
PNG ore barges . President Soeharto and Mr Somare signed a 
Technical Cooperation Agreement and undertook to make j oint efforts 
to obtain third party funding for it. It was also agreed tha t 
negotiations should be conducted in the near future on the c loser 
co-operation of  air services . 
There wa s little oppo sition from sympathiser s  of the Free 
Papua Movement (OPM ) to President Soeharto ' s  vi sit. 
2 
year , a s  we ll  a s  plans for a j oint 'development programme' in the 
border area , c learly heralds better future relations be tween the 
two countrie s . The communique also contains an Indone sian promise 
to give wha t  help i t  can i n  the deve lopment of  the huge Ok Tedi 
copper projec t on the headwaters o f  the Fly. Among other thi ngs 
thi s  wi l l  involve I ndonesian acquie sence i n  the use of  barge s to 
bring copper down the Fly River from Ok Tedi to the Gul f  of  Papua 
where the concentrate wi ll  be loaded onto bulk carri ers .
1 
The tension i n  the si tuation was always a good deal more acute 
on the Papua New Guinea side where the government had to contend wi th 
a real pol i tical si tua tion o f  ' pan Melane sian ' or e thnic sympa thy , 
caused by s torie s  - some false , some true , a number simply exaggerated -
of heavy handed I ndones ian activi ties i n  I rian Jaya and by a sporadic 
flow of  border crossers compri si ng tradi tiona l vi l lage people , 
poli ti cal and economi c refugees  and i l l i c i t  OPM gueri l l a  force s . I t  
had also to contend wi th a fai rly wide spread and i ncreasing I ndophobia 
in Papua New Gui nea ' s  e l i te s , the s tudents , police and Armv . Thi s 
was principally the result of  a good deal of  shortsi ghted and ul timately 
counter-productive Aus tralian propagandi zing in the late 1960s aimed 
largely at putting the brakes on the pace of po li tical deve lopment 
but i t  took on a new dimension wi th I ndonesia ' s  armed intervention 
in Eas t  Timer , seen by many in Port More sby as an expansioni s t  pre lude 
to a mi l i tary attack on Papua New Guinea i tsel f . 2 
Tens ion i s  probably the wrong word to use to de scribe I ndonesian 
a tti tude s .  I rritation i s  not . There ha s certainly been p lenty of  
irri tation i n  the policy making bodies in Jakarta , i nc luding HANKAM , 
DEPLU and BAKIN . The Papua New Guinea government was seen a l l  too 
1 
2 
See Has ti ngs ( 1970 ) .  
Hastings ( 1 977 ) ,  Thi s  i s  fundamenta lly a paper on Papua New Gui nea­
Indone s ian relations given to Papua New Guinea ' s  Department o f  
Forei gn Affairs i n  Port Moresby. 
3 
frequently as being both intransigent and unnei ghbourly in fai ling 
to curb the use of the Papua New Guinea border area as a sanctuary 
for OPM gueri l la s  and in fai ling to ' di scipline ' Australian and 
domestic media reporters i n  Port Moresby for writing and broadcasting 
exaggerated stories about Indonesian mi l itary activities a long the 
border. While Jakarta c learly recogni zed that Papua New Guinea was a 
recently independent country and therefore inexperienced in the 
requirements of bi lateral relations it also took the view that Papua 
New Guinea could not be excused for pursuing what in Jakarta ' s  opinion 
were anti I ndonesian pol icies  simply on the grounds of ignorance . The 
Indonesian view during that time could be put quite simply . Whi le 
Jakarta appreciated the political problems rai sed for Port Moresby by 
pro Melane sian sympathies it i nsi sted that Port Moresby should recogni ze 
that all Irianese , whether traditional crossers or political or 
economic di ssidents , were Indonesian c iti zens subj ect to Indonesian 
law . 
I t  was always the OPM , however , which rai sed I ndonesian temperatures , 
not because o f  its number s  but because it was able to seek refuge i n  
another country . Jakarta could not tolerate a Papua New Guinea policy 
which , by design or by default , passive ly al lowed armed enemies o f  
the I ndone sian state the right to cross  the broder into sanctuary 
whenever the going got tough and to return to Indonesian territory 
when the time appeared propitious. Such a policy , in conj unction with 
the very di f fi cult terrain in the border area , simply invited hot 
pursuit by I ndone sian forces . And thi s  i s  preci sely what happened on 
a number of occasions . In addition , the situation was not helped by 
1 
Indonesian use of imprec i se Dutch map s . Despite a good deal of 
scare monge ri ng i n  Papua New Guinea the actual number of I ndonesian 
troops i nvolved i n  actions against the OPM (or its so called mi litary 
arm ,  the Tentara Nasional Papua ( TNP ) ) has always been small , at the 
most about hal f  a battalion or 500 men . But of course the OPM has 
also been small . At its peak it did not boast much more than 100  
1 
Personal statement by Brig-Genera l K .  Santosa , Panglima , 
Cenderawasih XVI I in Jayapura , September 1978 . 
4 
hard core fighters - wi th supporters numbering about 300
1 
- equipped 
wi th antiquated Dutch and American rifles  and s everal Indonesian 
automatic weapons captured in ambush .  It never captured mortars a s  
wa s c laimed . As every I ndones ian soldier on patrol i s  res tricted to 
twenty to f i f ty rounds o f  ammuni tion , cap tured weapons are i n  any case 
o f  dubious value . Nevertheless  the ' bi g  push ' i n  the middle o f  las t  
year , involving a battalion o f  I ndonesian infantry , many o f  them 
Timores e  veterans armed wi th AK 4 7 s , and accompanied by Air Force OV 
10 s trafing o f  known , i f  emp ty ,  OPM vi l lage s , and the use o f  Bell 
he licopters to drop p la s ti c  bombs ( the se cause li ttle damage but 
the noi se i s  frightening ) was seen by many including mys e l f  as a 
typical exerci se in I ndonesian overk i l l, the use o f  a s ledgehammer to 
crack a nut . I t  was not ti ll  later in di scussions in Jakarta that 
I reali sed the pol i cy may have been qui te deliberate in order to urge 
upon the Papua New Guinea governmen t  the growing seriousnes s  o f  
unchecked border cro s sings and to obtain from i t  a proper re sponse . 
To this  extent , whi le there were c l early o ther considerations 
involved on both side s , it was succ e s s ful . I t  has also large ly made 
pos sible , I be lieve , the I ndonesian swi tch to the ' smiling policy ' .  
From I ndones ia ' s  s tandpoint certain facts are worth rei terati ng 
a lthough some are scarcely new . There has neve r been the s lighte st 
doubt among I ndonesia ' s  e l i te s  that I ri an Jaya was part o f  the 
Republic which from the time o f  the pre i ndependence BPKI 2 talks i n  
1 9 4 5  regarded i ts e l f  a s  succe ssor s tate to the Netherlands Eas t  I ndie s .  
The ethnic  argument that Melane sians were di f ferent did not wash . 
Di fferent from whom? The Javane se? They in turn were di fferent from 
a hal f  do zen o ther e thnic groups in the archipelago . And in any case 
Papuan feature s , cul tural influence and language s truc ture s extend 
1 
2 
By supporters I mean li terally t hose who carried supplies . The 
numbe r o f  sympathizers i s  hard to e stimate but may run into thousand s 
along the border area . General Santosa e s timated tha t  the OPM ' s 
capaci ty to ' upset vi llagers ' was total ly di sproportiona te to its  
numbers . But  in a Me lane sian context ' sympathizer ' i s  hard to 
de fine . My impre ss ion of Marthen Tabu , archi tec t  o f  the heli copter 
incident ,  was tha t he was a cargo cul ti st . 
Badan Penjelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia ( ' investigating 
body for the preparation of I ndone sian independence ' ) , e stabli shed 
by the Japanese in 1945 . 
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not only east from I rian Jaya to the Pac i fic but we st , a s  wel l ,  to 
Maluku , the Halmaheras , the Kei and Aru I slands and east Timar. I n  
fact the Malay and Papuan worlds meet and mingle in the Arafura and 
Banda seas. Expecting I ndonesia , as some do expect , to help create 
one Melane sian state makes as much sense in Jakarta as asking Lagos 
to al low Nigeri a ' s  Hausa people to form one state with those o f  
Dahomey , o r  Port Moresby to acquie sce in  Bougainvi l le and the 
western Solomons forming an i ndependent blackskin state. There are 
other e lements to the equation. Papua New Guineans have never had 
to fight a war of independence and simply fai l to realise the intense 
sensitivity o f  a people like the I ndonesians , who have fought such 
a war , to any suggestion of fragmentation. Moreover I rian Jaya sti ll  
retains a symbolic  importance in  terms o f  nationali st values because 
of the number of I ndonesian nationa l i sts including Hatta and S j ahrir 
who langui shed in the c amps o f  Tanah Merah. 
But having said that it i s  necessary to regi ster important 
qua l i fications. Indone s ia ' s  domestic priorities lie  first and 
foremost in the political viability of the great Javane se heartland 
and all other interests are subservient to that fact. Its external 
prioritie s  are with its ASEAN neighbours , with Vietnam , with the US 
and with j udging the a ctions of the two powers which worry it most 
China and Rus sia. The eastern end of  the archipelago , Nusatenggara , 
has not been a preoccupation. Nor i s  it now. Many Papua New Guineans 
have be lieved , and many resident white s in the past have a s siduously 
led them to believe , that I nlonesia is an expansioni st powe r , that 
a fter Timar Papua New Guinea was next on the l i st of conquests. In  
fact , the record o f  official I ndone sian statements on Papua New Guinea 
s ince 1945 , through the West Irian takeover , Confrontation and the 
' Act o f  Free Choice ' ( seen in Papua New Guinea understandably as an 
Act o f  No Choice ) reveals nothing in the way of territorial ambitions 
although in Sukarno ' s  day Australi a  as  the admini stering colonial 
power was ritually casti gated as  neko lim . And in point o f  fact , 
despite Jakarta ' s  past irritation with Port Moresby over border 
policies , in general , relations with its tiny neighbour have been good. 
I ndone sia welcomed self-government. It we lcomed independence .  It 
6 
has re frained , public ly at all events, from characterizing Papua 
New Guinea a s  neo coloniali s t . I t  clearly regards Papua New Guinea 
as a sovereign country , not a co lonial remnant like Eas t  Timor , but 
as a sovereign , independent member s tate of the UN , a Commonweal th 
country wi th Commonweal th and regional al liances through the South 
Paci fic ·Forum and as having a specia l re lationship wi th · Aus tral i a. 
Jakarta ' s  intere s t  i n  Papua New Guinea i s  no t in  absorbing i t  - Papua 
New Guinea i s  not in any case easi ly dige s tible , mi l i tari ly or in 
any other way - but i n  Papua New Guinea ' s  capacity to mai ntain s table 
government , to maintain an anti communi st forei gn pol i cy and to re s i s t  
fragmentation which Jakar ta be lieve s would lead some in Papua New 
Guinea to fish in the troubled waters of Irian Jaya by s tirring pan 
Me lane sian sentirnent .
1 
Las t  but not leas t Jakarta hope s tha t  future 
Papua New Guinea governments wi l l  unders tand Jakarta ' s  nation bui lding 
problems in Irian Jaya and Timor, and e l sewhere in the archipe lago , 
in the same way tha t Jakarta understand s  that Papua New Gui nea face s 
simi lar problems in the We stern Highlands or in the North Solomons . 
By way o f  pos tscript to thi s  section i t  i s  proper , I be l ieve , to 
observe that I ndonesi a  ha s only intervened in unre solved colonial 
si tua tions on or wi thin i ts borders - We st New Guinea , confrontation 
wi th Malaysia over what i t  regarded a s  a Bri ti sh manipula ted disposal 
o f  the Borneo territories, and recently over Timor. Since 1 966 it has 
accepted Sarawak and Sabah as state s  of  the Malaysian Federation . 
I t  seems content to let Ma laysi a ,  Bri tain and Brunei work out the 
latter ' s  future s tatus . I t  ha s fi l led a good office s  role over the 
Malaysia -Phi l ippine s  dispute . And i n  de termination o f  offshore 
seabed and re source boundaries i t  has sought to nego tiate . 
However the de fusing of  the border si tuation and the new era 
of c loser Papua New Guinea-Indonesian re lations symbol i zed by 
1 This doe s not preclude pos sible I ndone sian intervention i f  Papua 
New Guinea should threa ten to fragment pol i tica lly and Aus tralia 
re fused to try by one means or another to arre s t  the proce s s . 
However, inte rvention a s  such would be at the leve l o f  pol i tical 
manoe uvring , by bribery and by ' propaganda aimed a t  attrac ting the 
support of those groups and institutions including e special ly the 
Army , seen by Jakarta as mos t  l ike ly to share i ts aims of securi ng 
s table , e ffec tive government . ' See Has tings ( 1977 ) . 
7 
Suharto's vi sit  sho uld not obscure real future problems . The 
signi ficance of the OPM and simi lar organi zations like Gerakan Papua 
Liar (GPL)  was never their numbers ,  which are sma ll , but their 
sheer Melanesian comp lexi ty . Jayapura and Jakarta have both tended 
far too long to take the view tha t  the OPM , for instance , is a purely 
Dutch creation , a colonial legacy , a produc t of the unfulfi lled pledges 
of 1 96 1 . I t  has certainly been that of cour se , whi le i ts princ ipal 
leaders have been the frus trated , betrayed generation o f  1960 . But 
it has a l so ben symbolic of the continuing problems of Melanesians 
throughout the whole i sland in reaching accommodation wi th the 
demand s  of a powerful and alien civi l i zation . Thi s  i s  not a new 
si tuation . The Dutch faced these problems in the late 1950s  and the 
Aus tralian admi ni s tration over a much longer period . The Papua New 
Guinea admi ni s tration faces them today in the Western Highlands, 
where thousands of Melanesians continue to resolve arguments over land , 
pigs and women by resorting to tradi tional means , and even wi thin a 
s tone ' s  throw o f  Port Moresby where an accused man can be murdered 
in the presence of a Chief Jus tice . I t  i s  a painful , di storting 
process whether the alien , admini s tering civi li zation is temporary and 
tutelary as Aus tra lia ' s  was or permanent and acculturating as  i s  
Indonesia ' s . 
The real point about the I rianese today i s  not the activi ties 
of the OPM but their future as Indonesians . Over a hundred years 
ago that sharp eyed Engli sh observer , Alfred Rus sel l Wal lace , wrote 
(Wallace 1869 vol 2 :  4 4 8 , 4 58 ) , 
. . .  i f  the tide of coloni zation should be turned to New 
Guinea , there can be li ttle doubt o f  the early extinction of 
the Papuan race . . . . ( for ) whether we consider their physical 
confirmation , their moral charac teri sti c s , or their intellec tual 
capac i ties , the Malay and Pap uan races offer remarkable 
di fferences and striking contra s ts . 
I n  an important and unhappy sense this i s  true . The Melanesians of 
Irian Jaya wi l l  eventually be I ndonesiani zed. It i s  not an entirely 
new proces s .  I t  has in  fact been going on for a long time in various 
parts of the Bird ' s Head , in the Schouten I slands , in the area around 
Sarong and Fak Fak and in outer i slands like the Radja Arnpats . But 
it is now a rapidly accelerating process in most parts of the i sland , 
8 
notably excepting the Highlands . And i t  wi ll  for a long time p lace 
ve ry brutal demands on the Me lane sian. 
There are probably some 260 , 00 0  non Iriane se Indones ians now 
re sident in Irian Jaya (pre c i se figures are not easy to get )  . Thi s  
represents a quarter of  the total popula tion . O f  thi s  number about 
30-50 , 000  are official  transmigrasi , mai nly poor Javanese rice farmers 
who , for the most part , have settled i n  farming commun i ti e s , some 
o f  them mi xed Javanese/Irianese communi tie s  like tha t  at Nabi re . 
The remainder , mainly Buginese and others from eastern Indone s i a , are 
voluntary se ttlers who have moved i n to poor kampongs on the outskirts 
of the mai n  centres where they run small shop s and food and cigare tte 
s ta l l s  to service the i ncreasingly I ndonesiani zed to'Wn s . They directly 
impinge on urban Irianese forci ng them to move into i ncreasingly 
depre ssed kampongs of  their own . Although the se ttlers have not impi nged 
to the same extent on rural subsi stence vi llagers the e f fec ts are 
beginning to be fe l t  through internal migration . Serious e thnic tensions 
are thus in the maki ng e spec ially as a ma j or problem is the 
unprecedentedly rapid growth o f  towns , Indone sian s tyle , whi ch favours 
the ski l led migrants at the expense of the unsk i l led Irianese . The 
government in Jakarta i s  aware of the problem and Dr Mochtar told me 
i t  would like to put a s top to inter provi ncial migration but that 
i t  presented considerable legal di fficul ti e s . The only factors likely 
to i nhibi t the flow of  internal migrants to I rian Jaya , i f  not reverse 
the trend , are a downturn i n  economic ac tivi ty or aboli tion o f  the 
subsidi zed ri ce pri ce s . As the latter i s  tied to the former as an 
incentive to attract ski lls  and as economic activi ty i s , i f  anything , 
on the upturn , owing to increased ac tivi ty i n  mining and loggi ng , the 
outlook i s  for more mi grants rather than fewer . 1 
The Iriane se i n  the towns are undoubtedly lowe s t  men on the 
totem po le , worki ng as garbage col lectors , truck and bus drivers, 
market men and road gangers . Increasingly they are recrui ted into 
the civi l  police and a number have enli sted in the armed force s .  There 
1 See the series of  arti c les appearing i n  The Sydney Morning Hera ld 
27 Sep tember to 5 October 1978  and 18 and 20 December 1978 dea ling 
wi th two vi s i ts to I ri an Jaya . 
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i s  evidence o f  real efforts on the part of the Indonesian admi nis tration 
to increase economi c opportunity and there are greater numbers o f  
Irianese in the public service than before . But e conomi c development 
aimed pure ly at increasing the opportuni ties for the Irianese  i s  
s till  limi ted .  
Jakarta ' s  po licy makers pin their fai th i n  future reconciliation 
of the Me lane sian in the twin policies of acce lerated educa tion for 
the Irianese  aimed at bringing them into the great mainstream o f  
Indone sian political , soc ial and cul tural value s and , more recently , 
in the ' smi ling policy ' aimed at winning the hearts and mi nds of the 
people . The education effort has ce rtainly been mas sive i n  terms 
of e f fort and expendi ture· and e specially in comparison wi th that of 
the Dutch . I t  has a l so been aimed at the Iriane se rather than the 
mi grant .  I rianese make up by far the large s t  proportion of s tudents 
at all levels  and now ge t the lion ' s  share of scholarships for tertiary 
and training insti tutes in Java and overseas. The policy i s  paying 
dividends in terms of i ncreasingly large numbers of Iriane se who 
speak Indone sian , not only i n  the towns where the lingua franca has 
always been pasar Me layu but in the Highlands and e l sewhere where 
Indone sian i s  the language of contac t a s  was pasar MeZayu under the 
Dutch . I thought the mos t  hope ful sign about students to whom I 
talked re cently in Jayapura, in Manokwari, in Merauke and in Sarong wa s 
tha t they saw their future in terms of I ndonesian va lue s ,  in terms 
of working the sys tem to their own bene fi t .  
I t  i s  too early to say for certain what e f fect the ' smi ling 
po licy ' i s  having . I t  certainly seems genuine enough . All thi rteen Iriane se 
technicians , graduate s of the Vocati onal Training Centre at Jayapura , 
arre sted at the Freepor t copper mine at Ternbagapura for involvement 
in the s lurry pipe attacks in July of last year have been released . 
Even more a s toni shing i s  the fac t tha t the army released Marthen Tabu 
a fter he mas termi nded the capture of a he licopte r containing Indones ian 
officia ls in January of last year , knowing that he mi ght sooner or 
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later re sume clande s tine OPM activi tie& which he did . Again ,  one 
of the principa l  OPM sympathizers i nvolved in the Tembagapura affair 
was a Dutch educated seminarian , Vicky Wamang . After he had been 
re leased from gaol , the admini s tration suppor ted his application to 
Freeport I ndonesia  for a j ob .  
To recapi tulate , the i ncorporation o f  Irian Jaya into the 
cul tural norms of the Republic wi ll  take time . I t  wi ll not be an 
easy proce s s  and there wi l l  be great tensions , but : 
Papua New Guine�s interests , Aus tralia ' s  no l e s s , and those 
o f  the I riane se wi l l  be be st served by a Papua New Guinea government 
policy of non i nterference in I rian Jaya ' s  problems . Any interference 
or ac tive di splay of sympathy leading to a recrudescence of pan 
Papuani sm wi ll  mee t  wi th I ndone sian hos ti l i ty and pol i ti cal action . 
I t  i s  very much in Papua New Guinea ' s  intere s ts to help as far a s  
pos sible I rian Jaya ' s  peace ful absorption into the Republic . 
The vir tual closure o f  the border , the OPM ' s  lack o f  arms , 
and its very smal l numbers imply that it  wil l  dec line in influence . 
I ts chi e f  achievemen ts in the past were i ts surprisingly e ffe c tive 
propaganda links wi th the I riane se communi ty i n  Port More sby . 
There i s  no civil OPM organization to speak of and i t  i s  
di f ficul t to see how i t  can operate . I t  i s  true that the OPM./GPL 
wri te s  and prints pamphlets , true that i t  has been able in the pas t  
to exploit outbreaks of  a more trad i tional kind , such a s  the Waghe te­
Ar fak uprisings and the Baliem di s turbances of 197 7 , and to orches trate 
last year ' s  attacks on the Freeport s lurry �ipe by di sgruntled 
vi l lagers . The s igns are that i t  i s  increasingly le s s  able to 
manipulate si tuations . I n  part too the ' smi ling policy ' i s  pos s ibly 
beginning to have some e f fect . 
Neverthe less  wi th the present rate of  outer i s land mi gration 
the middle term outlook i s  not reas suring . In  the long term the 
Iri ane se wi l l  be absorbed . The middle o f  the j ourney wi ll prove 
di fficul t and painful . One of the things tha t Aus tralia may expec t 
i s  the pos s ibi lity of boat people from the southwest. This, i f  i t  
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should occ ur , wi ll  need very sympathetic handl ing . 
Hi s tori cal perspectives? I have mentioned some , perhaps too 
few . I can bes t  give an idea of how di f ficult I believe i t  i s  to 
general i ze by saying that a short whi le ago I was in Fak Fak where 
I heard that a man I had once known was in pri son , pending release , 
for anti Indonesian activi ties. When I knew him nearly twenty years 
ago he was i n  the same pri son , held there by the Dutch , for anti 
Dutch ac tivi ties . 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL BORDERS WITH PARTICULAR 
REFERENCE TO THE CURRENT RE-NEGOTIATION OF THE 
INDONESIA-PAPUA NEW GU INEA AGREEMENT 
CONCERNING ADMINISTRATIVE BORDER ARRANGEMENTS 
J.R.V. Prescott 
The relations between modern states reach their mos t  
critical stage in the form o f  problems relating to 
terri tory . ( Hi l l  1976 : 3 ) 
There are no problems o f  boundaries . There are 
only problems of Nations . ( Ancel 1 9 3 8 : 196 ) 
These two quotations emphas i ze the importance o f  boundary 
questions and the fact that they are one part o f  the totality o f  
s tates ' relationship s . I t  would be equal ly true to say that there i s  
n o  boundary di sagreement which could not be readi ly solved given 
goodwi l l  on both sides , and tha t there is no boundary which would not 
furni sh a cause of di spute i f  one country wi shed to force a quarrel 
on another . 
Thi s  essay i s  divided into three mai n  sections . First , a short 
introductory pas sage identi fies the principal types o f  boundary 
di sputes . Secondly , each o f  these categories i s  examined in detail , 
and their occurence i n  the borderland between Indonesi a  and Papua New 
Guinea i s  considered . Thirdly , the conclusions of the second section 
are listed . 
Throughout thi s essay the terms boundary and border are used 
in their prec i se senses . A boundary i s  a line and a border i s  a 
zone i n  which a boundary i s  located . I t  would be possible to define 
the width of the border according to a number o f  di fferent cri teria ; 
i f  a particula r border wa s defi ned by an economi s t ,  an anthropo logi s t ,  
a geomorphologi st and a general i t  would be surpri s i ng i f  a l l  the 
limits selected coinc ided . 
The principal types of boundary disputes. 
The general term boundary dispute inc ludes four di s tinct 
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kirrls of disagreements between coun tries . Terri torial boundary disputes 
occur when one country finds part of the terri tory of an adj o i ning 
s tate attractive and seeks to a cquire i t .  Somalia ' s  claim to the Haud 
and Ogaden areas of Ethiopia and Guatemala's c laim to Bri tish Honduras 
provide examp les of such disputes . Positiona l boundary disputes occur 
when there i s  a disagreement over the exact location o f  the boundary , 
probably because of a controversy over the interpretation of a phrase 
in a treaty or over the correc t i ntention of parts of previous agree­
ments . The disagreement between China and Rus sia over the cour se of 
their boundary i n  the vic inity o f  the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri 
Rivers , and the quarrel between Argentina and Chi le concerning the 
location of their comm::>n boundary in the Beagle Channel provide examp les 
of posi tional boundary disputes . In terri torial and posi tional di sputes 
succes s for the claimant s tate wi l l  involve a change in the posi tion 
of the boundary and therefore the trans fer of some terri tory from one 
country to another . The amount o f  terri tory involved would usua l ly be 
les s in the case of a posi tiona l di spute than in the case o f  a 
terri torial di spute . 
Governments wi l l  normally find i t  :roc>s t convenient to apply certain 
functions , relating for example to immigration and trade , as  close to 
the international boundary a s  pos s ible . Sometimes the nature of these 
functions or the manner in which they are applied may give a neighbouring 
country cause for grievance . Di sagreements o f  this kind can be ca lled 
functiona l boundary disputes .  Iraq's occasional interference wi th 
Iranian shipping on the Shatt-el -Arab and Benin ' s  c losure of boundary 
crossing points into Togo in October 1 9 7 5  typefy such boundary di sputes. 
Because boundaries are lines they wi ll  of ten intersect discrete resources 
s uch as rivers or an oil  field which the countries on both sides of the 
boundary wi l l  wi sh to use . Conflict over the use of such features form 
a separate category of resource boundary disputes . The quarrel 
between India and Bangladesh over the diversion of Ganges waters at 
the Farraka Barrage i s  representa tive of thi s  kind of boundary di spute. 
In resource and functional boundary di sputes the c la imant state can 
be success ful wi thout any alteration in the location of the boundary ; 
i n  each.case what i s  sought i s  an agreed set of regulations which wi ll  
a lleviate the admini strative problem . 
14 
Territorial boundary disputes. 
Territorial boundary di sputes can be divided i nto two mai n  
c la s ses . Firs t there are legal di sputes when the c la imant country 
ins i sts that the territory desired is improper ly owned by i ts neighbour . 
The Phi lippines ' abandoned claim to par t  of Sabah and Kampuchea's c laim 
to the temple of Preah Vihear i n  Tha i la nd ,  which wa s upheld by the 
I nternational Court of Justice i n  1 96 2 , were both terri torial claims 
based on legal grounds . Secondly , there are a l l  the other cases when 
a country a sserts that i t  would be more appropriate i f  part o f  i ts 
neighbour ' s  territory pas sed to i ts own sovereignty . Uganda ' s  c laim 
to Tanzania ' s  Kagera Salient and the Argentine ' s  claim to the Falkland 
I s lands are typical o f  thi s large group of terri torial boundary di sputes . 
There are many grounds on whi ch countries wi l l  make c laims agai ns t the 
territory o f  neighbours ;  the arguments wi l l  be ba sed i n  hi s tory , i n  
geography , i n  economic s , and i n  ethnology . Usua l ly the c la im wi l l  be 
buttres sed by a s  many different arguments as  pos sible . For example , 
Afghani stan ' s  persistent territorial c la im to parts of wes tern 
Paki stan , which i s  thi nly vei led a s  support for a separate s tate of 
Pushtuni s tan , has at lea s t  four strands . First there are the legal 
and moral arguments that Afghani stan was forced to sign the 1 8 9 3  agree­
ment , whi ch produced the Durand Line , under duress. Secondly , his torical 
arguments are deployed to demonstrate that Afghani s tan once ruled over 
areas of wes t  Paki stan , and i t  i s  true that the Durrani Empire control led 
some of the c laimed area for seventy-s i x  years prior to 18 2 3 ,  when 
Peshawar was los t .  The third set of a rguments i s  based i n  the wi tness 
o f  ethnologi sts that Pathans in Afghani s tan and Pak i s tan form a single 
c ul tural group . Fi na l ly , i t  i s  a sserted on geographi cal grounds that 
the proper boundary of the Afghani s tan uplands lies c loser to the 
I ndus River, along the Sulaiman Range . 
Although i n  mo s t  cases when terri torial di sputes originate the 
c laimant s tate genuinely hopes and expects to acquire add i tional 
terri tory , there are cases when terri torial c laims are made to serve 
some domestic or international policy . Presi dents Nkrumah and Ami n , 
at different times , have made c la ims against Togo and Tanzania 
respectively , when it wa s obviously useful to di stract attention from 
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pres sing domestic problems o f  an economic and political nature . When 
the Phi lippines claimed parts o f  northern Sabah it was suggested by 
some observers that the chief desi gn was to delay the formation o f  
Malaysia . 
When the border between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea i s  
considered there does not appear to be any likely terri torial c laim 
from ei ther side . The agreement between Aus tralia and Indonesia on 
12 February 1 9 7 3 fixed the boundary in a c lear manner which does not 
a l low any territorial c laims . However , i t  should not be assumed that a 
c la im could not be manufactured by either side i f  changed poli tical 
c ircums tances warranted i t. Once it was fashionable to c la s s i fy boundaries 
into two ma j or classes called arti ficial boundaries and natural boundaries . 
Arti ficial boundaries included those which did not correspond wi th 
any of the ma j or divisions o f  the physical or cultural landscape , whi le 
natural boundaries were di stinguished by thei r coincidence wi th rivers 
or watersheds or lines o f  triba l separation . The fashion wa s abandoned 
because i t  was recognized that i t  was sti l l  necessary to select a 
spec i fi c  line wi thin the river or the watershed or the frontier between 
two tribes . Thi s realization underlines the point that in the vicini ty 
of a boundary there wi ll  be other limi ts which wi l l  be more or les s 
obvious . Some wi l l  concern the physical landscape of plants , geol�gical 
structure and hydrology , whi le other s  wi l l  relate to human occupance 
and include di f ferences in language , systems of land tenure , and patterns 
of trade . Because the present boundary formed by the two meridians and 
the Fly River do not correspond consi s tently with possible physical 
and human divi s ions in the border i t  would be possible for either country , 
by empha si zing one o f  these dividing zones , to call for a rec ti fication 
of the boundary . It could be argued by Indonesia , for examp le ,  that 
the admini s tration o f  the border would be simplified i f  more o f  the 
boundary was made to coincide wi th rivers , which form prominent features 
in the landscape . Thi s  as sertion could then be extended to the sugges tion 
that the boundary abandons the meridian 140° east when it inter sects 
the Alice River , and that that river is then fo l lowed by the boundary 
to i ts confluence wi th the Fly River and then the Fly River to boundary 
marked MMll ( see figure 4 )  . 
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The example j ust c i ted i s  entirely hypothet ical but it does 
i l lustrate the ease wi th which establi shed lines can be chal lenged i f  
a country feels that there are compelling reasons to do so . Those 
reasons might i nvolve the desire to provide an external focus for 
national sentiment or the desire to take advantage of the weakened 
condition of a neighbour or the desire s imply to show di spleasure wi th 
some policies and atti tudes bei ng adopted by a neighbour . 
It must a l so be recogni zed that population di s tributions sometimes 
change , and i f  a lien settlement occurs on a signi ficant sca le acro s s  
a boundary i t  can later provide the ground for a demand to redraw the 
boundary. It was the maj or immigration o f  Chilean workers to the 
guano and nitrate fields o f  southern Bol ivia which strengthened Chi le's 
determination to acqui re that area . 
A wi se government wi ll  prepare for all  eventualitie s , and because 
it i s  eas ier to collect evidence in periods of cordial re lations i t  
would seem sensible for both Indonesia and Papua New Guinea to accumula te 
any evidence which they might need to rebut any terri torial c laim . 
Murty ( 1 968 ) has provided a very i nteres ting account of the problems 
of col lecting and i nterpreting evidence concerni ng the location o f  
traditional boundaries  i n  the Sino-Indian border . The di spute between 
India and China and be tween the Argentine and Chi le have shown the 
importance whi ch the contending parti e s  attach to maps showing the 
ali gnment they favour . A portfolio o f  maps derived from archives and 
modern sources would be a useful weapon in the armoury of any country 
wi shing to re fute terri torial c laims. 
While there appears to be no present ri sk of e i ther side making 
a territorial c laim on land , the situation i n  the waters southwest 
of the mouth o f  the Bensbach River is less certain. The pre sent po si tion 
is that Papua New Guinea has inheri ted a seabed boundary wi th Indonesia 
which was drawn i n  two sections by tha t country and Aus tralia. A sho rt 
sec tion o f  boundary measuring 2 2  nautical mi les from the mouth o f  the 
Bensbach River was sett led in the 1 9 7 3  agreement ( see Bl-B 3  i n  figure 2 ) . 
The longer continuation , mea suring 1 3 2  nautica l mi les , wa s drawn as the 
seabed boundary between Indone sia and Austral ia in May 1971 . That segment 
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o f  boundary effectively became the boundary between I ndonesia and Papua 
New Guinea by the terms of the treaty between Austra lia and Papua 
New Guinea relating to Torres Strait ( Department of Foreign Affairs 
1978 ) . That treaty has not yet entered into force but there seems 
li ttle doubt that i t  wi l l  do so . Thi s compos i te seabed boundary between 
I ndonesia and Papua New Guinea lies very c lo se to the line o f  equidi stance 
based on Indonesi an terri tory on one side and the terri tory of Australia 
and Papua New Guinea on the bther side . A line of equidi s tance i s  a 
unique line which at every point i s  equidi s t�nt from the neares t points 
of the territory o f  the oppos i te or adj acent s tates . I n  effect such 
a line ensures that each country obtains the seabed and waters which 
are closer to portions of its terri tory than to the terri tory of any 
other country . 
From the point of view o f  national sovereignty counter c laims 
to mari time areas be ar direct compar ison to terri torial boundary 
di sputes considered earlier . There are two lines of argument whi ch 
I ndonesia could fol low in maki ng maritime c laims against Papua New 
Guinea southwest of the Bensbach River . First it could be stated that 
the seabed boundary agreed in 1 9 71 ( see Bl-A3 in figure 2 ) , depends 
on Australian c laims from Turu Cay , a tiny feature s tanding three feet 
above sea-level which i s  not inhabi ted . I t  could then be asserted that 
since 1971  there has been a s trong development in international opinion 
regarding the construction of mari time boundaries , in favour of the 
operation of equitable principles . Such principles would prevent the 
i solated speck o f  terri tory which i s  Turu Cay from playing a decisive 
role in es tabli shing the maritime boundary south o f  the mouth o f  the 
Bensbach River . Thi s argument direc ted agains t Papua New Gui nea would 
have some force because i t  was preci sely by the operation o f  such 
principles that Papua New Guinea obtained parts of the seabed and water s 
o f  Torres Strait which could have been claimed by Australia on the 
ground o f  equidistance . 
Even i f  Indonesia decided not to rai se any questions about the 
alignment o f  the seabed boundary i t  could sti l l  rai se another i s sue .  
The present boundary only applies to the seabed , i t  sti l l  remains to 
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draw a boundary separating the waters above the seabed. Where the 
seabed boundary i s  a line of equidis tance then the boundary dividing 
the waters would normally coincide wi th it . However , i n  thi s case i t  
would not be unreasonable for I ndonesia to i ns i s t  that the boundary 
through the waters i s  being drawn between I ndonesia and Papua New 
Guinea and that therefore the presence o f  any Australian i s lands , from 
whi ch Austra lia i s  only c laiming 3 nautical mi les of terri torial waters , 
should be di sco unted . I f  Turu Cay i s  di scounted the line o f  equidi stance 
between the terri tory of I ndonesia and Papua New Guinea would result 
i n  about 1 5 0 0  square nautical mi les of sea on the eastern side of the 
seabed boundary falling under I ndonesi an j uri sdiction . 
The agreement over Torres Stra i t already provi des a precedent for 
one country to have rights to the economic use o f  waters overlying the 
seabed of another country , and at present I ndonesi a  i s  i n s i s ti ng that 
the divi sion between the exc lusive economic zones o f  Aus tralia  and 
i tsel f must be drawn south of the seabed boundary agreed i n  1 9 7 2  i n  
the Timer Sea and the wes tern Arafura Sea . 
I t  i s  convenient at thi s  point to observe that there i s  no 
comparable problem connected wi th the maritime boundary between I ndonesi a  
and Papua New Guinea i n  the Pac i fic Ocean . The agreement i n  May 1 9 7 1  
defi ned a short section of seabed boundary measuring 30 nautical miles . 
I t  began where meridian 140° east intersects tLe coast and terminates 
at a point i denti fied as C 2  ( see figure 3 ) .  On 30 March 1 9 7 8  Papua 
New Guinea defi ned its maritime boundaries and extended the boundary 
northwards to the outer edge of i ts o f fshore seas , whi ch lie 200 
nautical miles from i ts baseli ne . 1 I t  appears that Papua New Guinea 
has c laimed less than the equidi stance princip le would permit ; however , 
part of the Offshore Seas Proc lamation 1978  of 3 0  March 1 9 7 8 , stipulates 
that where no agreement has been reached wi th other s tates the defined 
line i s  drawn wi thout prej udi ce to the ultimate location of the 
2 boundary. 
1 Papua New Guinea Nationa l Gaze tte G24 , 30 March 1 9 78 , pp 3-4 . 
2 Ibid p . 2. 
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Posi tiona l boundary disputes . 
Whi le the basic cause of terri torial boundary di sputes i s  
superimposi tion of the boundary o n  the cultura l or physical landscape , 
which al lows one or both s ides to canva s s  the greater merit o f  alterna tive 
lines , posi tional boundary disputes ari se because the evolution of the 
boundary is i ncomplete . I t  i s  a defec t in the defini tion of the boundary , 
in a text , on a map or in the landscape , which i s  critical in the case 
of posi tional di sputes . They wi ll  often arise during the proces s of 
demarcation when j oint survey teams are striving to match the boundary 
defined in a treaty text wi th the fea tures of the landscape . For example , 
the Anglo-Persian treaty o f  1896 s tipula ted that the boundary between 
the area s now known a s  I ran and Paki s tan would fol low the Tahlab River 
to i ts j unction with the Mir j awa River . Eight years later it was 
discovered that Tahlab and Mir j awa are two names for the same river 
and there i s  no point where usage changes from one to the other . Often 
the problems ari se because the boundary wa s defined by diploma ts in 
imperial capita l s , worki ng wi th inaccura te maps . Sometimes the errors 
ari se because of the errors on the map , on other occasions confusion i s  
created becaus� the diplomats tried to make a ssurance doubly sure and 
defined a single point in two ways which werP. found later to be qui te 
different . For example , the first boundary between Bolivia and Peru 
was defined as passing through the confluence of the Lanza and Tambopa ta 
Rivers which lay north of para l lel 1 4° sou th . The surveyors had no 
trouble finding the confluence , but unfortuna tely i t  wa s south of 14° 
south . 
Posi tional di sputes can a l so arise in situations where a boundary 
has been demarca ted thro
.
ugh an unpopulated border which subsequently 
becomes more intensively used . The movement of new settlers into a 
border and the use o f  virgin land c lo se to the boundary provide an acid 
tes t for the completenes s and accuracy of the boundary defini tion and 
demarca tion. 
Sometimes pos i tional boundary di sputes ari se because the line 
i s  made to coincide with some uns table feature i n  the landscape . Some 
river s make very poor boundaries because they tend to change their 
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cour s e  i n  two way s . First , river s can change thei r  cour se gradua lly 
and genera l ly imperceptibly , by accre tion and ero s ion . The downstream 
migration of meanders fa l l s  into thi s category . Secondly , river courses 
can be changed s uddenly by cutting through the neck of a meander . The 
firs t case doe s  not usually call for any special arrangements because 
over the long term both s ides wi l l  lose and gain approximate ly equal 
areas . However ,  in the second case the area o f  land enc losed by the 
meander i s  suddenly swi tched from one side of the river to the other . 
I t  i s  then a nice poi nt to decide whether the boundary fol lows the new 
cour se of the river or continues to follow the abandoned course . The 
que s tion of river i s lands can a l so be di fficult beca use the depo si tion 
of s i lt wi ll  sometime s  j oin i s lands to one of the bank s . Thi s  latter 
problem has been particularly serious on the River Mekong where i t  
forms the boundary between Thai land and Laos . The Franco-Tha i treaty 
o f  1893  gave France ti tle to all the i s lands in the river and problems 
of  j uri sdiction arose when some o f  the i s lands became attached to the 
Thai bank through the deposi tion of alluvium . A commi s sion was 
e s tabl ished in 1 9 2 6  to rule on a l l  future problems o f  thi s  na ture but 
the decolonizatj on of Inda-China and the determination of Lao s  to own 
all  the i slands , as France did be fore it , ha s caused a fre sh round of 
problems . 
Many boundary archit ec ts have been decei ved by apparently exac t 
representa tion of rivers on maps and have dec ided that such precise  
fea tures would make excel lent boundaries . Unfortunately the actual 
rivers po ssess  a width which makes i t  nec e s sary to select some pa rticular 
line wi thin the river . Lines which can and have been used in rivers 
include the bank , the line of equidi stance or median li ne, and the 
tha lweg . I f  a bank i s  used then the entire river be longs to a single 
country , but an added disadvantage is tha t wa ter leve l s  change and so 
doe s  the pos i tion of the bank . Further , the banks of some rivers in 
very flat country might merge into swamps be fore reaching firm ground . 
The median line can be eas i ly constructed i f  the bank s are clearly 
defined , but of course the line wi ll  change in loca tion a s -. the bank s 
are eroded or extended by alluvia l deposi tion . Furthe r, the median 
line mi ght intersect the navigable channel of the river and create 
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problems for commercial use. The thalweg i s  the line o f  the deepest 
continuous channel i n  the river. Whi le thi s line wi ll  al so change i t  
does mean that countries o n  both sides wi ll b e  able to claim navigation 
rights for thei r citi zens. 
Turning now to the boundary between I ndonesia and Papua New 
Guinea i t  seems that the only s cope for a posi tional boundary di spute 
concerns the section of the Fly River used for the international 
boundary. The meridians north and south o f  the Fly River have been 
marked by ten and four monuments respectively. The maximum distance 
between any two markers i s  the 56 nautical mi les between monuments MMll 
and MM12 ( see figure 4 ) . Such a di stance would mean that i t  would be 
di ffi cult for a farmer to know exactly where the boundary lay i n  the 
intervening area , but i t  i s  understood that all maj or tracks have 
been signposted and the exact location of each adj acent vi l lage has 
been computed . Modern survey techniques would make it a comparatively 
easy matter to fix more monuments on the line i f  that was deemed 
essential. The 197 3 agreement defines the boundary along the Fly 
River as the wate'P7JX1y , which i s  shown in parentheses to be the thaZweg . 
The distance between monuments MMlO and MMll , whi ch mark the termini 
o f  the sec tion of the Fly River which forms the boundary , i s  34 
nauti cal mi les , but the course of river wi ll be much longer because it 
meanders widely over the flat , marshy plain ( see figure 5 ) . Maps o f  
the region show very clearly the abandoned meanders along the river ' s  
course , and in some ca ses the boundary has moved as much as 3 . 5  
kilometres when the neck o f  a meander was breached ( see the meander 
marked B on figure 6 ) . The map evidence suggests that the Fly River 
has an unstable course which makes i t  unsui table for use as an inter­
national boundary. I f  the border in the vicinity o f  the river ever 
became intensively used i t  would prove to be a very di fficult line to 
. 1 moni tor. The maps suggest that the river contains few islands whi ch 
1 
Duri ng di scussion o f  Dr Pre scott ' s  paper it was observed that the 
Fly River could be intensively used i f  plans went ahead to exploit 
the Ok Tedi copper-go ld deposi t in the Star Mountains o f  Papua New 
Guinea and to transport the ore by barge down the Fly . An early 
feasibi l i ty study has recommended the breaching of meanders to 
faci li tate navigation . (Ed . ) 
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wil l  reduce the problems caused , but i t  would be necessary to examine 
large scale air-photographs to confi rm thi s point . 
Funetiona, l boundary disputes .  
A functional boundary di spute i s  crea ted when one country ' s  
authorities decide that national interes ts have been adversely and 
unfairly affected by the ac tivi ties of a neighbouring country along the 
boundary . These activi ties wi ll  obviously be concerned wi th movement 
across the boundary o f  people , or stock , or goods , or idea s , and the 
complaint can take two ma j or forms . I n  the first case the plaint i f f  
sta te might consider tha t i ts neighbour i s  unrea sonably inter fering wi th 
trans-boundary movements . For example , Pakistan , in  retaliation against 
Afghani stan ' s  support for the Pathan secessioni st movement , required 
Powinda herder s to produce certi ficates o f  hea lth for their animals 
be fore admitting them on their annual transhumance movement to the 
I ndus plains at the beginning of winter . I t  proved impos s ible to 
sati s fy thi s new regulation and the Powindas and their herds had to 
winter in Afghanis tan . More recently Tanzania has prevented Kenyan 
lorries from operating between Kenya and Zambia along the roads 
through the west of Tanzania . Tanzania c laims that thi s heavy tra ffic 
is  damaging i ts unsealed roads ; Kenya believes that Tanzania is 
unwi ll ing to see Zambia ' s  dependence on Dar es Salaam reduced . The 
imposi tion o f  tari ffs i s  another device by which one country can 
hinder trans -boundary trade ; whi le the wi thholding o f  work -permi ts 
is one method of obstructing immigration into a coun try . 
I n  the second case the plainti ff country mi ght be di ssati s fied 
because its nei ghbour i s  not preventing i l lega l trans -boundary move­
ments . For example , in the last year the export earnings of both Uganda 
and the Central African Empire were serious ly reduced because diamonds , 
cotton, cocoa and coffee were smuggled out and sold in nei ghbouring 
countries . Countries might a l so complain i f  a neighbour fai l s  to enforce 
health standards whi ch result in animal or human di seases being intro­
duced across the boundary , or fai l s  to prevent a flood o f  refugees into 
the plainti ff ' s  part o f  the border . Some of the mos t  serious func tional 
28 
boundary di spute s arise when one country fai ls  to prevent i ts border 
being used as a ba se for di ssidents attacking the authori ty across 
the boundary . Such at tacks may be launched a s  mi litary campaigns in 
the s tyle of  the POLI SARIO raids into Mauritania from Algeria , or they 
may simply be propaganda attacks by radio transmi tters . 
Functional boundary disputes have not a ttracted the interest of  
scho lar s to the same extent as territoria l or pos i tional di spute s .  
This  situation may b e  due either to the prompt settlement o f  most · 
functional di spute s or to the fac t tha t serious and persi s tent functional 
disputes occur only be tween hostile countries which display their 
antagoni sm in more obvious and often more threateni ng ways . I t  seems 
l ikely that the chance o f  func tional di sputes  deve loping wi ll  be greate s t  
when the tra ffic across the boundary i s  mainly in one direction , whe ther 
it is legal or i l lega l . This  i s  be cause in  such si tuat ions there wi ll  
be l i ttle or no opportuni ty for retaliation by the plainti f f  sta te . 
I f  there i s  a flouri shing tra ffic in both direct ions acro s s  the boundary 
any country which consider s i ts e l f  to be adverse ly affected by i ts 
nei ghbour ' s  actions in  the border can adopt similar measures . The 
introduction of new regulations or the more s tringent applicat ion of  
exi s ting rules which precip i ta te func tional di sputes , wi ll o ften be made 
for sound s tra tegic or economic rea sons � However , i t  i s  also possible 
tha t they may be introduced or intens i fied in order to show di spleasure 
wi th the policies or at ti tudes of a neighbouring country . 
While i t  is  possible to speculate intelligently about the 
possibi lity of  territorial or pos i tional di spute s developing by s tudying 
the texts o f  treaties , large scale maps and air photographs , and by 
applying current and deve loping rules about the construc tion of  
mari time boundaries , there are no substi tute s for rigorous fieldwork 
i n  identi fying functional di spute s . From conversa tions wi th people 
fami l iar wi th the border and from pres s  and radio reports i t  appears 
that the problem mos t  likely to produce func tional di spute s concerns 
the flight of  di ssidents from Iri an Jaya into Papua New Guinea . I t  does 
not appear tha t the numbers involved would crea te serious logi s tic 
problems for the authorities of Papua New Guinea , as  the movement of 
re fugee s into Thailand and into Bangladesh have for the governments of 
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those countries . I t  therefore seems pos sible tha t I ndonesia would be 
the p lainti ff s ta te on one of two grounds . The I ndone sian admi ni s tration 
mi ght argue that o fficials  in Papua New Gui nea should prevent di ssidents 
from cros sing into their country so that I ndonesian mi li ta ry sweeps 
against such groups could be more e f fective . Alterna tive ly i t  might 
be argued that the officia l s  of Papua New Guinea should be more diligent 
in s toppi ng di s sidents from re-entering I ndone sia a fter a soj ourn in 
Papua New Guinea . 
Any research programme seeking to establish the exi stence o f  
functional di sputes , o r  the likelihood o f  any deve loping , would need 
to col lect informa tion on the number o f  c rossing poi nts ; the tra ffic 
across each point ; the extent o f  trans-boundary landholdings in  the 
border ; the po ssibi lity of any part o f  the border experiencing rapid 
economi c development ; and the regulations governing border acti vi ties 
and the manner in which they are applied . The fact tha t Dr Mochtar has 
described the pre sent agreement as  ' very rudimentary ' sugge s ts tha t 
there are functional problems which I ndonesia seeks to a l leviate . 
Resource boundary disputes . 
Not a l l  trans -boundary resources wil l  provi de possible causes 
of re source boundary di sputes . For examp le , i t  i s  un like ly tha t a 
va luable ,  pure stand of hardwoods whi ch straddled the boundary would 
cause any di fficulties , providing the exac t posi tion of the boundary 
was known . The mi ning of ore bodi es in the border wi l l  only ca ll for 
cooperation and discuss ion when the construc tion of sha fts and ga lleries 
mi ght produce drainage or flooding problems for a mine on the other 
side of the boundary . The mos t  common source of resource boundary 
di sputes are wa ter bodies , such as lakes or rivers , which mark or 
cross the boundary . Two main cases can be di stingui shed . First there 
are those si tuations where the boundary is drawn through the lake or 
a long the river In that case each state ha s equa l access to the same 
stretch of the river or lake for navi gation , fi shi ng , wa ter supplies 
and irrigation . It i s  usual for treati e s  producing such boundari e s  to 
stipulate tha t each side ha s equa l rights to use the river or lake , but 
that such use must not be to the detriment of the other user . Pla i nly 
any country which a llowed a breakwater to be construc ted into a river 
without consultation with its neighbour runs the risk of fomenting 
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a di spute if the a ltered flow of  the water begins to erode the neighbour ' s 
bank . Equa l ly it would be aga i ns t  the terms of the general c lause 
de scribed above if one country al lowed deve lopments along a tributary 
of a boundary river to pol l ute that boundary river and perhaps spoil  
the f i shing for people on both banks . 
The second s itua tion arises when the river basin i s  divided by 
the boundary and the s tate s  have successive use o f  the waters . In such 
a si tua tion the down s tream state can adver sely a ffec t the upstream 
country by bui ldi ng a dam which floods back into the neighbour ' s  
terri tory . Such f looding wi l l  reduce the nei ghbour ' s  capaci ty to 
use that land . The construc tion of the Aswan High Dam resul ted i n  flood­
ing in the Sudane se border and the Egyptian government agreed to share 
the cost of resettli ng those vi llagers whose lands were inundated . 
The downs tream country can be adversely affected i f  the ups tream state 
bui lds a dam which alters the regime of the river or diverts large 
volumes for irrigation , which reduces the flow in the lower sec tions . 
When Kariba Dam wa s built i t  wa s necessary for what are now Zambia 
and Zimbabwe Rhodesia to guarantee a minimum flow along the Zambezi 
into Mozambique . Many international agreements have been reached to 
deal wi th the succe s sive owner ship of rivers ; the I ndus Waters Agreement 
shows tha t even countries which exhibit a high leve l of mutual suspicion , 
such as  I ndia and Paki stan , can reach a sati s factory solution to thi s  
kind of problem . 
The other obvious resource which could create problems i s  a 
hydrocarbon deposit of na tura l ga s or crude petroleum . Such a deposi t ,  
given the right structural condi tions could be tapped from e i ther side 
of the boundary . For thi s  reason most current seabed boundary agreements 
require consultation be tween the parti es if any hydrocarbon depo sit  i s  
found to straddle the boundary . I n  some cases this consul tation i s  
required for any deposit found wi thi n a set di stance of the boundary . 
Once again ,  it would only be possible to analyse the risk of 
resource boundary di spute s in the vi cinity of the I ndone sia -Papua New 
Guinea boundary after detailed fieldwork to e s tabl i sh the economi c 
activities i n  the border which might damage boundary rivers or the use 
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o f  a common ore body o r  hydrocarbon fie ld . 1 I n  pursuing thi s  fi� ldwork 
i t  would be necessary to look beyond the border in some cases . For 
e xample , it is possible that a programme of e xtensive fe lling of timber 
in the headwate rs of the Sepik River on the Indone sian side of the 
boundary could incre ase the rate o f  run-off to a leve l  which would have 
consequences for the lower reache s of the river remo te from the border . 
Conc lusions . 
Thi s review o f  the four type s o f  boundary di spute s sugge sts a 
number o f  conclusions regarding the I ndonesia-Papua New Guinea border .  
Fi rst , the only pos sible , inune di ate territorial boundary di spute concerns 
waters and perhaps the seabed southwe st o f  the Bensbach River . I ndone sia 
has a fairly strong argument that Papua New Guinea should not be allowed 
to pro fi t  at I ndonesi a ' s  e xpense by basing the common maritime boundary 
on Turu Cay , a small , i solated i sland belonging to Australia which that 
country only use s to claim a zone o f  terri torial waters 3 nautical 
mi les wide . Secondly , the re is unl ikely to be any te rri torial di spute 
on land unle s s  the re i s  a dramatic worseni ng o f  relations between the 
two countri e s . S uch a c laim would have to be ba sed on the hi story and 
ethnography of the border , and both administrations would be wi se to 
collect as much information as i s  necessary to re fute any claims which 
mi ght be made . Thirdly , the central course o f  the Fly River , whi ch forms 
part of the i nte rnational boundary , represents the only probable cause 
o f  a posi tional boundary di spute . It would only ari se i f  that part of 
the val ley was sub j e c t  to more i ntensive economic deve lopment . Fourthly , 
the nature of any functional or resource boundary di sputes wi l l  be 
e stabli shed only by detai led fieldwork . The present apparent functional 
di spute is related to the flight o f  pol i t i ca l  di s s i dents from Indonesia 
to Papua New Guinea and the i r  activities i n  the border . The only probable 
re source di spute is likely to concern those rivers whi ch are shared or 
divi ded by the two countrie s . 
1 
In the course o f  di scus sion of Dr Pre s cott ' s  paper re ferences were 
made to the possibi l i ty of re source boundary dispute s ari sing from 
explo i tation of the Ok Tedi copper-gold deposi t .  Pos sible points 
of contention include river pollution associated with the proposed 
mining operation and e f fects down s tream o f  sugge sted breaching o f  
meanders of the Fly River ( see footnote p . 24 ) . There i s  a l so the 
pos sibi lity of other ore bodie s  in thi s  area extending to both sides 
of the borde r .  (Ed . ) 
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Given the undeveloped nature of much o f  thi s border i t  i s  
surprising tha t the exi s ting agreement has not worked sat i s fac tori ly , 
i n  view o f  the provi sion which i t  makes for j oint consul ta tion at 
various leve l s  o f  government . Papua New Guinea , a s  the sma l ler country , 
would be wi se to ensure that a l l  outs tanding que s tions are c leared up 
during the present negotia tions , even if thi s  involve s  conce s s ions in 
a number of matters .  
THE ' JU S UF L I NE ' : 
BEG I NN I NGS OF A MORE F RU I TFUL P HAS E ?  
Rex Mor t imer 
I ndonesia ' s  approach to the problem o f  securing and de fusing 
i ts border wi th Papua New Guinea underwent a maj or reappraisal in 1 9 78 , 
re sul ting in the adoption o f  more flexible policies towards the Irianese 
population and more speci fically the armed di s sidents of  the OPM . The 
new policies have impor tant implications for I ndone sia ' s  relations wi th 
Papua New Gui nea , and thi s  paper wi l l  try to unravel the rationale 
behi nd Jakarta ' s  policy revi s ion , examine the likely impact on Papua 
New Guinea , and assess  the longer term pro spec ts for the success of the 
new approach . 
From Indone sia ' s  point of view , the border si tuation and 
attendant problems had been deteriorating s teadily for severa l years 
prior to mid 1 9 78 . The root of  the problem , in  Jakarta ' s  eyes , lay 
across the border in Papua New Guinea . Despi te the Papua New Gui nea 
government ' s  forma l adherence to the border agreement reached wi th 
1 
Indonesia in 1 97 3 , border controls were not working e f fective ly to 
limi t the ac tivi ties of  the OPM gueri l la s , who we re able to cross 
vi rtually at wi ll  to evade I ndones ian operations agai nst them , establ ish 
more or less permanent ba ses inside Papua New Gui nea territory , and 
maintain a courier and intelligence network , all o f  whi ch together 
contributed signi ficantly to their abi li ty to hara ss Indonesian patrols 
and insta l lations . Beyond the border management i ssue i tse lf , the Papua 
New Guinea government was unable or unwi lling to re spond as Indone sia 
wi shed to reques ts for the return o f  pol i tical refugees seeking 
sanctuary ins ide Papua New Guinea borders , or for fi rmer re s traints upon 
the political activities of  I rianese re sidents of  Papua New Guinea . 
l The agreement i s  reproduced as appendi x 1 to thi s  volume . 
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Large ly a s  a result of these delinquencies on the par t o f  Papua 
New Gui nea , mi l i tary uni ts of the OPM were growing bolder and more 
s ucce s s ful in their attacks upon Indonesian authori ty . Early in 1 9 7 7  
they ambushed an Indonesian patro l , killing seven soldiers .
1 
F o r  se�eral 
months of the same year , they provided leadership to a ma j or uprising 
by tribe smen in the Baliem Val ley , which required energetic measure s for 
i ts suppre ssion . 2 Thi s in turn wa s fol lowed by acts of sabotage against 
the Freeport copper mine at Ternbagapura and its  pipeline to the south 
coa s t  of I rian Jaya .
3 
Finally , in May 1 9 78 , an OPM uni t ambushed and 
kidnapped member s  of an Indones ian negotiating mi ss ion , k i l ling two of  
them and ultimately forcing the authori ties to under take a humi liating 
exerc ise in order to gain the re lease of the remainder . 4 
These incidents not only indicated a new level of  boldness on 
the part of  the OPM but a l so gave the rebel s  international public i ty 
on a scale unknown since the ' Ac t  of  Free Choice ' in 1969 , an opportunity 
which the OPM was able to capita l i ze upon wi th new and more e f fective 
propaganda outlets ba sed in Port Moresby and regular ly providing the 
media wi th i ts news and views . The possibi l i ty could not be di smi ssed 
in Jakarta that a continua tion of this trend in rebel ac tivi ty would 
cause I ndonesia o fficial embarras sment overseas and even a ttract 
material support for the rebel c ause from revolutionary regimes in Asia 
or Africa . Coming so c losely on top o f  the unhappy East Timor affair , 
these prospects were di s tinctly unwelcome to Jakarta . 
Although Indonesia regarded Papua New Gui nean policies as  the 
key to the border control problem - and consequentially to the reduc tion 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Confide ntial information from I ndone sian official source . 
Hami sh McDonald ,  ' Looking Back at Irian Upr ising ' , Sydney Morning 
Hera ld 7 December 1977 . 
Ibid. 
John Waugh , ' Irian Jaya Rebe l s  Ki ll Two o f  the ir Hostage s ' , Sydney 
Morning Hera ld 2 Augu st 1977 . 
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of  OPM strength a nd mobi lity - Jakar ta wa s aware of  the di fficul ti e s  
faced by the Papua New Gui nea gover nment a nd hence of the need for 
re straint and patience on it s par t in securing the k i nd of cooperat ion 
required to improve the si tuation . It well  knew tha t large number s of  
the po litica l public i n  Papua New Guinea were fearful a nd suspicious of  
I ndone sia , that they resented the forcible absorption of  Iria n  Jaya , 
a nd tha t they e spoused a mys tique of  ' Me la ne sian uni ty '  which made them 
1 
highly sympathetic to the rebe l cause acro s s  the border . I t  was also 
ful ly aware of the fragi le charac ter of the Somare coalition governments 
be tween 1 9 7 2  a nd 1 9 7 7 , the formidable problems which tho se governme nts 
faced i n  the transition to a nd consolidat ion of  i ndependenc e ,  and the 
manner in which internal conflicts tended repea tedly to become embroi led 
with the I r i a nese i s sue . 
I n  thi s context , despi te considerable irr itation wi th Papua New 
Gui nea fai li ngs , the most importan t  fac tor for Jakarta wa s tha t Papua 
New Guinean leaders ,  i n  particular Somare a nd the foreign mi ni ster Sir 
Maori Kiki , strove to pac ify anti I ndones ian elements in cabi net a nd 
constantly reiterated their determination to prevent the use of  the 
border a nd Papua New Guinea territory general ly by OPM guerillas a nd their 
Iriane se sympathi zers resident in Papua New Gui nea . While these efforts 
resulted i n  lit tle positive ac tion , they provided I ndonesia wi th 
lever s to keep pres sure upon the Papua New Gui nea government to live up 
to its promi ses . More crucially , they e nabled Jakarta to adhere to a 
policy of  suppor ting governmen ta l  s tabi l i ty in Papua New Gui nea . I have 
no doubt that if the Papua New Guinea government had opted for ope n  
o r  covert hosti lity towards I ndone s ia , the lat ter would eventually have 
sought to crea te trouble for it by a comb i na tion of externa l hara ssmen t  
a nd i nternal di sruption , but this would have been undertaken faute de 
m�eux . I ndones ia ' s  be st approach ha s always lain in consol ida ti ng 
governmental capacity in Papua New Gui nea , since effec tive border manage­
men t ,  and deriva tively the pac i fication of  Irian Jaya , demand stable 
1 For a more extensive treatment of Papua New Guinean attitudes toward s 
I ndone sia and the Irianese , see Mortimer ( 19 7 6 ) . 
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admini strative and mi litary pre sences  on both sides of the border . 
Indonesia ' s  commi tment to this approach was demonstrated from the outset 
of Papua New Gui nea ' s  independence by the level and s i ze of i ts diplomatic 
representat ion in Por t Moresby , a nd has been confirmed many time s s ince 
then by assuranc e s  to the Papua New Gui nea government and to Australia , 
whose good - offices Jakar ta has used frequently to sor t out difficulties 
wi th Papua New Guinea and have i ts requirements transmi tted quie tly but 
pointedly . 
Indonesia ' s  pat ience began to be rewarded wi th the re turn of the 
Somare government wi th an enlarged ma j ori ty in July 1 9 7 7 . Mr Somare ' s  
authority and self -confidence had already been enhanced by the success ful 
purge of the ' left  wing ' executive of the Pangu par ty in 1976 , and the 
solution ( for the time be ing at lea st )  of the country ' s  mos t  volatile 
i s sue - that o f  regiona l unrest - through the introduction of  provinc ial 
governments . Fol lowi ng the 1 9 7 7  e lection , he began to act far more 
dec i sively a s  prime mini ster , a s s i s ted in the sphere of foreign rela tions 
by the able and ambitious Ebia Olewa le . (Like mo s t  Papua New Gui nean 
poli ticians , Mr Olewale has a pa s t  hi s tory o f  opposi tion to Indonesia 
on the Irian i s sue , but - again typ ica lly - once i n  office he ha s 
implemented government policy energetically . )  
As far a s  we can j udge without direct access to the records , the 
ini tial breakthrough leading to Jakarta ' s  changed approach to the Irian 
Jaya problem appears to have come duri ng talks held among Papua New 
Guinean, Australian and I ndonesian offic ia ls  in December 197 7 . Both 
Somare and Olewa le had been convinced for some time that Papua New Guinea 
had to do something to s tem the deteriora ting border si tuation , wi th 
its potential for serious di scord with Indonesia and escalating internal 
confl i c t  in Papua New Gui nea i tse lf . They were a l so of the opinion , 
1 
a s  were Austra l ian o ffic ials whom they consulted , tha t the position 
1 The extent of  Austra lia ' s  role i n  the border i ssue cannot be fully 
known wi thout access to Foreign Affairs and diplomatic files , but 
many sources ( i nc luding confidential information passed to me ) indica te 
that it has been considerable . One would l ike to know the considerations 
behind Tom Cr it chley ' s  trans fer from Por t More sby to Jakar ta . 
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of the government wa s now s trong enough t o  enable i t  to act upon i ts 
verba l under takings to tighten up on border controls and OPM ac tivi ties 
inside Papua New Guinea . Their disposition to act may we l l  have been 
s timulated by the revelation of the lack of governmental coordinat ion -
and possibly more serious problems - di sclosed by the so-called ' Diro 
Affair ' : 1 
The new level o f  Papua New Guinea - I ndonesian cooperation on the 
border was vividly revealed in June 1978 when Papua New Guinea defence 
forces for the first time undertook large sca le opera tions fully 
coordinated wi th an I ndonesian of fensive against the Ir ianese rebe l s . 
The j oint operation resul ted i n  a signi ficant weakeni ng of rebel capaci ty ;  
although the guerillas narrowly avoided being trapped be tween the two 
armies , and suffered few direct casualtie s ,  their force s were dispersed 
and vi tal supplies captured or destroyed , their sanctuari es in  Papua 
New Guinea were overrun and rendered unsafe for the future , and a number 
o f  friendly vi llage s in Irian Jaya were savage ly puni shed . Jus t a s  
important as  the opera tion i tself wa s the dennnstration i t  provided that 
Papua New Guinea ' s  new hard line agains t  the OPM wa s pol i tically viable . 
Desp i te protes ts i nside and out side par l iament , the Somare government 
was able to carry through i ts policy wi th no more concession to i ts 
cri tics than an expre ssion of concern at I ndonesian violations o f  Papua 
New Guinea terri tory during the mili tary operations .
2 
1 
2 
I n  the light of this experienc e , the Papua New Gui nea government 
Brigadi er-General Diro , commander-in-c hief o f  the Papua New Gui nea 
Defence Forces ,  had ta lks wi th OPM leader Seth Rumkorem in the latter 
part of 1 9 7 7 , apparently wi th the knowledge of the minister of defence 
but not that of Mr Somare or the ma j or i ty of cabinet . Genera l Diro ' s  
carpeting over the affair , and his vigorous ripos te (backed up by Papua 
New Guinea and Aus tralian of ficers under hi s command ) created a minor 
cri s i s  in Por t Moresby at the time , revea ling deep divi s ions in  
cabinet and the top levels of the administra tion . See i ssues of the 
Post-Courier October 19 7 7 . 
For an account of the operations and their results , see Far Eastern 
Economic Review 4 August 197 8 . 
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wa s abl e  to enforce more pos i tive sanc tions aga i nst rebel activity inside 
Papua New Gui nea . Refugee s  were now scrutinized more rigorously and 
active opponents of I ndonesia among border crossers were re turned to 
I ndonesian custody . I n  September came the mos t  drama tic event of  a l l  -
the arrest of  OPM leader Jacob Prai and two a s sociates at Vanimo , j us t  
across the. border from Jayapura . De spi te a renewed wave of  prote s ts , the 
Papua New Guinea government again s tood firm and held Pra i  in gaol for 
1 nearly six months unti l he was granted a sylum i n  Sweden . In  the same 
period , the permi ss ive a tti tude towards Irianese pol i tical agi ta tion 
agains t  I ndonesia i n  Papua New Guinea was rep laced by close surveil lance 
and s tern inj unctions to the offenders . The extent of  Papua New Gui nea ' s  
new effec tivenes s  against the OPM - and hence i ts usefulne s s  to Indone sia -
could be measured by the s tate of  mind among OPM supporters i n  Port 
Moresby by the end of 1 9 7 8 . Defea ti s t  and rent by feuding fac tions , 
their animus against the Papua New Guinea government wa s so i ntense that 
there was wi ld ta lk among them o f  terrori s t  attacks upon their hos ts . 2 
By year ' s  end , then , the Papua New Gui nea government had given 
Indone sia subs tantial evidenc e both of the sincerity of  i ts des ire to 
coopera te in sani tizing the border and of  i ts capac i ty to do so � I t  
i s  in thi s  light that Jakar ta ' s  new line in Irian Jaya must b e  apprai sed . 
The firs t  i ndica tion o f  the change was contai ned in speeches delivered 
by the Indonesian defence mini s ter , General Jusuf , on successi ve days 
in November 1978 , the first one in Jayapura and the second in South 
Sulawesi . Jusuf announced that Indone sia would des i s t  from i ts direc t 
a s saults upon Irianese culture and al low the people to adj us t more 
slowly to the norms o f  Indonesian civi li zation .  At the same time , he 
s tated that in future the OPM rebe ls would be treated as the mi nor 
nui sance they consti tuted in fac t .  Indone sia would no longer engage i n  
ma j or operations against the rebe l s ; instead , i t  would confine i ts 
mi l i tary activi ties  to routine border patrolling and security duties , 
leavi ng the gueri llas e i ther to rot in the j ungle or accept in their own 
good time the generous clemency terms Indonesia wa s prepared to off er 
3 
them . 
1 
2 
3 
For a brief summary of the Prai affair , see Far Eas tern Economic 
Review 2 3  March 1979 . 
My own sources . 
Far Eastern Economic Review 2 4  November 1 9 7 8 . 
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Pre s s  comment on the Jusuf initia tive ha s tended to concentra te 
upon the defence mini ster ' s  ' new broom ' and per sona l  qua li ties . Wi thout 
derogating from Jusuf ' s  accompl i shments , however , i t  is c lear from the 
background we have surveyed that Jakar ta ' s  po licy revi sion is the 
c ulmi na tion of those events , and represents no t merely modi fica tions in  
the trea tment of  Irianese but a ' pay-off ' to Papua New Guinea for i ts 
cooperativeness of the pas t  year . I f  a l l  goe s  wel l  under the new 
di spensation , Papua New Gui nea should not be called upon to undertake 
further ma j or mi l i tary operations embarras s i ngly associated wi th I ndonesian 
offensives ; there should be less border crossing by OPM ef fec tives , and 
less nec es s i ty for the latter to set  up ba ses on Papua New Guinea so il . 
Papua New Guinea ' s  re sponsibi l i ties wi l l  be more routine in  character , 
concentrated upon border patrolling and the checking of  Irianese 
ac tivi ties inside Papua New Guinea . I n  turn , a lower Papua New Guinea 
pro fi l e  on the Irianese i ssue should moderate domes tic opposi tion in this  
area . 
Indone sia ' s  gains wi l l  be no l e s s  substantial i f  the policy 
works . Havi ng abandoned i ts a ttempts to achieve total control in Ir ian 
Jaya , moderated i ts assaults on Irianese l i feways , and se ttled for a 
rea l i s tic assessment of  i ts nationa l  i nteres t and OPM margina l i ty ,  i t  
wi l l  suffer fewer manpower losses , save a good dea l of unneces sary 
expense , and sti ll  internationa l di squiet about i ts rule in Irian . 
For both parties , the new policy opens up the prospec t of  
expanded relations upon a more cons tructive bas i s  and wi th less  resi s tance 
from cri tics  and sceptic s  in  both camp s . Already last December , foreign 
mi ns ter Kusumaatmadj a ' s  vi s i t  to Por t  More sby , where he confirmed Jusuf ' s  
interpretation o f  the new line in  I rian Jaya , appears to have gone off  
1 
we ll . In January thi s year , di scussions began on a new border agreement 
to replace the expiring one of  197 3 ,  and prel iminary repor ts sugge s t  
that on thi s occasion posi tive programmes fur deve lopment a long the border 
are being di s cussed .
2 
1 Far Eastern Economic Review 2 3  March 1979 . 
2 Ibid. 
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I t  s ti l l  rema ins to be seen whether the new line wi l l  stick , 
however . I n  the long term , I ndones ia can probably count upon i nduced 
demographic changes �n Irian Jaya to consol idate i ts pos i tion in the 
provinc e . On pre sent trends , inuni gration i nto the province from other 
parts of  I ndonesia wi l l  wi thin a decade overwhe lm the indigenous i nhabi tants 
in the co�s ta l areas and provide the c entral authorities wi th a powerful 
loyali s t  communi ty to rely upon for the maintenance of contro l . 1 The 
hi nterland wi l l  remain a source of instabi l i ty, but wi th I ndones ia able 
to bui ld up a local (mi xed imrni grant and Iriane se )  c ivilian and mi l i tary 
peacekeeping force and wi th improved logi s ti c s , trouble there can 
probably be contai ned if not elimi nated . ( Irian Jaya ' s  highlands are 
not a s  crucial for I ndonesia a s  those eas t  of the border are for Papua 
New Guinea . )  
I n  the medium term , however , trouble for the new di spensation 
could come from either side of the border . In Irian , the rebe ls are 
down but not out , and i f  they can overcome their pol i tical di sabi l i ti e s  -
always , i n  my opi nion , their mo s t  serious weaknes s  - they could once 
more capi ta l i ze upon I rianese disenchantment wi th I ndonesian economic , 
cultural and demographic modes o f  domina tion . One paradox of the kind 
of pol icy now adopted by I ndonesia i s  that the more i t  succeeds in the 
short run , the more i t  tends to breed laxi ty and complacency among tho se 
on both s ides of the border who are responsible for the routine 
patrolling and security which the policy assume s to be a cons tant 
accompaniment of i t .  Another problem is that high level policies  are 
o ften admini stered wi th considerable unevenne ss by subordinates , and a s  
a result higher expectations are shattered by arbi trarine s s  - a frequent 
recipe for revolt . In other words , an OPM revi ta li zed by I rianese 
di scontent and a uni fi ed na tional l ibera tion front ideo logy could rebui ld 
its shattered bases , communications and intel l i genc e in an atmosphere 
rendered more conducive by the very approach de signed to remove i ts sting . 
I f  that happened - and i t  i s  a real ri sk i nvolved in tre new line - then 
the pre Jusuf si tuation would be res tored , only wi th conceivably greater 
1 See Garnaut and Manning ( 19 74 ) . 
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OPM gueri l la potential , and Papua New Guinea-Indonesian relations 
would once more come under strain . 
The other point o f  vulnerabil i ty for the new po licy lies i n  the 
. question marks that hang over Papua New Gui nea ' s  future s tabi l i ty .  At 
the rnom�n t ,  sys tematic breakdown there does not appear to be a serious 
cause for concern but gradual ly rising graphs o f  anomic di sorder in Port 
Moresby and , more crucial ly ,  the Highlands , do cons ti tute danger signa l s . 
What make s  the Highlands a particularly sensi tive spot i s  a combination 
of  geography and economi c s : i f  the Highlands decide they do not want 
to be ruled , then they cannot be ruled , and i f  they cannot be ruled 
the country faces an acute economic cri s i s  from the los s  of vital export 
i ncome . I n  such a circumstance , Papua New Guinea ' s  resources would be 
solely concentra ted upon s urviva l , and great swathe s of the country -
not j ust the border - would be wide open to dis sident activities o f  
diverse kinds , o f  whicn the I rianese vari ety would doubtless  be well 
represented . 
Needless  to say , a combination o f  both sources o f  de stabi li zation 
would repre sent the ' worst case ' that the new Indonesian pol icy might 
confront . Indonesia has obviously wei ghed the first possibility in the 
balance be fore adopting i ts new approach , however , and the hi story of 
the OPM to date suggests that i t  has more than an even chance of  working . 
That being so , and the pessimi s tic scena rio for Papua New Guinea being 
more remote and in any case l e s s  amenable to po licy deter�i nation , 
Jakarta may well  feel reasonably confident that i t  has embarked on a 
fruitful new phase both in Irianese a ffairs and in i ts rela tions wi th 
Papua New Guinea . 
DOES I NDONE S IA HAVE E XPAN S I ON I S T  
DE S I GNS ON PAPUA NEW GU I NEA ? 
J . A . C .  Ma c k i e  
Thi s paper had i ts origins in a talk I gave a t  the Univer s i ty of  
Papua New Guinea shor tly a fter the September 1978  Wai gani semi nar , 
i n  which I attempted to answer some o f  the comments I had encountered 
there to the effect that I ndonesia ' s  foreign policies were inherently 
expansioni st and that her stra ined relat ions wi th Papua New Guinea 
over the various border incidents of 1 9 78 were a sign tha t she 
a spired to domi nate and perhaps ultimate ly to annex Papua New Guinea . 
Comments o f  thi s kind were usually based on three types of  
argument . According to one o f  these , the pressure the I ndone sian 
government was then putting on Papua New Guinea to cooperate mi l i tarily 
wi th her in tryi ng to seal the border against the Irianese dissidents 
seeking re fuge on the eastern s ide of  the border wa s to be seen as 
merely the first in a series of  demands which , unl e s s  re si s te d  from 
the outset , would culminate eventua l ly in the complete subj ugation 
of  Papua New Gui nea . My own feeling wa s - and sti ll i s  - tha t 
I ndonesia ' s  obj ectives here we re and are merely limi ted ones to do 
with her border problems ; there wa s no rea son to bel ieve she had 
limi tless  and si nister designs for the ul timate annexation of  Papua 
New Gui nea as a whole . I could wel l  understand that many people in 
Papua New Guinea who felt strongly that the Melanesian inhabita nts 
of  I rian Jaya were their blood brothers were unsympathet ic even 
towards Indonesia ' s  limi ted goals of c losing the border agai nst 
OPM elements who were tak ing advantage of  the opportunities  for easy 
sanc tuary it provided ; but that in i tself wa s not an adequate reason 
for in fe rring that I ndonesia had expansioni st ambi tions . To meet 
thi s  obj ection , cri tics  of Indonesia ' s  policies c i te d  one form o r  
other o f  the argument that her expansioni st appeti tes had al ready 
been amply demons trated by the Timor epi sode , by the ' confrontat ion ' 
of  Malaysia in 1 96 3 -66 ( re ferred to herea fter s i mply a s  konfrontasi ) 
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and by the earlier campaign to gain control o f  Irian Jaya over the 
year s 1950-6 2 . 
I t  i s  this  second argument - about the conc lusions to be 
drawn from the hi stori cal record regardi ng the supposedly ' expansionist ' 
chara�ter o f  her foreign policies - whi ch consti tutes the central 
theme of this  paper . If one looks only at thi s sequence of event s ,  
three epi sodes involving the use o f  force around I ndonesia ' s  borders ,  
apparent ly directed towards the acqui sition of  terri tory , i t  i s  very 
easy to draw the conc lusion that thi s i s  evi dence of territorial 
expansioni sm . Yet when we examine the motivations and political 
dynami c s  behind each of  these epi sodes we find that crude territorial 
expansioni sm , as defined be low , has played li ttle or no part in 
bri ngi ng them about . At thi s  poi n t ,  however , we must de fine ' expansioni sm ' 
a little more preci sely . I am interpreting it to mean a desire to 
annex addi tional terri tory either 
i for the sake of  more lebensraum ( l ivi ng space ) or re source s 
(oi l , copper , timber , etc . ) ;  
ii  for the sake of  demonstrating the national power so as 
to intimidate ne.ighbours i 
i i i  because o f  an ideology of nationa l greatness , power and 
vigour , as  in  the case o f  Mus solini and Hitl er ; 
iv for irredenti st reasons ( to recover part s of  the national 
terri tory which have been lost in past wars ) , or 
v because of  a be lief that the nation has a hi storic mi s sion 
to reestabl i sh its anci ent or mythical bounda rie s , as in 
the ca se of Rus sia ' s  pan Slavic tendenc ies in the late 
19th Century 
None of these obj ectives has played any signi fi cant part in motivating 
I ndonesia ' s  foreign po licies since independence , in my opinion , wi th 
the pos sible exception o f  the last two ( and I would even query that ) .  
I wi ll later give some attention bri e fly to this last hypothe sis , 
however , for several articles have been wri tten , wi th ti tles like 
' The Potential for I ndonesian Expansioni sm ' (Gordon 196 3-64 ) to explain 
her foreign policy obj ectives in the konfrontasi epi sode and these 
have gained wi der circulation than they de serve . They we re ba sed 
44 
on the Indonesia Raya , or ' Greater I ndonesia ' ,  theory that the 
country ' s leaders have constantly nurtured i rredentist aspirations 
to redraw their nat ional boundaries in accordance wi th the historic 
boundari e s  of  anc ient Srivi j aya and Maj apahit . I n  my study o f  the 
c ause s of konfrontasi , however , I found thi s  theory utterly erroneous 
and irrelevant .
1 
It seems to me equally irrelevant as an explanation 
of  the i nva sion of  Timer , although the Timer affair revived many o f  
the old fears that I ndone sia has a n  ominous appeti te for addi tional 
territory . And i t  i s  even le s s  relevant , I think , to Indonesian 
attitudes to Papua New Guinea , for reasons I wi ll  outline at the end 
of  the paper . 
A third type of  argument , which one mos t  frequently encounters 
among radi cal cri ti cs _ o f  the I ndonesian government ,  is one I wi l l  
c a l l  the ' analogy wi th fas c i sm ' argument - that i s , the proposi tion 
that expansioni sm tends to be an i nherent s tructura l feature of 
mi l itary or authori tarian or avowedly fasci s t  regime s . Hence , since 
I ndone sia undeniably has a highly authori tarian , army-based government , 
there i s  a prima faci e  presumption that her foreign policies  are 
expansioni st and aggressive i n  much the same way as were Mussolini ' s  
or Hi tler ' s  or those o f  pre -war Japan , ei ther because o f  a mi l i taristic 
and imperi a l i s t  ideology or for more complex socio-po l i tical reasons . 
Thi s kind of analogy i s  absurdly far- fetched , however .  The Suharto 
regime may be authori tarian and i n  some respects even repressive ,  but 
to call it ' fasci s t '  in any but a pe j orative sense is a sheer mi suse 
of the term . Yet thi s  kind of hypothe s i s  ha s some affinities wi th 
what mi ght be categori zed a s  ' diversionis t ' or ' i nstabi l i ty ' theories 
of the dynamic s  of  I ndonesian foreign polici es , which a l so achieved 
qui te wide currency at the time of the konfrontasi epi sode and 
cannot be entire ly di smi sse d  out of hand . 
Closely akin to thi s approach i s  one of  the more plausible 
(but in my opi nion mi sleading ) recent explanat ions of  the Suharto 
1 For a fuller di scus sion o f  the Indonesia Raya theory and the 
Malaysian propaganda use of  i t ,  see Macki e  ( 1 974 : 2 1-4 , 3 26-7  and 
the re ferences cited therei n )  . 
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government's forei gn policies , p u t  forward in 1 9 76 b y  Rex Morti�er 
(Mortimer 1976 ) which could almost be called a 'neuros i s  theory' 
o f  I ndonesian national sel f  as sertiveness , to which also I wi ll  return 
later . But before we go any further , i t  wi l l  be helpful to look more 
closely at the partic ular cases whi ch are commonly held to be evidence 
of Indonesia ' s 'expansioni st' appetites . From these I think i t  
wil l  become c lear that the search for explanatory hypotheses i s  a 
good deal more comp lex than i s  implied by the word ' expansioni sm ' in 
any me aningful sense . 
The Irian Jaya Claim 
The basi s o f  the original I ndonesi an claim to I rian Jaya i s  so 
well known that i t  i s  hardly neces sary to go into i t  at any length .
1 
I ndonesia maintained that as  the successor state to the former 
Netherlands East Indies her national territory should embrace the 
whole o f  what had formerly been the Netherlands East I ndies , including 
I ri an Jaya which had previously been considered an integral part o f  
the former colony (albei t one o f  the mo s t  neglected and li ttle­
developed parts ) . The Dutch insistence on retaining possession o f  
wha t  they called 'Dutch New Guinea ' at the time o f  the 1949 Round 
Table Conference negotiations leading to I ndonesian independence , for 
reasons of Dutch domestic pol i tics and wounded amour propre , created 
a deadlock which was broken only by the unsati s factory compromise 
deci sion to postpone further negotiations on the issue until 1950 . 
I n  the course o f  those negotiations nei ther s ide would budge - and as  
the status quo favoured the Dutch , they clung on grimly to their 
colony until mounting I ndonesian pressures , mi li tary as wel l  as  
diplomatic and economi c , coup led with dec lining international support 
for the Dutch , fina l ly compelled them to surrender their hold on the 
colony i n  1 96 2 . 
1 The best account o f  the early s tages o f  the I rian Jaya campaign 
i s  Bone ( 1958 ) ; for the final stages , see Mackie ( 1974 : 98 - 10 3 ) . 
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The rationale behind I ndonesia ' s  case was perfectly 
straightforward : her claim to Irian Jaya derived from the c entra l 
principles of nationa li sm and anti colonialism upon which her 
revolut ion aga i nst the Dutch had been fought . To abandon the claim 
would have been to deny those princ iples at a time when the very uni ty 
o f  the fragile new s tate depended on mai ntaining the pri nciple of  
nat ional i sm a s  paramount i n  the face o f  potentially seces sioni s t  
regiona l  dissident movements . I ndone sians be lieved that in pursuing 
the ir claim to Irian Jaya they were mere ly trying to gai n  control 
over terri tory that should have been recognized as rightfully theirs 
from the out set . The Dutch were thought to be holding on to Wes t  
New Guinea for n o  better reason than to use i t  as  a base from which 
they could subvert and fragment the new Republic of Indone sia , 
e specially by s tirring up trouble i n  the Moluccas and other eastern 
i s lands of the archipelago � I t  i s  worth noting , incidentally , that 
it wa s not unti l five or six years a fter 1949 that the Dutch began 
to ta lk seriously about ' self-determi nation ' for Wes t  New Guinea and 
not unti l 1959-60 that they embarked upon their ' crash programme ' 
to create a New Guinea e l i te rapidly in the hope o f  frus trating 
the I ndone s ians by rushing Wes t  New Guinea to i ndependence . The 
Dutch put great emphas i s  on the racial di fferences between I ndone sians 
and the Melanesian i nhabi tants of  We s t  New Guinea , but I ndone sians 
regarded thi s  as i rrelevant , since they themselve s were ethnically 
heterogeneous and they did not regard racial affini ties as  the 
determining cri teria of their nat ionhood . 
I ndones ians of  all  political per suasions were uni ted in suppor t 
of  the claim to I rian Jaya . ( The stronges t  initial proponents o f  
the c laim were , i n  fac t ,  the mos t  pro Dutch and conservative group 
of  leaders at the Round Table Conference negotia tions , the Federalists , 
not the Republicans . )  No one ever publicly denied the rightness of  
thi s claim , as far as I know , although there were maj or differences 
between the parties about the mos t  e ffective tactics for pursui ng 
the claim . As time passed the more radical parti es became i ncreasingly 
mi litant in the prominence they gave to thi s i s sue and the lengths 
they were wi lling to go to pre s s  i t ,  whereas the more anti communi s t ,  
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pro Wes tern parties and opi nion leaders c lung to the belief  tha t 
moderation and persuasion would i nduce the Dutch to make conce ssions . 
Thi s  did not happen , however , and the latter group were outmanoeuvered 
by the radicals i n  1 9 5 7  when , after seve ral efforts to wi n support 
in the UN had fai led , the radicals sei zed the intiative , at President 
Sukarno ' s  instigation , and ' took over ' all Dutch plantations , busine s s  
enterpri ses and bank s i n  I ndonesia and nationalized them soon after . 
But the Dutch mere ly dug their toes i n  harder and i t  took the threat 
of  mi litary invasion o f  I rian Jaya i n  1961-62  to force them ( largely 
at the insti gation of  the US government ) to abandon the s truggle 
and negotiate a compromi se set tlement . 
It would be i nappropriate to say that ' expansioni sm ' was a 
fac tor i n  the I ndonesian campai gn for We s t  Irian , in my vi ew , ei ther 
in re spect of the arguments used or o f  the bas i c  pol i ti cal dynami c s  
which impel led Indone sia i nto what wa s b y  196 2 a n  undeniably aggre ssive , 
confrontative pol i ti cal s trategy for put ting pres sure on the Dutch . 
The s tyle o f  the campaign i n  i ts fina l s tages wa s certai nly hi ghly 
emotional ,  the pol i tical atmosphere almo s t  feveri sh; the i ssue lent 
i tse l f  to a form of mobi li zation politics  which President Sukarno 
and the Indonesian Communi s t  Party explo i ted very effectively for 
their own dome s ti c  advantage , whereas the Army leaders found themselves 
badly outmanoeuvered . That lesson was not los t  on the Army leaders , 
however , for when the confl ict wi th Ma laysia loomed up a year or so 
later they took good care not to lose the po l i tical ini tiative on an 
i ssue wi th strong national i s t  appeal and so they played an important 
part in getting the campaign of konfrontasi agai nst Malaysia s tarted . 
But by that time the poli tical tensions and instabi l i ty o f  the late 
Sukarno era were s tarting to exert a qui te unique influence on both 
the forei gn policies and the domesti c  politics  of I ndonesia . 
Konfrontasi 
I ndone sia ' s  ' confrontation ' of Malaysia in the years 1963 -66 
provides the s tronge s t  ammuni tion for advocate s of the expansioni s t  
theory , but an explanation given i n  these terms alone i s  serious ly 
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mi sleadi ng , i n  my opi nion , and the real dynamic s  of the campaign have 
1 
to be sought e l sewhere . I ndonesia never a s serted any c laim to the 
terri tory of the northern Borneo states whose incorporation into the 
Malaysia federati on she was prote sting ;  her argument was that the 
proj ect was a neocolonialist  strategem , master-minded by the British 
to enable them to maintai n  their interests there , and tha t the people 
of  Borneo and Singapore were being steamrol lered against their wi l l  
i nto the wider Malaysian federation . There was a good dea l  of  evidence 
in favour of  that proposi tion , al though I bel ieve that overall the pro 
Malaysia case· was much s tronger on nearly a l l  accounts . The whol e  
epi sode was a c urious , hal f-hearted a ffair , a mixture o f  threats ,  
propaganda , low leve l border raids and reconnai sance i ncur sions into 
Sarawak and Malaya , at tempts to ferment domestic oppos i ti on to the 
Malaysian government , coupled with diplomatic and economic pressures 
which seemed to have a variety o f  obj ec tive s  and motivations , few of 
them at a l l  clear to outside observers . 
Konfrontasi wa s very much a personal campaign of Pre sident 
Sukarno ' s , although both the Armed Forces leader s and the PKI suppor ted 
it enthusiastically in the early stages ( though much less wholeheartedly 
later o n, when the cos ts and r i sk s  were greater ) .  And it undoubtedly 
served a vari ety of purpo ses which Sukarno found conveni ent - for 
example , maintaining an atmosphere of cri sis  and externa l threat , so 
that cal l s  for nat ional uni ty and so lidarity wi th the leadership were 
more eas i ly j usti fi ed ;  simplify ing the j ob of balanc ing l e ft and 
right wing forces in the government and in the country ; enabling him 
at times to divert attention from pressing domestic i s s ues by stre ssing 
the primacy o f  the confl ict wi th neocolonialist  enemie s  at home and 
abroad ; providing apparent j usti fication for hi s ideological doctrines 
of  inevi table conflict be tween the ' New Emerging Force s '  and the old 
establi shed forces of neoco lonial i sm and imperial i sm .  There i s  
something to be said for explanations o f  the campaign i n  terms o f  i ts 
1 I have summari zed the strengths and weaknes ses o f  the various 
i nterpretations of this epi sode in Mackie ( 1 974 : 1- 1 1 , 3 2 6 - 3 3  et 
passim) . 
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' diversionary ' va lue , a t  a time when the nationa l economy was i n  
dec l i ne and political tensions mounting , but they too tend to be 
grossly over-simpl i fied , although in a more refined form there i s  
1 
something in them . 
_ Konfrontasi was , i n  a very real sense , an extension i nto the 
forei gn a f fairs sphere o f  the basic instabi l i ty of Indonesian domestic 
pol itics at that time . Yet on several occasions when he had to 
make difficult choices in domestic pol i tic s ,  Sukarno did make them 
and on severa l occasions he scaled down the intens i ty of confrontation 
when c ircumstanc es made i t  prudent for him to do so . So the diver sionary 
theory cannot be carried too far . A more fundamental element in the 
explanati on o f  the whole affai r ,  in my view , i s  the relevance o f  the 
ideological factor . The struggle against Malaysia served , in e ffect , 
to va lidate the doc tri ne o f  the New Emerging Forc es and at the same 
time that doctrine created the imperative to engage in the struggle , 
for otherwi se the ideology would · 'have been ho llow and meaningless . 
All Sukarno ' s  speeches on the i s sue stres sed the ideo logical factor , 
never the Indone sian Raya theme or the appea l to hi storic greatness -
I n  short , the whole epi sode wa s very much an outgrowth of the 
rather unique political and ideological c limate prevailing in 
I ndonesia in the early 1 960s . The only sense in which i t  could be 
categori zed as  ' expa nsioni s t ' was i n  terms o f  the style and methods 
adopted , not the obj ec tives or moti vat ions - for example the generally 
a ssertive , sometime s truculent claims made by Sukarno for the univer sali ty 
o f  hi s doc trine o f  the New Emerging Force s  as  applying to all  Thi rd 
World countries . I t  must also be admi tted that i f  I ndone sia had 
succeeded at that po int in the decoloni zat ion proces s  in overthrowi ng 
the Malaysian federation , she would undoubtedly have been cock o f  the 
roos t in Southea st Asia . Sukarno certa inly a spired to a leader ship 
role , not only in that region but in the Third World genera lly 
( though wi thout much succe ss , in the final analysi s ) . But the 
1 The best exposition of the ' diversion ' theory i s  given by Donald 
Hindley ( 1964 ) . 
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explanation for thi s  impulse i s  better seen in terms o f  what Kahi n  
( 1964 : 26 0 - 1 ) has called ' the powerful , sel f-ri ghteous thrust o f  
Indonesian nationa l i sm ' , derived from the sense o f  pride in  their 
revolutionary struggle for independence , than as ' Greater I ndone sia ' 
doctrine s  or an i deology o f  terri torial expansion remini scent o f  Mussolini ' s  
or Hi tler '·s demands for more l and . 
East Timar 
Even le s s , in my opi nion , can the campai gn to incorporate Ea st 
Timer be categori zed or explained as  simp ly a mani fe station of expansioni st 
appeti te s . Indonesian motivations i n  that unhappy affai r are murky 
and comple x ,  not at a l l  as easy to i denti fy wi th preci sion - or to 
de fend on legal and moral grounds - a s  in the previous cases examined . 
But it i s  not di fficult to discern the maj or fac tors impelling the 
Suharto government to become i nvolved in the way i t  did . Certainly 
there could be no claim here , as there was in the case of I rian Jaya , 
on the ground that thi s  territory had been part o f  the former Netherlands 
East Indi e s . Nor wa s i t  pos sible a fter April 1 9 7 4 , as  i t  might have 
been prior to the overthrow o f  the Salazar-Caetano regime in Portuga l , 
to make a case on the grounds o f  liberating Ea st Timer from coloni a l  
rule o f  a s ingularly mi serable , debi l i tating character . The Indone sian 
case was , instead , argued mainly on the ground that the people of  East 
Timer wanted incorporation into I ndonesia , that the Timorese party 
favouring i ncorporation , Apodeti , had substantial popular support , 
but was severe ly handi capped by the s trong anti I ndones ian propaganda 
campaign earlier maintai ned by the Portuguese colonial authori ties and 
later by Freti lin . I t  seems hi ghly dubious that Apodeti rea l ly did 
have very wide spread popular support initially , but that is hardly 
surpri sing in view of the sus tained anti - I ndonesian propaganda to 
which the population had been subj ec ted ( and the inabi l i ty to put a 
contrary case i n  the appropriate languages , Portuguese or Teturn or 
regional dialects , since Bahasa I ndonesia was li ttle understood i n  the 
co lony ) . During the six months be fore I ndonesian mi l i tary i ntervention 
in Timer at the end of 1 9 7 5 , the Indone sians tried to engineer a 
poli tical formula on the ba si s o f  consultations (musjawarah)  between 
the Portuguese authori ti es and the three ma j or Timore se parties , whi ch 
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would have resulted , they hoped - wi th the a i d  o f  a little ' gentle 
pressure ' - in a decis ion to seek incorporation in I ndonesia . But the 
outbreak o f  fighting between the UDT and Fretilin factions in  July 
wrecked any hopes of thi s and soon resulted in the mi li tary victory o f  
the Fretilin force s ,  which were b y  tha t  time the faction mo st s trongly 
commi tted to an independent Ea st Timar and the most uncompromi singly 
anti I ndonesian . (UDT had by that time swung over towards a pro 
Indonesian stance . )  Thi s  created a situation in which the I ndonesian 
government had to decide e i ther to acquie sce in a Freti lin victory and 
the e s tabli shment of an independent , strongly anti I ndonesian regime 
in East Timar , or to intervene mil i tari ly in the civi l war there . The 
Suharto government opted for the latter choi ce , sending in Indonesian 
troops covertly in October-November and then invading overtly in 
1 December .  
The legal and moral rights and wrongs o f  the se actions are a 
matter o f  controver sy whi ch i t  would be i nappropriate to enter into 
here . But the ques tion o f  I ndonesi a ' s  underlying motivations is  a 
que s tion o f  a di fferent order . Why did the I ndonesians feel i t  
mattered s o  much t o  them t o  prevent East Timar be coming independent? 
Their mi l i tary intervention did no good to Indonesia ' s  international 
reputation and appears to have been costly to he r armed force s in both 
live s and re sources . Why , then , could they not have acquie sced in a 
Fretilin vi c tory? 
I suspect that the basic  answer boi l s  down to the proposition 
that as time pas sed I ndonesia ' s  key pol i cy makers simply found themselves 
more and more commi tted by thei r  own rhetori c and their ini tial policies 
to the ultimate incorporation o f  East Tima r ;  hence they either had to 
press  on towards that goal at any cost or accept a humi lia ting defeat 
which might have been serious ly damaging to their own domestic po litical 
1 
I know o f  no good account o f  the I ndone sian side o f  the Timar 
affai r .  A use ful survey of events in Timor stre ssing the ro le of  
the Portugue se , i s  Ni col ( 197 8 ) . A s trongly anti Indonesian , pro 
Freti lin version i s  given by Joliffe ( 19 7 8 ) . 
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pre stige and influence . But be fore we look into that explanation more 
c lo se ly it is worth noting several predisposing factors which were 
c ertainly relevant . 
The mo st important was the fear that East Timar might become a 
nes t  o f  �ommuni st influence , ' another Cuba ' on her doorstep . The 
charge s that Freti lin leaders were communists or pro Chinese were 
wi ldly exaggerated but they seem to have been widely be li eved in 
I ndonesia . Even i f  they were not , i t  was clear that an i ndependent 
East Timar would have had to look overseas for economic a s s i s tance and 
perhaps also political support from some quarter , since the economy was 
hardly viable and the politi cal structure rudimentary , and China or 
Rus sia seemed like ly to be the obvious candidates for such a role . 
Moreover , the possibi lity that even a non communi s t  independent Eas t  
Timar might provide a haven for I ndonesian communis t  exi l e s  out side 
Indonesian contro l  was alarming e nough , for i t  would be hard to prevent 
their infiltration from there into other parts o f  the archipelago . 
A second consideration frequently mentioned was the fear o f  
seces sioni st sentiment in other parts o f  eastern Indonesia i f  East Timar 
• 
were to succeed in maintaining an independent exi s tence . The e ffects on 
the I ndonesian side of the i sland would have been di sturbing , to say 
the least , and perhaps elsewhere too . Ever since the 1950s  when 
regionalist movements threatened the terri tori al integri ty o f  the young 
nation , I ndone sia ' s  leaders have been sensi tive to the danger s o f  
secessionis t  sentiments i n  the outlying regions o f  the archipelago . I 
doubt i f  there is  currently as  much risk of  sece s sioni sm or terri torial 
disintegration as  i s  often suggested , for the centrali zing tendencies 
o f  the last two decade s have been very powerful . But it i s  probably 
true to say that I ndonesia ' s  national uni ty is sti ll  a ra ther brittle 
creation , which might not stand up to any serious blow to the authori ty 
of  the central government . I f  any part o f  the country were able to 
de fy central authori ty on a maj or is sue and get away with i t ,  the chain 
reac tion e l sewhere could be quite di sastrous . That kind of  consideration 
probably exerted great we ight on the mind s of  the government ' s  po licy 
makers throughout the Timer affai r .  
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Two other background considerations were also , I bel ieve , 
important . One was the inclination to believe that Apode ti real ly 
did represent the true voice of the Timorese people . I ndonesians 
referred to Freti l i n ,  not entirely wi thout j us t i fication , as the ' Eurasians ' 
party ' ,  as a coterie o f  part-Portuguese , urban , educated leaders wi th no 
substanti al fol lowing among or rapport wi th the bulk o f  the vi llage 
population . They i nevi tably compared them wi th simi lar groups o f  
first gene ration leaders o f  the anti colonial movements in I ndonesia , 
most of whom later dri fted away from the mai ns tream o f  I ndone sian 
nationalism ;  i n  fac t ,  I ndonesia ' s  Eurasians tended to be either pro 
Dutch or highly ambivalent towards the nationali st cause during the 
s truggle for independence , so their nationali s t  credentials were suspect .  
In the ci rcumstance s I ndonesians were highly s ceptical that the Fre ti lin 
leaders really represented the true voice o f  East Tirnore se nationali sm .  
Their suspi cions o f  Freti lin were later exacerbated by the col lusion of 
the radical Portuguese o fficers , Maj ors Mota and Jonatas , in advancing 
the Freti lin cause during 1975 , whi ch was remini scent of Dutch patronage 
of the ' puppet ' Federalists in 1948-49 . UDT , on the other hand , had 
ini tially spoken out in favour of maintaining Portugue se rule and 
against immediate independence , so i t  was c learly a ' reactionary ' rather 
than a ' progres sive ' force . So the hi storicist caste of mind with 
which Indonesians approached these matter s  would have i nclined them 
towards Apodeti even though i t  could show li ttle posi tive evi dence of 
substantial popular support . Thi s  i s  not to say tha t they were right 
in that assessment i i t  i s , howe ver , to point out the ba sis  o f  Indone sian 
perceptions of the matter , which is what we mus t be concerned with here . 
The other consideration that probably played a part , although 
rather speculative and intangible , was the general be lief that prevai led 
throughout the fi fties and s i xties  that sooner or later Portugue se 
Tirnor would be liberated from colonial rule - and it was commonly 
assumed that thi s would take the form o f  becoming part of Indonesia , 
e i ther wi th Indonesian he lp or wi thout . Portugue se Tirnor was seen as  
an outdated anomaly , like Goa be fore 1 96 1 . But almo st no attention was 
ever given ( e xcept momentari ly , in a very desultory fashion , in 196 3 )  
to the que stion o f  when or how thi s would happen , nor were the impli cations 
o f  the alternative outcome ( the emergence o f  an independent East Tirnor) 
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ever se riously considered . I n  short , the principle o f  anti colonialism ,  
which was a central plank of  I ndone si a ' s  fore ign po licy i n  the 19 50s , 
created a presupposi tion that i t  would be ' natural ' for thi s territory 
to form part of  Indonesia , j ust as  Sukarno once remarked that ' even 
a chi ld can see that West I rian is part of Indone sia ' .  I am not saying 
that thi s · i s  a valid , incontrovertible line o f  reasoning , but I thi nk 
it was probably qui te i nfluential in  shaping the a ttitudes and 
expectations of Indonesia ' s  leaders prior to 1 9 7 4 . In fac t ,  if the 
Suharto government had mounted a campaign to assi st in the liberation 
of East Timar from Portugue se rule prior to 1 9 7 4 , j us ti fying thi s on 
the ground that it was also helping to overthrow Portuguese colonial 
rule and he lp the freedom fighters of  Angola and Mozambique , i t  would 
a lmost certainly have won wide spread international support and le ft 
the Freti lin leaders no option but to side wi th Indonesia . Suharto 
must have subsequently regretted that he had been too cautious and 
re strained to embark on such a course , for once the revolution of  Apri l  
1974  in Portugal had occurred the ball  was a t  Fretilin ' s  feet , not 
Jakarta ' s .  To c laim that I ndone sia ' s  atti tude towards Timar was a 
grasping and covetous one seems to me , in the light o f  these circumstance s ,  
quite mi sleading . 
Fina l ly ,  we should notice certain aspec ts o f  the dome stic 
pol i ti cal dynamic s  o f  the Timer epi sode which indicate , I be lieve , that 
expansioni sm in a crude sense was not a signi fi cant element in Indonesian 
motivations . The initial reaction o f  the Fore i gn Mini s ter , Adam Ma lik , 
was , indeed , di stinctly ' dove -ish ' r He went so far as to assure Jo se 
Ramos Horta , a Fretilin leader , that Indone sia made no c laim to Ea st 
Timar and would seek close relations wi th i t  ' after independence ' .  
But thi s  early vi ew was soon modi fied as the ' hawks ' in Jakarta began 
to express concern at what they saw as a dri ft towards the le ft in 
Timer , paralleling the course of the revolution in Port uga l in i ts 
fi rst year . Jakarta at thi s  time still  regarded the Portugue se 
government as the key factor determini ng the course of events in Timer . 
By the beginning of  1975  i t  wa s be l i eved by many observers that Indone sian 
troops mi ght be sent into Timer at any time . There wa s a fl urry of  
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apprehension among Austra lian officials  in  February , but in the 
fol lowing month the Indone sian government gave clear indications that 
i t  had decided agai nst a mi litary invasion and was re lying instead on 
the political negotiations be tween the three main parties that were to 
take place at Macao later in the year . The Indone sians were now 
beginning to woo (or buy over ) the UDT leaders as  the latter fel t  
themse lves increasingly under threat from Freti lin and the left 
Portugue se officers in control in Di lli . Suharto wa s clearly re straining 
his ' hawks ' as long as he could in the hope that a political-dip lomati c  
s trategy would work towards Indone sia ' s  ends . But afte r the outbreak 
o f  the ' civi l war ' in Timar in July-�ugus t ,  it must have become 
increasingly di fficult for him to res train the hawks and maintain any 
hope that a pol itical solution would work , so the determination of  
policy finally swung over into the hands o f  the mi litary , for by thi s 
time I ndone sia was too deeply commi tted to achieving i ts goals to 
back away . 
I t  should be remembered that i f  Suharto had fai led to prevent 
the emergence of  an independent East Timar once the Indonesian government 
had commi tted i tse l f  to incorporation , he would have been highly 
vulnerable to the charge that this kind of thing would never have 
happened in Sukarno ' s  days ft Preci sely because Suharto ' s  foreign po licies 
were so di fferent from Sukarno ' s ,  unas sertive , low-keyed , commi tted to 
good-nei ghbourly relations wi th the ASEAN countries , there was muted 
cri ticism from the former radical -nationa list fri nge of the politi cal 
public in I ndone sia that he was subordinating the country ' s  intere sts 
too much to the goa l o f  pre senting an image of  moderation and 
re sponsibi lity to the We stern credi tor nations . Pol i tical comment 
wi thin Indone sia was di stinc tly muted in 1974-7 5 , for the crackdown on 
di ssentient opinion fol lowing the ' Malari ' riots during Prime Minister 
Tanaka ' s  vi sit  in  January 1974  wa s very severe . But precisely be cause 
the regime had been shaken by the mi ld expre ssions of  cri tic i sm tha t 
occurred in late 19 7 3 ,  there was a good deal of  nervousne s s  about 
arousing fresh criticism over new i ssue s . I t  i s  hardly surpri sing , 
in those circumstance s ,  that there was almost no overt opposi tion to 
the government ' s  policies on Timar , even though there seems to have 
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been nothing like the wide spread popular support that the re was over 
Irian Jaya . In 1 9 75 , moreover , the development o f  the Pe rtamina cri s i s  
was creating new di ffi culties for the government and making it even l e s s  
wi ll ing t o  run ri sks o f  leaving i t s  flanks exposed to cri tics  o f  any 
hue , whether radical or nationalis t .  The fac4 too , tha t the Timer 
cri s i s  occurred soon after the fal l  of Saigon , when the genera ls in  
Jakarta were mos t  s ensi tive to what they perceived as  communi st threats 
to the region , must have helped to s trengthen the hands o f  the hardli ners 
and undermine the advocate s of  moderation . By the latter part of 1975  
Suharto had li ttl e choice but to go along wi th hi s hawks unle s s  he were 
prepared to take very considerable ri sk s  of increasing his vulnerabi l i ty 
to dome stic critics , both wi thin the armed forces and outside them . 
Are we j us ti fied , then , in a s serti ng that ' expan sioni s t ' elements 
have played no par t in the shaping o f  Indonesia ' s  policies towards 
her neighbours? I am incl ined to answer : ' Ye s ;  the primary motivating 
forces behind her foreign policies could not be described as expansioni s t  
in any substantial respect ' .  One could even go further and list  a 
series o f  opportuni ties Indone sia has not taken since 1945  whi ch , i f  
she really had been determinedly bent upon expan sion or aggrandi zement 
of her influence ove r  her neighbour s , she could easi ly have exploi ted 
to her advantage - for examp le the si tua tion created by the race riots 
of  May 1969 in Malaysia , the Muslim insurgency in the southern Phi lippines , 
to mention only the most obvious . 
I t  may be possible to de fine ' expansioni sm ' according to some 
more complex formula and apply i t  to the Indonesian case , but I have 
not yet seen thi s done in any convincing fashion . The nearest approach 
to a care ful ly formulated theory is Rex Mortimer ' s  1976 article (Mortimer 
1 9 76 ) in which he put great emphas i s  on the country ' s  poten tial 
instabi lity and the inherent weaknes se s  or incapaci ty o f  i ts government , 
seeing various factors in that si tuation as  ' nudging Indone sia towards 
a more as sertive regional role ' .  Mortimer explicitly recogni zed tha t 
Indones ia was ' not an actively expansioni st power ' ,  but he portrayed 
her leaders as  bordering on the neurotic ( the article i s  studded with 
words like ' hysterical ' ,  ' obse s sive ' ,  ' tense ' ,  ' hypersensi tive ' and 
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' frustrated ' )  in their preoccupation wi th their country ' s  regional 
influence , parti cularly in the a ftermath of the communist victories 
in Indochina in the previous year . Hence he regarded them as  intensely 
concerned wi th the stabi l i ty o f  Papua New Guinea also . 
�ortime r ' s  theory seems to me vulnerable on three main grounds . 
Firs t ,  Indone s i a ' s  ' regional role ' since 1965 has not been at all 
' assertive ' or ' obse s sive ' ,  as it  was under Sukarno . Qui te the 
opposite . Secondly , the emphasis on the ' hysterical ' ,  neurotic ' 
character o f  I ndonesian politics i s  gro s s ly exaggerated . Thirdly , in 
the three years that have passed since that arti cle was written , the 
course o f  events has not borne out the pre di ctions Mortime r  then made . 
Instabi lity has not signi fi cant ly increased in I ndone sia , her 
government has responded rather sensibly and coolly to the emergence 
of  a powe rful Vie tnam as a potential rival for political influence in 
Southeast Asia , not hysterically at all , while its handling of relations 
with Papua New Guinea has not conformed wi th the pattern Mortimer 
adumbrated . One might j us ti fi ably ask whether the underlying theory 
on whi ch Mortimer was then relying was wrong , or whether hi s data was 
erroneous - or both? 
Mortimer began hi s arti cle with the valid observation that we 
should not take it for granted that the Suharto government ' s  economic 
moderation , rationality and peaceableme s s  towards its  nei ghbours during 
the years 1 966-76 would continue inde finitely . Because o f  the Timor 
affair and the collapse of the Pertamina empire , I ndone sia seemed in 
1976 ' to be facing another highly unstable period in he r short and 
stormy hi story as an independent state . ' I t  would be a mi stake , he 
argued , to put too much stre s s  on the Suharto government ' s re liance 
on diplomati c  methods and good-neighbourly cooperation throughout the 
previous decade , for the Timor a ffai r i s  then explicable ' only as a 
momentary aberration ' ,  whereas he saw it  as  merely one o f  the factors 
whi ch ' tipped the sca les in  favour o f  regional interventioni sm ' and a 
more a s se rtive regiona l ro le . Both the theory and the pre sentation o f  
the facts began to go astray at thi s point o f  the argument , i n  my view . 
Consider the fol lowing crucial paragraph : 
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Indone sian intere sts have be en and rema i n  primari ly 
tho se of internal securi ty and enhanced regiona l 
influence . The se interests are perceived in a 
rathe r tense , and at times o f  cri si s , hys terical 
manner by a pol i tical class which has been 
continually frustrated by the gul f between its 
ambi tions and i ts capaci ty ;  hyper-sensitive to 
the intractable problems of national se curi ty ; 
prone to regard obstructions to its aspirant 
regional hegemony as  the re sult o f  malevolent 
plots agai nst i t ; and for the past ten years 
obses sive about the dangers of communi sm both 
to i ts securi ty and i ts regional ambi tions . 
Indone s i a ' s  concerns are not novel ones for 
any s tate to pursue , but they are concentrated upon 
wi th an unusua l degree of fixity and intensity . . . .  
(Mortimer 1976 : 5 1-2 ) 
Qui te apart from the highly coloured terminology used here and the 
reliance on what i s  virtually a neurosis  theory of national self­
asse rti vene ss ( the assertiveness being seen as akin to Sukarno ' s , 
though ' the target of  I ndonesia ' s  frustrations ha s changed ' ) ,  I think 
we must query Mortimer ' s  assumption here that an ' enhanced ' regional 
influence i s  seen as  a primary interest by the Suharto government or 
that it i s  ' frustrated by the gul f between its ambitions and i ts 
capaci ty ' , the ambition be ing ' aspirant regional hegemony ' .  But why 
i s  the word ' enhanced ' added there? The entire sentence i s  s lanted to 
convey an impression of assertivene s s  in her regional foreign policies 
which i s  simp ly not warranted by the reco rd . Even i f  it i s  true that 
some I ndonesians sti l l  talk about the ir country ' s  regional role in a 
way that mi ght j usti fy the use of those terms ( and neither Pre sident 
Suharto nor hi s two foreign mi ni sters has been inclined to do so to any 
degree ) ,  I ndonesia ' s  whole po licy towards the bui lding up of ASEAN i s  
te stimony to the fact that her actions over the las t  twelve years have 
been directed large ly towards calmi ng the fears among her neighbours 
that President Sukarno ' s  policies aroused . Mortimer ' s  theory mi ght 
have seemed tenable i f  I ndonesia ' s  general s really had been as serting 
a more mi litant role o f  regiona l leadership o f  the anti communi st 
nations against Vietnam , but so far they have been ve ry res trained on 
that score , far le ss vocal than out side commenta tors swayed more by 
their tidy theories about regional power struggle s than the actual 
evidence o f  what Indone si a ' s  leaders have said and done about the 
communi st threat from Vie tnam . 
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There i s  no doubt that Indone si a ' s  genera l s  are profoundly anti 
communi st in the ir internal policies and it is arguable that the present 
poli ti cal system is potentially far more unstable than it appears on 
the surface because of  i ts fai lure to institutionali ze genui nely 
repre sentative insti tutions . But to j ump from those premi ses to the 
conc lusion that the pre sent regime i s  bent upon the same sort of drive 
for regional influence as  Sukarno was , or that ' setback s wi ll  feed 
resentment and inc linations to assertivene s s , especially i f  the present 
internal divi sions in the state are intensi fied ' seems to me simply not 
supportable by what we know about current Indonesian politi cal behaviour . 
Only by dinging to a ve ry mechani stic theory o f  expansioni sm as  an 
outgrowth o f  instabi l i ty can one j usti fy such reasoning . The record 
of  the Suharto government ' s foreign pol i cy certainly doe s not j us ti fy 
i t ,  despi te all  the hyperbole , eva sivenes s  and worse that has 
characte riz ed i ts handling of the Timor a f fai r . 
Mortime r ' s account of  Indonesia ' s  lust for regional domi nance 
doe s not rely di rectly on the analogy-wi th- fascism argument , al though 
I think both re st upon the assumption that authori tarian regime s are 
potentially unstable (be cause by de fi nition unreprese ntative - although 
it i s  que stionable whe ther more repre sentative political systems are 
signi ficantly more stable ) ,  so there is likely to be some sort of  
link between the politics o f  dome stic instabi l i ty and the po litics of  
e xternal assertiveness , pa rti cularly if  frustrations over the failure 
of domestic po licies rea l ly are generating neuroti c atti tude s and 
i rrationality .  But that has not been the case of Indone sia in the 
1970s . Her leaders have fe lt they have been achieving results , despi te 
all the cri ti cisms that have been directed at their policie s .  Their 
actions seem to me to betoken a good deal o f  confidence {wi thin the 
authori tari an framework o f  the pol i ti cal system , admi ttedly ) rather 
than a sense o f  inse curi ty and hysteria . 
Be fore concluding , I want to comment brie fly on the 7ndonesia 
Raya ' theory of Indone sian expansioni sm and offer some gue s se s  about 
the likel ihood of a re currence of that stream of foreign policy thinking . 
6 0  
I had t o  examine the influence o f  the se doctrine s c losely in 1964-65 
when I was trying to analyze the causes o f  konfrontasi and I have 
di s cus sed the mat ter more ful ly in my book on that sub j e c t  (t1!ackie 197  4 )  . 
Advocate s of  the 'Indonesia· Raya' theory o f  e xpansioni sm ,  like Bernard 
Gordon , re lied mainly on two sources of evidence . One was the wri ting 
and speeche s of the I ndonesian politician-poet-historian , Mohammed Yamin , 
who was a great advocate o f  ' Indonesia Raya ' and inclined to wax 
e loquent on the theme o f  I ndonesia ' s  historic greatne ss in the days o f  
Srivi j aya and Maj apahit , when I ndonesian language , trade and cultural 
influence allegedly extended as  far afield as Madagas car to the west 
and Cambodia to the north . Yamin was a maverick , non-party mini ster 
in several o f  Sukarno ' s  cabinets and had a ce rtain a ffinity of 
temperament and style with Sukarno , insofar as both were romantic s  
and rhetoricians wi th a strong sense of  I ndone sia ' s  hi stori c destiny . 
He played an active part early in the campaign to recover I rian Jaya . 
But nei ther he nor hi s ideas played any great part in the 
�onfrontasi campai gn ,  for Yamin died shortly be fore it  began to 
develop and Sukarno never made use o f  the historic appeal to ' Indonesia 
Raya ' theme s in hi s speeche s on the sub j e c t  o f  Malaysia . Nor did any 
other I ndonesian public figure try to step i nto Yamin ' s  shoes in  order 
to exploit the theme for i ts pol i tical mi leage , a rather signi fic ant 
piece of evidence which advocates of  the ' Indonesia Raya ' theory 
overlooked . Presumably there was not much mi leage in i t .  Yamin was 
very much sui generis and hi s poli tical influence depended more on 
hi s proximi ty to Sukarno than the i ntrinsic appeal o f  his doc trine s . 1 
The other piece o f  evidence used in support of  the ' Indonesia 
Raya ' theory was the debate that took place in June 1945 in the 
Preparatory Commi ttee for Indonesian I ndependence on what the future 
boundaries of independent Indone sia should be . Yamin p layed a promi nent 
part in thi s  debate , arguing that ' the areas whi ch should be inc luded 
in Indonesian territo ry are those which have given birth to I ndone sian 
people ; the motherland of  a people wi ll be trans formed into the 
terri tory of  a State ' .  Thus I ndonesia should consist not only o f  the 
1 See Mackie ( 1974 : 2 1- 2 3 ) . 
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the former Nethe rlands I ndie s ,  i nc luding We st New Guinea , but a l so 
the whole of Timar and North Ebrneo and Malaya , inc luding the four 
northe rn s tate s of Malaya whi ch the Japanese had trans ferred to 
Thai land . Sukarno supported Yami n ' s  formulation (although on rather 
di fferent grounds ) against the more cautious arguments o f  reali sts like 
Mohamme d Hatta and Haj i Agus Sali m ;  and the Yamin-Sukarno view carried 
the day when it came to a vote . But the debate had no practical 
consequences ,  for when the I ndonesian leaders proclaimed the independence 
of  thei r  count ry in Augus t  194 5 , they were so hard-pressed by events 
that they neglec ted even a commitment they had earlier given a group 
o f  Malayan revol utionaries to inc lude Malaya in the anti colonial 
s truggle . Twenty years later the Malays i ans quoted the 194 5 debates 
extensively for propaganda purposes as evidence of  I ndone sian terri torial 
ambi tions (Department of  In formation , Malaysia 196 4 )  but that assertion 
does not really stand up to serious cri ti cal scrutiny . 
I t  i s  not inconceivable , o f  course , that at some point i n  the 
future another Yami n or Sukarno wi ll  eme rge in Indonesia and try to 
exploit  nationali st sentiments on the bas i s  of an appeal to hi s toric 
greatne s s . The teaching o f  I ndone sian history and I ndone sian patrioti sm 
in the school s ,  mi li tary academies and i ndoctrina tion course s  almo st 
certainly continues to incorporate some e lements o f  Yarninesque fantasy 
about the past whi ch could in appropriate circumstances be nurtured 
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as the basi s  for a kind of  reviva l i s t  movement . But one could say 
that of most countrie s  in the world . Patriotism , they say , is the 
last re fuge of scoundrels . Logi ca l ly ,  however , the weakne ss of theories 
about expansioni st tendencies which are based on predictions about how 
a country rrright one day react i s  that they can ne i ther be confi rmed 
nor re futed by tes tible evidence . That be ing the case , they are 
virt ual ly use less . 
My own gue s s  i s  that I ndonesia , l ike China and Vietnam , wi l l  
continue t o  b e  concerned to ensure that developments she considers 
adverse to her interests wi l l  not occur around her immediate periph e rie s . 
1 An intriguing recent mani fe station o f  thi s sort o f  subterranean 
surviva l  of  ' Indonesia Raya • sentiment is Rahasia ( 19 75 ) . 
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She wi l l  also , no doubt , seek to play a prominent part i n  the politics 
of the ASEAN region . But the se are perfec tly legi timate obj ec tives , 
provided they are pursued by legitimate means . They are not in  
themse lves evidence o f  a desire for aggrandi sement o f  either power or 
terri tory . The re may indeed be aspects o f  Indonesian national i sm and 
of the style of Indone sian politics  whi ch outsider s fi nd repugnant or 
frightening , but to infer that thi s is evidence of aggre ssive intent 
is  to oversimpli fy absurdly . One could easi ly imagine a state o f  
po litical instabil i ty deve loping , in whi ch Sukarnoesque policies o f  
mi litantly radical nat iona l i sm and assertive foreign policies could 
conceivably recur , the implications of which could be alarming for 
Australia and Papua New Guinea . But the dynamic s  of that kind o f  
polit ics entail something very di f ferent from the dynami cs o f  crude 
' expansioni sm ' . 
I t  has been put to me that even i f  my re j ection of the 
appropriatene ss of the term ' expansioni sm ' is accepted , we can hardly 
be surpri sed i f  many people in Papua New Guinea feel apprehensive 
about their country ' s  future when they contemplate Indonesia ' s  forei gn 
policy record . For she has on occasions had no compunction about 
re sorting to force and pursuing po licies whi ch could be described 
as  both interventioni st and aggre s s ive . Moreover , she has been inc lined 
to c laim that what happens in neighbouring countrie s  is a ma t ter o f  
direct concern to h e r  and she might d o  s o  y e t  again i f  there is  any 
collapse of governmental authority in Papua New Guinea which Indonesia 
regarded as posing some potential threat to her . Parti cularly i f  
Indonesia herse l f  subsided back into a n  era o f  political and social 
instabi lity remini scent of the late Sukarno era , the possibi lity of 
a reversion to more as sertive , interventioni s t  foreign policies could 
not be ruled out of consideration . 
While these points can hardly be denied , I think there are 
several strong reasons for believing that Papua New Guinea is mo st 
unlikely to become a target for Indone sian aggre s sion . A l l  the other 
episodes we have been considering here had to do wi th the process 
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o f  decoloni zation and the redrawing o f  the frontiers created by 
co lonial i sm .  The claims made t o  I rian Jaya and East Timor were to 
that extent sui generis. (Konfrontasi was also in part a response to 
the decolonization process , but in that case no c laim was made to 
Sarawak or Sabah . ) Neither in I rian Jaya nor in Eas t  Timor had the 
decoloni zation proce s s  been completed and international recognition 
through the UN achieved for a new and independent state i nor was there 
in either case , much e ffective international support for such an 
outcome , for the principle o f  sel f-determination cannot always be 
sustained in the course of the decoloni zation proce ss , as Bougainvi l le 
and Papua Besena have di scovered . But once the independence of a 
former co lony has been achieved and recognized internationally , 
challenges to i ts sovereignty are quite another matter . Moreover , as 
time passes , the new map o f  the post colonial world tends to achi eve 
fi rmer acceptance . To that extent , the case of Papua New Guinea i s  
radically di fferent from that o f  Irian Jaya and Ea st Timor . Papua 
New Guinea has been granted recogni tion as an independent , sovereign 
state quite explici tly by Indonesia and the re st o f  the world , so it 
would be extreme ly di ffi cult and embarrassing for her to go back on 
tha t .  President Suharto has vi sited Papua New Guinea , as well as 
both Indonesian foreign mini sters and numerous other officials . The 
government has c learly come to accept the status quo there and as  time 
passes the less likely it become s that this wi ll  be chal lenged . 
(Conceivably , i f  Papua New Guinea had crumbled into anarchy or a series 
of seces sioni st movements in 1 9 7 5 , immediately a fter independence , 
Indonesia might have been di sposed to intervene to restore order and 
central authori ty ,  but even that is very dubioUS i Mortimer i s  probably 
correct in his beli ef that Jakarta would have expected Australia to 
perform that task for her . ) As anyone who ha s ever canvassed the 
ma tter in Jakarta wi ll  attest , Indonesian o ffi cial s give very little 
attention to Papua New Guinea and basically j ust do not want to be 
bothered with addi tional problems , worry and expense in that quarter . 
Irian Jaya and Timor have already caused them more than enough already . 
They have required special financiai allocations , which i s  a cause o f  
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re sentment in other provinces . Unless there is a reversion to quite 
serious instabi lity and i rrationality in Indone sian politics , as in 
the late Sukarno era , I see no reason for Papua New Gui nea to fee l  
vulnerable t o  annexationi st des
.
ign s  in Jakarta . 
Jacob Pra i  and We s t  Papuan freedom fighter s (photo : Mark Baker ) 
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PAPUA NEW GU I NEAN PERC E P T I ON S  ON THE BORDER ; 
I NTERNAL PRE S SURES AND POL I C I E S  
Kwasi Nyamekye and Ralph R .  Premdas 
The Papua New Guinea-Indonesia border has been a source of some 
friction between the two countries since Papua New Guinea ' s  independence 
in 1975 . I n  June-July 19 7 8 , to demonstrate that it sincere ly sought 
I ndone sian friendship , Papua New Guinea collaborated with Indonesia in a 
massive mi litary operation along the border to uproot and des troy the 
OPM . 1 The Papua New Guinea government was pre s sured by Indone sia to act 
against the OPM . Caught between an e thni c  bond committing its emotions 
to support the Me lane sian freedom fighters on one hand , and a c le ar need 
to promote its national security against an I ndones ian menace on the 
other , the Papua New Guinea gove rnment had to make the extreme ly 
di fficult decision whether or not to e liminate the OPM from operating in 
its territory . I t  chose to expe l the OPM . The incident triggered off 
popular demonstrations and acts o f  di sapproval against the Papua New 
Guinea government , especially since I ndones i an soldiers ventured into 
Papua New Guinea territory in pursuit of the freedom fighters , destroyed 
vi llage s ,  and precipitated a f lood of re fugees into P apua New Guinea .
2 
Engaging in a j o int border operation with I ndonesia to e l iminate 
the OPM was a maj or foreign policy decis ion by the Papua New Guinea 
government . I t  entai led enormous risks by incurring popular disapproval 
and was premi sed on the proposition that it would win the friendship of 
its powerful neighbour thereby , at least temporari ly , e liminating a maj or 
1 .  See Mark Baker , 'Papua New Guinea Launche s Drive Against Rebel s '  , 
Sydney Morning Hera ld 6 June 1 9 7 8 ; also 'Rebel Hunt S teps up• , 
Pos t- Courier 2 1  June 1 9 7 8 . 
2 .  ' Papua New Guinea Row on Rebe l s ' , Age 8 July 1978 ; also Colleen 
Ryan , ' Papua New Guinea Government Attacked over Indone sian Raids ' ,  
Austra lian Financial Review 7 July 19 7 8 . 
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source of malaise between I ndonesia and Papua New Guinea . In reaching 
thi s  crucial decision , the Papua New Guinea government made a calculated 
gamble that its action would promote national security , to whi ch it  had 
ascribed greater priority over the more elusive and dangerous course of 
ignoring the use of its territory by the OPM guerri llas against 
I ndonesian presence in I rian Jaya . 
The purpose of thi s article i s  to describe the sources o f  
internal pressure exerted upon Papua New Guinea fore ign policy dec i sion 
makers . Of nece ssity ,  however , thi s  must be sketched against the l arger 
background of the con flict . Consequently , we have supplied some general 
pre liminary observations about the OPM and its activities in Papua New 
Guinea ,  about the I rian Jaya re fuge e s  in P apua New Guinea , and about 
Papua New Guinea ' s  interests in relation to the border . 
�e &M 
The OPM is  the direct offshoot of Dutch e f forts to instigate the 
formation of a nucleus of We st Papuan dissidents to fight for the 
exclusion of I ri an Jaya from an independent I ndone s i a . But when the 
cause of e s tabl i shing a separate Dutch colony or c lient-state fai led , 
and I rian Jaya was for all practical purposes turned over to I ndonesia 
on 1 5  August 1962 , many o f  the Dutch trained anti - I ndonesian di ssidents 
continued activity on the ir own initiative to free the territory and 
make it  an independent sove reign state . This  moti f has provided 
continuous j ustification for the exi stence of the OPM since its 
formation in 196 3 .  ' The Act of Free Choice '  was so devised by the 
Indonesians that the outcome of the musyawarah was guaranteed be fore a 
ballot was cast . OPM activi sts call the exercise ' The Act of No Choice ' .  
The OPM has two segments . One segment , based outside I rian Jaya , 
is  almost entirely engaged in political and propaganda activities . The 
other segment , based wi thin I ri an Jaya and areas contiguous to the P apua 
New Guinea- I rian Jaya border , is both mi li tary and political in purpose . 
The mi litary arm i s  often called the Tentara Nas ional Papua or TNP . 
However , we sha l l  use the term OPM to re fer to the rebel movement as a 
whole . 
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S ince it was formed in 196 3 ,  the OPM h a s  witne ssed the gradual 
and e f fective conso lidation of I ndones ian control o f  I rian Jaya . Large 
numbers of non I riane se from the Moluccas , Sulawe s i , and Java migrated to 
I rian Jaya so that by 1969 , when ' the Act of Free Choice ' occurred , a 
subs tantial part of the territory ' s  urban population , concentrated in 
the provincial capital Jayapura , was non Me lanes ian . A prograrrme o f  
I ndone s iani zation proceeded systematically in all  government , cultural , 
and educational institutions .  Many I rianese participated in these 
changes , but were alarmed by the progres sive loss of their Me lane s ian 
identity as wel l  as  the subj ugation of I ri anese in all walks o f  l i fe to 
Indone sian personnel .  The Suharto regime added a poli tico-mil itary 
repressive dimension to I ndones i an control over I rian Jaya ,  limiting 
meaningful local partic ipation in col lective decision making . 
From all  of  these sources , then - ' forced incorporation ' ,  
' cultural imperialism ' ,  ' loss of land ' , ' political repres s ion ' ,  and so 
on - the OPM gathered sustenance and support from frustrated I rianese . 
At various times the OPM sought sel f-determination only for I rian Jaya , 
but on other occas ions it envi saged its liberation e fforts as part o f  
a pream t o  establish a n  independent Melanes ian Federation encompassing 
not only I ri an Jaya and Papua New Guinea but also the Solomon I s lands , 
New Hebrides , F i j i ,  and New Caledonia . P apua New Guinea ' s  independence 
in September 1975  encouraged the OPM to be lieve that it too could 
achieve independence from its colonial master . Indeed , the OPM , viewing 
an independent Papua New Guinea as an important ally to promote I rian 
Jaya ' s  independence , liberally uti liz ed P apua New Guinea territory to 
establish bases from which attacks against the Indones ian presence in 
I rian Jaya were launched . 
The OPM ' s active guerri lla force has never been very large . 
Controversy about its precise s ize range s from 20 , 000 trained gueri llas 
( the figure from the OPM) to 2 , 000 . Most re liable sources accept a more 
modest figure of 400- 600 hard core guerrillas .
1 Vi llage s contiguous to 
1 .  Mark Baker , ' Playing the Number Game ' , Age 2 6  September 1978 ; 
see also Peter Hastings , ' Indone s ians I rritated at Australian 
Attitudes ' ,  Sydney Morning Hera ld 2 9  July 1978 . 
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the border , o n  each s ide , have demonstrated steadfast support for the 
activities of the OPM troops most of whom are indi stinguishably dre ssed 
like ordinary vi llagers . 
The OPM in Papua New Guinea . Attacking I ndones ian installations and 
soldiers required the OPM to secure a source of re spite beyond the 
pursuit of the wel l  equipped I ndonesian counter- insurgency force s .  This 
they obtained not only from their thick j ungle hideouts but also by 
crossing the border into Papua New Guinea territory . Consequently , a 
substantial amount o f  OPM activity has tended to concentrate around the 
border , particularly the northern sector not far from Jayapura and 
Vanimo . To the guerri llas , the borde r ,  lacking clear demarcation lines 
and poorly guarded ,  is  a seamle s s  web through whi ch a flow of men ,  
medicines , and small weapons move . While mos t  o f  the guerri l las ' 
supplies of food and weapons appear to come from their own e fforts and 
from supporters on both side s of the border , other kinds of support , 
particularly information , and morale and political direction , appear to 
be obtained through a network o f  secure contacts established partly in 
Papua New Guinea . About 10 , 000 I rianese re fugees , most sympathetic to 
the OPM but legally pledged not to support the movement , re side in 
. f . 1 various parts o Papua New Guinea , mainly in Port More sby . From 
the se re fugees a maj or source of the OPM ' s external assi stance flows to 
the border . For instance , the ' South Pacific News Agency ' which i s  the 
propaganda mouthpiece of ' the Provincial Revolutionary Government of 
West Papua New Guinea ' ,  i s  secretly located in Port Moresby . However , 
it  is di fficult to evaluate how salient external assistance i s  to the 
survival o f  the movement . 
Unti l recently , the OPM force s have limi ted their activitie s to 
ambushe s o f  I ndone sian patrols and use of sabotage , terrorism , and 
kidnapping . Some of this  has already occurred . I n  1 9 7 7  the OPM 
claimed that it was re sponsible for sabotage that dis rupted operations 
of the large American owned Freeport copper mine in I rian Jaya . In  
February 19 78 , nine I ndonesian officials  including the provincial 
1 .  The o fficial e stimate i s  2 , 000- 3 , 000 ; c f .  p .  98 be low ( Ed . ) 
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governor o f  I rian Jaya and senior mi litary and intelligence officers 
were kidnapped by the OPM . The hostage s were used to demand a ' round 
table ' conference with I ndonesia to di scuss the independence of I rian 
Jaya . Even Papua New Guinea ,  which has until recently turned a blind eye 
to OPM activities within Papua New Guine a , has been threatened with 
terrorist action i f  i t  doe s  not de sist from behaviour hosti le to OPM 
activitie s with in Papua New Guinea . 
Under I ndonesian pressure , the Papua New Guinea government has 
agreed to clean up its side of the border .  The OPM leader and deputy 
were arre sted and gaoled by the Papua New Guinea government for i l legal 
entry in September 1 9 7 8 . All thi s  attes ts to a new phase in the borde r 
conflict . The I ndones ians do not take the OPM for granted any more . 
Pre sident Suharto has reque sted that the prime minister o f  Papua New 
Guinea demonstrate his commitment to Indone s ia ' s territorial integrity 
by taking action against the OPM. The prime minister obliged him during 
June-July 1978 when the Papua New Guinea De fence Force launched a large 
anti OPM operation on the Papua New Guinea s ide of the border . 
Papua New Guinea po licy towards OPM. Jakarta ' s  preoccupation wi th 
ensuring that Port Moresby does not adopt a pro OPM policy stems from 
its sens itivity towards the OPM and its belie f that Port Moresby is  
secre tly sympathetic towards the movement . A pro OPM policy would 
complicate Jakarta ' s  abi lity to cope with the group ' s  activists . Safe 
sanctuaries would become avai lable ; weapons could reach the dissidents 
through Papua New Guinea , and Port Moresby might provide the group wi th 
the external voi ce it  has sought for so long . For the se reasons , 
Jakarta has obtained Port Moresby ' s  continuing reaffirmation that I rian 
Jaya i s  a part of the state o f  I ndonesia .  
I n  the communique i ssued a fter Mr Somare ' s  1 9 7 7  state vi sit to 
Indonesia , both heads of state pledged that their respective countrie s  
would not b e  used t o  conduct activitie s against the other , and during 
his state visit in May 1 9 7 8  Papua New Guinea ' s  Fore ign Affairs ministe r , 
Mr Olewale , ' assured his counterpart that the Government of Papua New 
Guinea wi ll take firm and e ffective measure s to safeguard th is 
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pledge ' . Afte r  his return , Olewale even stated that I ndone sia was 
suspicious o f  Papua New Guinea over the I ri an Jaya i ssue and maintained 
that ' We do not want I ndonesia to interpre t that we condone OPM . . .  
(There fore ) , we must now take decisive action against the people work ing 
. d . ' 
2 
against In one s i a  . Thi s  pledge was honoured in July 1978  when , for the 
first time , Papua New Guinea sent mi litary forces to patrol the border , 
and again in September , when Papua New Guinea arrested and gaoled the 
leader of OPM and his deputy . Although Port More sby maintained that its 
July border action was not the j oint border patrol favoured by Jakarta , 
it undoubtedly he lped Jakarta ' s  attempts to track down the dissidents 
because it  denied them acces s  to their sanctuaries on the Papua New 
Guinea s ide for some time . Thi s  i s  the sort of unambiguous ly pro 
Jakarta posture that the Suharto regime wants Port More sby to adopt . I t  
has dispe l led the view that Port Moresby has a dual border policy with 
Jakarta . 
One of Jakarta ' s  obj ectives in its borde r relations with Port 
More sby is to avoid the growth of a size able I riane se community in Papua 
New Guinea . There i s  fear that the I ri anese community has already grown 
too large and might open up channel s  o f  commun ication for the OPM . I n  
addi tion , it might b e  able t o  influence Port More sby ' s  border policies 
given the strong ethnic bond with P apua New Guinea .  Consequently , 
Jakarta ' s  policy has been to persuade Port Moresby to return most of the 
I riane se to I rian Jaya on the grounds that they are innocent vi llagers 
caught up in the border game being conducted by OPM . Jakarta believe s  
that most of these people cannot b e  class i fied as pol itical re fugees . 
There is  mutual de sire on both s ides to re solve the re fugee 
issue . Apart from the ·cost , Papua New Guinea has to weigh the 
humanitarian aspects of the problem . The o fficial Papua New Guinea 
1 .  Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Official Visit of his 
Excel lency Niwia Ebia Olewa le, the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and Trade of Papua New Guinea to the Republic of Indonesia, 
1 3- 21 May 1 9 78 .  
2 .  ' Indone sia i s  Suspi cious ' ,  Post- Courier 26  May 1 9 78 . 
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poli cy has been to secure Jakarta ' s  assurance o f  safe conduct be fore 
returning those I ri anese who express a wish to return home . Concerning 
I rianese permi ssive residents , Jakarta ' s  interest has been to ensure that 
they do not use Papua New Guinea as a base for anti I ndonesian 
activitie s .  At a pre s s  conference during his 1977  state visit to 
Indonesi a ,  the Papua New Guinea prime mini s ter , Mr Somare , admitted that 
there were about 500 OPM members living in the country . I t  would seem 
that Jakarta ' s  policy on Irianese re sidency in Papua New Guinea i s  
motivated b y  a de sire t o  prevent known OPM members cross ing the border 
and conducting activities that might harm re lations between the two 
countries . Evidence of this  policy was given by the first secretary of 
the I ndonesian Embassy in Port More sby , when he undiplomatically called 
on the Papua New Guinea government to seek reaffirmation of loyalty 
from ten natural ized ex- I ri anese citi zens named in the de facto 
government o f  West Papua in April 1978 . 
Jakarta i s  mos t  concerned about the involvement of the UN High 
Commissioner for Re fugees in a matter it regards as an internal affair . 
Some senior officials in Jakarta mai ntain that i f  a strict de finition o f  
a re fugee i s  applied , most o f  the people in the re fugee camps would not 
qual i fy to be there . This  i s , o f  course , a legali stic approach to an 
unmanageable pol itical problem. 
De spite the se di fficultie s ,  Jakarta remains hope ful that with 
goodwil l  on both sides the re fugees can be kept unde r reasonable control 
and that relations with Papua New Guinea over the border can be 
stabi lized . But growing economic di sparities between Papua New Guinea 
and I rian Jaya could compl icate thi s  policy . Pressure could be expected 
to bui ld up for I rianese to come to Papua New Guinea in search of better 
j obs . I f  this  happened , the notion of ' Me lanes ian brotherhood ' would 
face its most critical tes t , and the like ly influx of I ri anese into 
Papua New Guinea in search of j obs would put border re lations between 
the two countries in a more complex environment . 
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Papua New Guinea ' s  interests . 
The Papua New Guinea-I rian Jaya border i s  more than j ust an 
i rritant to Papua New Guine a . I n  some ways the intere sts around thi s  
border can b e  j usti fiably classi fied as  vital . With over 200 , 000 
troops , I ndonesia has As ia ' s  third large s t  army . Very recently thi s  was 
deployed to invade and acqui re East Timar in de fiance of United Nations 
protests that the mi litary incursion was i llegal . Very sensitive to 
regional secce s s ionist movements which threaten to rend asunde r its 
fragile fabric at i ts ethni c  seams , I ndonesia could eas i ly overreact to 
OPM operations if they were enlarged and made e ffective . Clearly , Papua 
New Guinea ' s  interest in thi s  context is  at least to do nothing to aid 
the OPM freedom fighters lest I ndones ian rage be turned against the 
fledgling Papua New Guinea de fence forces of only 3 , 500 troops . A 
1 friendly I ndonesia i s  much less costly to relate to than a hos ti le one . 
Even Australi a , much better prepared than P apua New Guinea mi litarily 
to confront I ndonesia , has chosen a course of friendship laden with 
foreign aid rather than engage I ndonesia in cool or hostile re lations . 
In  opting for a policy that does not aid the OPM , the Papua New 
Guinea government exposes itsel f .  Politicians who are overtly 
sympathetic to the OPM wi l l  probably win much popular support from a 
maj ority o f  the country ' s  elite who have been brought up during the 
' confrontation ' period to detest and fear ' expansionist ' I ndone s ia . 
There are such politicians both in the government and in the opposition . 
Thi s  would be a very dangerous chauvinist game since nationalist 
pas s ions stirred to support ' Me lane sian Brothers ' across the border are 
likely to trigge r  a much larger and dangerous re sponse from the 
I ndonesians . Thi s  political problem points up the need for I rian Jaya 
border policies to be forged j ointly by both . 
1 .  For a detai led exposition o f  the rationale for the Papua New 
Guinea border policy see Somare ' s  statement in Draft Hansard 
7 August 1978 page s 9/1/1- 3 ;  also see O lewale ' s  statement in 
Draft Hansard 17 August 1 9 7 8  pages 2 1/7/2- 3 .  
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I n  e f fect , opting for a policy of  neutrality t o  the OPM entails  
foregoing the temptation to mobi lise dome s ti c  anti I ndonesian pre j udice s 
in national politics . In  turn , the Papua New Guinea citizenry may well  
have to accommodate i ts e l f  to secret diplomacy on the border i ssue so as 
to minimi se the chances of uns crupulous political outbidders seeking to 
use the border problem to promote personal political intere sts . I n  
following thi s  policy , there wil l  b e  no e scape from periodic criticisms 
of the Papua New Guinea government that it is permitting itse l f  to be 
' bullied ' or ' blackmai led ' by its mi lita rily superior neighbour . What is  
lost in face i s  compensated for by buying hard international security , 
unle ss  Papua New Guinea ' s  compromises on the OPM cause are interpreted 
by the Indonesians as  a s ign o f  weakness and taken as an invitation to 
intervene indirectly in the political li fe of  Papua New Guinea .  In  
suppress ing overtly its supportive linkages to the OPM , the Papua New 
Guinea government will  take a calculated gamble that the mi litary regime 
in Indonesia will  not go furthe r by demanding that political freedoms in 
Papua New Guinea be curtailed . 
Papua New Guinea ' s  border intere sts are also re lated to the 
re fugee problem. Already there are ove r 10 , 000 re fugees in Papua New 
Guinea ( see p .  68 ) . The 1 , 000 to 1 , 300 recent re fugees require about 
K2 , 000 daily to maintain . Thi s  can be partly o ffset by subsidies from 
the UN ,  but the refugee i ssue goes wel l  beyond the immediate issue of 
cost . The long run dangers are both economic and political . A stream 
of  re fugees would entail competition with Papua New Guinean citi zens 
for j obs and servi ce s .  Already some o f  thi s  has been experienced . The 
Papua New Guinea gove rnment has an ongoing interest in upli fting the 
material we ll-being o f  its own citizens before distributing its scarce 
resources to its ' Me lanesian Brothers ' .  Many of  Papua New Guinea ' s  
elite who strongly espouse a policy of aiding the OPM are yet to 
consider seriously the e conomic rami fications in the event that the ir 
pro OPM sentiments led to a uni fi cation of Papua New Guinea and I rian 
Jaya . Papua New Guinea is  much more advanced economically than I rian 
Jaya . Even within Papua New Guinea strong j ealous ies are inflamed over 
regional inequality in the distribution o f  commercial and agricultural 
proj ects . One can envisage the sort of  turmoil that would engul f the 
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entire nation i f  a l l  Papua New Guinea provinces had to sacri fice large 
parts of thei r  budget to assist the I rian Jaya provinces to ' catch up ' .  
On a much smaller scale the growth o f  the refugee population may 
eventually lead to a backlash agains t  the present pol icy makers who 
must solve unemployment di fficulties concentrated most heavi ly among 
Papua New Guinean school leavers and urban migrants . 
On the political front , the growth of a refugee population could 
be more explos ive . The I rianese re fugees in Papua New Guinea today 
provide a maj or source of support to the OPM . Not only do they 
communicate OPM grievances to Papua New Guineans , many of whom quicky 
turn against the Asian menace , but they develop an uncompromis ing body 
of popular opinion which makes dec i sion making on the border issue very 
difficul t .  Papua New Guinean dec i s ion makers may b e  exposed to 
political pressure to support the OPM from a voci ferous I rianese-derived 
urban population , many o f  whom have intermarried with Papua New 
Guineans . I f  the Papua New Guinea government seeks to ignore the 
demands of thi s  small group , it c an face blackmail in the form of lost 
vote s , demonstrations and even terrori st threats agains t  Papua New 
Guinea government instal lations . 
Thi s  scenario i s  not unrealisti c . When the Papua New Guinea 
government announced in 1 9 7 7  that it  was demanding that the OPM 
e liminate i ts bases from Papua New Guinea territory , certain OPM 
di ssidents announced that they would unleash terrorist attacks against 
the Papua New Guinea government . The same sort o f  threat was made when 
the Papua New Guinea gove rnment announced that it was not returning to 
the I ri an Jaya j ungles OPM leaders who were arre sted and gaoled in P apua 
New Guinea . 
Finally , P apua New Guinea , as part of a regional bloc of pro 
Western countries ,  is not like ly to win friends from its powerful 
regional neighbours who may view the OPM as  a threat to regional 
stability .  Papua New Guinea ' s  economy is intimately dependent on 
Aus tralia for aid , trade and forei gn inve stment . Australia provide s 
annually about $A2 2 5  mi ll ion or 3 5 per cent of the Papua New Guinea 
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budge t .  Australia does not wish t o  engage I ndonesia i n  a n  unnecessary 
conflict . I ndeed , it  has care ful ly evolved a workable peace ful economic 
and political neighbourly arrangement with Indone s i a . I t  is  extreme ly 
doubtful that Australia would ass ist Papua New Guinea if it should be 
attacked by Indonesia because Papua New Guinea refused to re strain or 
e liminate the OPM on i ts side of the border .  Austral ia must calculate 
its own gains and losses from supporting Papua New Guinea in such an 
engagement . Papua New Guinea wil l  face not only I ndones i an hostility 
but powerful Australian and US e conomic and political pres sures should 
it seek to inflame the border , inviting hostile foreign force s to 
penetrate and di sturb the stability of the region . 
Papua New Guinea ' s  border po licy : interna l pressures .  
Papua New Guinean policy o n  the border i s  a calculated 
consequence of complex factors , some internal others external , 
converging on the central decision makers , the National Security 
Council . Some factors support the adopted poli cy , others are opposed . 
This  part of the paper tries to identify , class i fy and evaluate the 
internal pressures . As in mos t  policy choice s , an adopted position i s  
rare ly without ambiguitie s and contradictions . 
The four main internal pressures a f fecting the decision makers 
re sponsible for the Papua New Guinea-I rian Jaya borde r are : ( i )  the 
' Melanes ian Brothers ' pressure whi ch capitalizes on ethnic bonds ; ( i i )  
the ' inte llectual- ideological ' groups whi ch oppose the I ndonesian regime 
and its al leged expans ionist de s i gns ; ( ii i )  the ' pragmatists ' ,  a 
variety of people and interests arguing for acconunodation with I ndonesia 
in  the light of Papua New Guinea ' s  economi c and mi li tary capabi l ities ; 
( iv) the parliamentary opposition whi ch institutionally opposes the 
ruling gove rnment ' s  policie s . 
'Me lanesian Brothers ' .  A s i gni ficant segment of those individuals and 
groups who oppose the Papua New Guinea government ' s  recognition of 
I ndones ian territorial sovereignty over I rian Jaya are motivated by 
sub j ective sentiments asserting fraternal and ethnic links between the 
Melanesian re sidents on both side s of the bord�r . Emotional and 
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uncompromis ing , thi s  pressure derive s its support mainly from educated 
Papua New Guineans ,  vi l lagers near to the border ,  University students , 
Irianese re fugee s ,  and a number of parliamentarians . They are not 
organiz ed as a coherent group that can be readily mobiliz ed for quick 
action , but they constitute a large sector of the population that 
influences government policy , and they expres s  their opinions fairly 
e ffectively . 
The students from the two national universi ties , for example , are 
among the most highly educated persons in Papua New Guinea .  They have 
mounted several demons trations on behal f  of the I rianese against 
Indones ia ' s  actions in I rian Jaya and East Timor . Many public servants 
abandoned their desks and participated in these demonstration s . Several 
parliamentarians , such as Tony Bai s , Michael Pondros , John Noe l , Roy 
Evara , James Mopio , from both government and opposition benche s , have 
expres sed strong views against the government ' s  pol icie s towards the 
OPM. Together , these pro OPM supporters constitute a formidable body of 
opinion , we ll placed and highly regarded , capable of structuring the 
collective opinion and sentiments of P apua New Guineans in regard to the 
border . Thi s  mass-based , emotional and influential pressure point 
worries the government mos t ,  lest its views be permitted to become 
government pol icy , triggering open hostility between Papua New Guinea 
and I ndonesia . 
The intel lectua l-ideo logical anti Indonesian foPces . This group i s  anti 
I ndone sian partly because of the repres sive regime that has ruled 
Indonesia since Sukarno ' s  overthrow and partly because of the Suharto 
regime ' s  economic deve lopment strategy under which fore ign multinational 
corporations are given a free hand in I ndonesia . Further , it bel ieve s  
that I ndone sia has expansionist de s i gns on Papua New Guinea , as 
witnes sed by the events in East Timor . Pre s sure from this source comes 
mainly from local and fore ign university students , lecturers , 
j ournali sts , and artists , mainly resident in Port More sby . Composed of 
widely respected and exceptionally able persons such as Bernard Narakobi 
and John Kasaipwalova , thi s  group is much smaller than the first but 
shares some of its arguments . It is articulate but only sporadic in its 
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outbursts against the government . Several foreign university lecturers 
and j ournalists , mostly from Austral ia and New Zealand , play a small 
supportive role in collaboration with like minded local intellectuals . 
Thi s  group lacks direct access to the government decis ion makers and 
depends heavi ly on the mass media for its impact . 
The Pragmatists . These individuals weigh the e conomic and mil itary 
costs involved , and argue that Papua New Guinea should pursue a pol icy 
of non interference in I ndones i an affairs . Whi le they are sympathetic 
with their ' Me lanes ian Brothers ' across the border , they argue that 
colonialism was re sponsible for the boundary and Papua New Guinea now 
has no choice but to comply with the historical facts of li fe . 1 They 
urge that avai lable time and resource s be used on more pre ssing 
national i ssues such as  rural development and unemployment , and warn 
that I ndone sia is too powerful to antagonize . The pragmatists note 
with anxiety that the lack of re straint in express ions by groups opposed 
to I ndonesia ' s  control o f  I ri an Jaya wil l  probably trigger ' prophetic 
ful filment ' and bring about precisely what was to be avoided , 
Indone sia ' s acquisition of Papua New Guinea .  
The pragmatists are very few , general ly quiet , but strategically 
placed in the decis ion making system to formulate policy on the border . 
They are composed o f  high ranking members of the Papua New Guinea public 
service , overseas advisers to the Papua New Guinea foreign office , 
senior officers of P apua New Guinea ' s  de fence and intelligence 
organizations , and many c abinet members o f  the Somare government . 
Because of their pos ition , they cannot agitate on the streets . They are 
general ly privy to secret information on the border and , consequently , 
find themselves unable to speak out in publi c . They tend to advocate 
secret diplomacy on the border , no consultation with the parliamentary 
opposi tion , l imited dis tribution of information to the parliament , and 
practically no consultation with the broad base of the Papua New Guinea 
citizenry . 
1 .  This  i s  the argument expre ssed by the government in 1978 . See 
footnote 1 on p.  72 . 
78  
The parliamentary opposition . The National Party , the parliamentary 
oppos ition party led by I ambakey Okuk , has endeavoured to exploit the 
government ' s  handling o f  the borde r i ssue . I n  a maj or statement , the 
opposition criticiz ed the government for its failure to inform the 
people about events on the border and called on it to consult with the 
opposi tion to formulate j oint policies on the border . 1 The opposition 
has also demanded that the government invite the UN to patro l  the 
border and settle the i ssue .
2 
I t  has severe ly critici zed the government 
for its hostil ity to the OPM , arguing that its foreign poli cy s logan 
' Friends to all  and enemies to none ' has been contradi cted by government 
3 
attacks on the OPM . . 
The opposition has criticiz e d  the government further for 
mi shandling the border issue . Several oppos ition parliamentarians have 
expre ssed strong support for the OPM , though whether as individual 
sentiments or official opposition viewpoints is not c lear . Part of the 
confusion stems from the fact that the oppos ition is a coalition o f  
three separate parties . The opposi tion h a s  expressed sentimental 
concern for the OPM, but has not expressed any concerted or systematic 
opposition to the speci fi c  pol icies adopted .  
Evaluation for the future . 
Papua New Guinea ' s  relations with I ndonesia over the border are 
replete with potentially destab i l i z ing e lements . The current 
equilibrium could be easily upset by a variety of internal factors in 
e ither Papua New Guinea or I ndones i a .  I n  Papua New Guinea ,  a new 
government more responsive to popular demands to support ' our Me lane sian 
Brothers ' may assist or at least tole rate OPM activities within Papua 
1 . See ' Re-Think on Foreign Policy ' , Post- Courier 9 June 1978 . 
2 .  ' Apologise - Gui se call to I ndone sians ' ,  Post- Courier 2 1  June 
19 7 8 . 
3 .  see Okuk ' s  statement in Draft Hansard 7 August 1978  page 10/1/2 . 
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New Guinea .  Contradictions and ambiguities wi ll  continue to bedevil the 
government . I n  human rights , Papua New Guinea can be accused of 
cooperating with a repres sive mi litary regime that seeks to destroy a 
self- determination movement with legi timate claims to a separate 
homeland . Further ,  the prevai ling policy can have grave dome stic 
repercuss ions . To maintain the current posture that seeks to 
depoliticize the border i ssue by limiting the avai lability of 
information to ordinary citizens , the Papua New Guinea gove rnment wil l  
have t o  conduct secret diplomacy t o  solve ongoing problems . This  could 
provide shelter on national security grounds for government incompetence 
and undermine the long run operation of P apua New Guinean democracy , 
under whi ch citi zens must be kept informed and must be al lowed to 
participate in the formulation o f  relevant decisions . 
Whi le undertaking to expel the OPM from its territory partly to 
sati s fy i ts regional neighbours ' need for security and stability ,  Papua 
New Guinea has yet to bargain for an explicit quid pro quo guaranteeing 
that it  would not be invaded or mi litari ly haras sed by Indone s i a . 
Conce ivably , the OPM , ' which is  today treated with hostility by the Papua 
New Guinea government , may be needed in future if an attack by I ndones i a  
should eventuate . I n  open warfare the OPM , with its popular support in 
I ri an Jaya , could provide a buffer against I ndonesian incurs ions or , at 
least , enlarge the scope o f  the I ndonesian undertaking to mi l itari ly 
acquire all  of the New Guinea i s land . Although highly unlikely , the 
possibi lity cannot be rej ected . 
L IV I NG W I TH A L I ON . PUB L I C  ATT I TUD E S  AND 
P RIVATE F E E L I NG S . 
R . J .  May 
Over the years the Papua New Guinea government has made 
abundantly c lear i ts unquali fied a cceptance of Indonesia ' s  sove reignty 
in I rian Jaya and o f  the coro llary ,  that Indone s i a ' s  action against 
di s sident elements in  the province i s  a matter of internal policy and 
not a concern of Papua New Guinea . At the same time , there ha s been 
wide spread recognition o f  an underlying conflict between Papua New 
Guinea ' s  o fficial policy , dictated by the pol i tical reality of the 
si tuation , and the fundamental sympathies of Papua New Guineans for 
their Melane sian neighbours , sympathies whi ch have been made explici t 
on occasion even by the prime minister and suc cessive forei gn ministers . 
There i s  no doubt that , without a f fec ting i ts acceptance o f  Indonesian 
sovereignty in Irian Jaya , the Papua New Guinea government has , over 
time , exerci sed varying degrees o f  di ligence in  i ts administration o f  
the borde r and Indone s i a ' s  recogni tion o f  thi s  fact has brought tensions 
in the re lations be tween the two countries . 
Our obj ect here i s  to de scribe Papua New Guinea ' s  handling 
o f  the border i s sue , in  a hi storical context , and to examine some of 
the dome stic pol i tical forces which a ffect o fficial po licy , parti cularly 
in relation to the events of 1977  and 1 9 7 8 . 
1 The co lonia l legacy . 
Unti l we ll  into the 1960s , within Papua New Guinea the concern 
over the We st New Guinea issue was largely that of Australian colonial 
o fficial s  and an already s lightly paranoid expatriate busine s s  and 
p lanter communi ty .  
1 A more deta i led account of the period up to 1 96 9  i s  to be found in 
Verrier ( 1976 chapter 11 ) , from whi ch thi s sec tion has drawn Al so 
see Hasluck ( 1 976 chapter 30 ) for an ' inside ' view of the period . 
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The concern o f  Austral ian o fficials was for the most part .a 
re flec tion of the Australian government ' s  atti tude toward We st New 
Guinea . Up ti ll  the end of the 1950s thi s atti tude was dominated by 
Australia ' s  perception o f  the importance o f  the i sland to Aus tralia ' s  
securi ty . The Australian government supported Holland in i ts denial 
of Indonesia ' s  territorial claims to We st New Guinea , it establi shed a 
numbe r  of new patrol posts in the border areas , and it  entered into 
agreements for adminis trative cooperation between Dutch and Australian 
officials in the two territories , par ti cularly in matters o f  j oint 
concern such as health and quarantine . 
The announcement in 1959 that Aus tralia would recogni ze any 
peace ful agreement between Hol land and Indone sia on the We st New 
Guinea i s sue gave the first indication of a change in policy in favour 
of Indonesia , anticipating Australia ' s  acceptance o f  the trans fer of 
sovereignty in 1 96 2 . Notwithstandi ng thi s , rela tions be tween Austra lia 
and Indonesia continued to deteriorate during the fi rst hal f o f  the 
1960s and Aus tralian fears of a possible Indonesian invasion of Papua 
New Guinea re sulted in a dramati c  increase in defence spending in Papua 
New Guinea and a subs tantial outlay on airstrips , wharve s and other 
infras truc ture in the border areas . 
The immediate impact of the transfer o f  sove reignty was an 
inflow of We st Papuan nationali sts into Papua New Guinea . As far as 
possible the Aus tralian admini s tra tion dealt wi th the se cross ings as 
though they were traditiona l movements and encouraged the border 
c rossers to return , but a small number was granted permi ssive residency . 
Wi th the growing resistance to I ndone sian rule in We st New Guinea from 
196 5 ,  movement into Papua New Gui nea increased sharply . There was , 
moreover , a number of border inc idents as I ndonesian patrols pursued 
I rianese across the border . The Australian re sponse has been well  
summari zed by Ve rrier ( 1 9 76 : 366-7 ) 
Along wi th the trouble s in WNG as a whole , the Australian 
Governme nt played this down [and ] , from 1967 , to avoid 
embarrassing Indone sia , took a toughe r line on border 
crossing even of the traditional kind which had been 
tolerated in the past . 
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She adds 
Contrary to offi cial public s tatements the maj ority of 
I ri anese who crossed the border in 1968 and 1969 
undoubtedly did so for politi cal reasons , j ust as  most 
o f  them were undoubtedly sent back for poli tical reasons . 
I n  addi tion there i s  no doubt that Irianese dis sident 
aci tivi ty directed against I ndonesia had a base i n  the 
bush camp s  on the Australian side of the internationa l  
border . One result was a number o f  border incident s  o f  
potentially serious proportion , and yet ano ther was 
the creation o f  liai son arrangements between Aus tralia 
and Indonesia to resolve them . 
The anxieti e s  o f  the expatriate population during the 1950s  
and early 1960s are recorded i n  the page s o f  the South Pacific Post 
(which mai ntai ned a regular coverage o f  events in  Wes t  Irian throughout 
the 1960s ) and the debate s  of the Legi slative Council . They urged 
support for the Dutch position unti l it became obvious that thi s was 
a lost cause and they used the spectre o f  an I ndone sian invasion to 
gain support for a Me lanesian Federation and for proposals that Papua 
New Guinea become a seventh state o f  Australia . 
Paradoxically , considering the re lative leve l s  o f  social and 
e conomic deve lopment in the two terri torie s , in 196 2 there was not in 
Papua New Guinea , as there was in Wes t  New Guinea , a conspicuous nationalist 
e l i te . Hence the reaction from wi thin Papua New Guinea to the trans fer 
o f  sovereignty in that year was a lmost entire ly an expatriate reaction . 
However i n  January 196 2 delega te s  to a local government council 
conference i n  Port Moresby passed a resolution against an Indonesian 
takeover of Wes t  New Guinea i in  June 1962 John Gui se told Papua New 
Guinea ' s  Legi s lative Counci l  that hi s electorate had asked him to 
expre s s  concern over the fate of West New Guinea and that he supported 
an immediate re ferendum in Wes t  New Guinea , and in August ( fo llowing 
a meeting of the South Paci fic Commi ssion ) Gui se was one of three Papua 
New Guinean signatories to a letter sent to the secretary-general o f  
the Uni ted Nations critici zing the UN ' s  handling o f  the que s tion . 
During the second hal f  o f  the 1960s the situation changed qui te 
profoundly i indeed Verrier ( 1976 : 369 ) ha s sugge sted that the We st 
New Guinea dispute was a catalyst in the emergence o f  Papua New Guinean 
national i sm in the 1960s and has commented furthe r (Verrier 1976 : 20 0 ) 
that 
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In  the unprecedented flurry o f  activi ty which took place 
in PNG [i n  the 1960s ] large ly because o f  Australia ' s  
own fears o f  Indone sia , those fears were firmly implanted 
in the minds o f  PNG ' s  first e l i te where they were to 
remain when for Australia they had gone . 
I n  a review of Austra lian admi nistration i n  Papua New Guinea from 
1951 to . 196 3 former Te rri tories Mini ster Has luck ha s wri tten ( 1 9 76 : 37 2 ) , 
' My impression was that mos t  of the indigenous peop le in our Territory 
who were at all  aware o f  the events were anti -Indone sian in sentiment ' .  
In  1965 , wi th I riane se refugees flowing into the Sepik and Western 
Provinces in  large numbers , and Australian officials  putting pres sure 
on them to return , na tional members of the first House of As sembly 
appealed for sympathe tic consideration of Irianese pleas for asylum 
and demanded a c lear policy on the refugee i ssue . 1 One o f  the most 
prominent spokesmen for the Irianese was the member for Upper Sepik 
Open , Wegra Kenu . Kenu , from Yako vi llage (where the Admini s tration 
had recently purchased land for the resettlement of refugee s ) , had 
been to school in Hollandia and had relatives on both sides of the 
border . Others included Paul Langro (member for West Sepik Open , who 
later became deputy leader o f  the oppos i tion and opposition spokesman 
on foreign a ffairs ) and Guise , who had become leader of the elected 
members of the House . In  the same year , Gui se and Uni ted Party leader 
Mathias Taliman , attending a UN meeting in New York , spoke with the 
UN secretary-general and demanded that the ' Ac t  of Free Choice ' be 
a true referendum (Ve rrier 1 9 76 : 38 5 ) . 
As the ' Act of Free Choice ' approached , ac tivi ty along the 
border intensified . By the end o f  1968 about 1 200 re fugees were 
reported to have cros sed and over 200  were granted permi s sive re sidency . 
In November 1968 , i n  response to repeated que s tioning of Admini s tration 
policy on the border (principal ly by former mi ssiona ry , Percy Chatterton ) 
the secretary for law told the House that in vi ew o f  the rapid bui ld 
up of Irianese camp s on the Papua New Guinea side of the border over 
the past few weeks , ' together wi th indi cations that the camps were 
focal point s  for pol i tical activi ty ' ,  the Admi ni s tration had informed 
1 See HAD I ( 6 ) : 924-5 , 3 1  August 1 96 5 . 
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the refugees that they must return to the Irian Jaya side of  the border ; 
near Sekotchiau a shelter had been destroyed 'owi_ng to i ts i nsanitary 
d . . ' 
1 
con i tion . Five days later the member for Eas t  Sepik Regiona l , Michael 
Soma.re , moved 'That thi s  House expresses its sympathy wi th the plight 
o f  the Wes t  I rianese refugees in the Terri tory and urges the Admini s tration 
to treat .them wi th every consideration ' .  Somare was supported by 
Chatterton but o f ficial members attacked the motion as implyi_ng 
c riti c i sm o f  the Admi ni s tration ' s  a lready liberal policy and it was 
2 
defeated . 
I n  June there was a further debate on the I ri an Jaya si tuation , 
occasioned by an official s tatement following border violations by 
I ndonesian troops at Wutung and Kwari . 3 Chatterton successfully moved 
an amendment to the s tatement ,  express ing di smay that the UN was 'not 
prepared to insist on the holding o f  a genuine act o f  free choice ' and 
requesting the Aus tralian government to transmi t the motion to the UN .  
During the debate a number of members expressed sympathy wi th their 
Melanesian brothers but , i nterestingly , their ire was directed not so 
much at Indonesia ( several spec i fi cally said they had no di spute wi th 
I ndonesia ) as at the UN ; members were quick to point out that though 
the . UN had thought fit to criticize the conduc t of the elec tions i n  
Papua New Guinea in 1 9 6 8  i t  was conspicuous ly silent o n  the denial o f  
free choice to the I rianese . 
I n  May 1969 about five hundred students , church leaders and 
others s�aged a march through the streets o f  Port Moresby , following 
a forum at the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG ) , and a petition 
was presented to the Administra tor protesting _against the Australian 
qovernment ' s  tacit support of Indonesia . 
1 
2 
3 
After the 'Act of Free Choice • there were numerous comp laints , 
HAD ! ! ( 3 ) : 589-90, 20 November 1 968 . 
See HAD ! ! ( 3 ) : 67 1-4 , 25  November 1 968 . 
See HAD I I ( 5 ) : 1 1 3 1- 3 , 1 34 2 -6 , 1436-44 ; 1 7 , 26 and 2 7  June 1969 . Also 
see Goode ( 1 9 70 ) . 
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expressed in the House of Assembly and through letter s to the Post­
Courier , that the Australian admini s tration was p utti ng pre ssure on 
refugee s to return to I rian Jaya . 
The reaction of Papua New Guineans to the West New Guinea 
que sti�n in thi s  p eriod was a complex of at lea s t  three elements . I n  
the first place there was a genuine sympathy for the position of these 
fel low Melane sian people ;  a s  no les ser p erson than Michael Sornare said 
in 1969 , ' We are the same people ' 1 Th.:i_ s syrnpa thy increased as  
the evidenc e of I ndonesian repression in I rian Jaya mounted and as  a 
growing number of Iriane se took up residenc e  in  Papua New Guinea and 
brought stories of repre s s ion and persecution . Secondly , the way in 
which not only the Dutch but a l so the Uni ted S tate s , Australia and in 
turn the United Nations capitulated to I ndones ia ' s  di splay of truculence 
caused concern among the more thoughtful members of Papua New Gui nea ' s  
elite . This  wa s pungently expres sed by Chatterton at the UPNG forum 
in 1 969 (as  recorded in Ni laidat 2 ( 2 ) ) :  ' If the United Nations rats 
in We st Irian now , it may wel l  be that in a few year s time it  wi ll  
rat in Ea st Irian . ' I t  wa s a l so a recurrent theme in comments in the 
House of Assembly and c l early lay behind some early Papua New Gui nean 
suppor t for seventh s ta tehood . Fina l ly , expressions of support for 
self-determina tion in West New Guinea were evidence of the emerging 
na tional i sm in Papua New Gui nea during the 1960s . By expressing sympa thy 
for the Irianese - par ticularly when o fficial pol icy wa s ac tive ly to 
discourage such expres sion
2 
- and by critici zing Aus tralia for i ts 
lack of moral fortitude , Papua New Gui neans were serving not ice on the 
Australian colonial regime of the ir own demands for self-determi nation . 
1 
2 
Even at thi s stage , however , Papua New Gui nean sympa thy for the 
HAD I I ( S ) : l 346 , 25 June 1969 . 
This wa s par tic ularly evident dur ing the June 1969 House of Assembly 
debate . Shortly before , Papua New Gui nean MHAs vi s i ting Aus tra lia 
had spoken about the comi ng ' act o f  free c ho ic e ' i n  I r i an Jaya and 
had been publ icly rebuked by Externa l  Terri tories Minister Barnes 
( see South Pacific Pos t 23 May 1969 ) . 
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p l ight of the Iriane se was not wi thout reserva tion . In  1965  Kenu 
( 1 965-66 : 10-12 ) had expres sed some fear s about the inflow of people 
from Wes t  Iria n ;  in 1968 Somare , while expre ss ing sympathy for them , 
said ' we must put them in different areas so tha t they cannot plan 
1 
unrest ' ,  and in 1 9 7 0  the member for Maprik Open ,  P ita Lus , to ld the 
2 House ' We· do not want these refugees to come here and make trouble . '  
More signi ficantly , a t  the UPNG forum i n  1969 Albert Maori Kiki 
disappoi nted s tudents by refusing to commit the Pangu Pat i on the 
Wes t  Irian question , stressing the need , on secur ity grounds , to see 
I ndonesia a s  a fri end , and i n  the House of As sembly Pangu member Tony 
Vouta s spoke of the need to ma intain a stable government in I ndones ia 
even a t  the expense of ' the human rights of the minority i n  Wes t  Irian . • 3 
The Irian Jaya ques tion in pos t independence Papua New Guinea. 
Although formal responsibi l i ty for Papua New Guinea ' s  foreign 
policy remained wi th the Australian government unti l Papua New Gui nea ' s  
independence i n  September 1 9 7 5 , in  prac tic e  the Somare government began 
to have a subs tantial say in pol icy formula tion from its acc e s s ion to 
office in 1 9 7 2 . 
On the que stion of Irian Jaya , as foreshadowed in the comments 
o f  Kiki and Voutas the coalition government did not seek to change 
the broad policy of the Austra lian government - indeed there were 
strong sugge stions in 1 9 7 2  and again in 1 9 7 3  tha t the Somare government 
was taking a much tougher line on Iriane s e  refugees than had the colonial 
admi ni stration be fore i t .
4 
Responding to questions about hi s government ' s  
deci sion in July 1 9 7 2  to deport eight Ir ianese border crossers , Somare 
was quoted as saying that acceptance of I rianese refugees wi th OPM 
sympathies could a ffec t relations wi th Indonesia ; 5 Austra lian External 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
HAD I I ( 3 ) : 6 7 1 ,  2 5  November 1 96 8 · 
HAD I I ( l2 )  : 3 709 , 19 November 1 9 7 0 . 
HAD I I ( 5 ) : 14 39 ,  2 7  June 1969 . 
See , for example , Age 2 1  August 1 9 7 2  and 2 3  July 1 97 3 .  
A ge 2 1  August 1 97 2 ;  also see Post-Courier 17 , 1 8  and 2 5  August 1 9 7 2  
and Sydney Morning Hera ld 1 8  August 19 7 2 . 
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Terri tories Mini ster Peacock , who se approval o f  the deportati on wa s 
required , wa s reported to have commented ' I t is  their country and 
they are entit led to determine who reside s there . •
1 
In  February 1 9 7 3  Somare , on behalf of the Aus tra lian government , 
signed an agreement wi th Indonesia which de fined the location of the 
border . There wa s little debate on the subsequent authori zing 
legi slation , the sole dissenting voice being tha t of Langro who was 
pointedly remi nded by Somare ' that we have a population of only 2 . 5  mi l lion 
people whi le Indonesia ha s about 100 mi llion people .  When we see such 
a big population in the country border ing our s  we mus t  not create any 
di sputes wi th Indonesia . •
2 
A further agreement , on admi ni strative 
border arrangements, wa s signed in late 1 9 7 3 . Thi s covered such ma tters 
a s  tradi tional land rights , tradi tiona l  movement , he alth , quarantine 
and pollution , and lia i son arrangements , which had been the subj ects 
of early agreements , and an important new provi sion , the obligation 
of both parties to prevent the use of their respec tive terri tor ies 
3 
for hostile activities against the other . 
During the early 1 9 70s border crossings conti nued , though on 
a much reduced scale , and the number of Irianese granted permi ss ive 
residency increa sed . However , wi thi n  Papua New Guinea popular interest 
in  the Irian Jaya si tuation seems to have dimini shed as  people became 
more preoccupied with maintaining interna l harmony and wi th the 
general business of preparing for independence . In official sta tements , 
which provided the first outlines of the country ' s  ' univer salist ' 
foreign poli cy , par ticular re ferenc e  was made to the fr iendship and 
understandi ng which exi sted between Papua New Guinea and Indone sia 
and it wa s acknowledged tha t ' Indonesia ha s shown understandi ng in our 
4 role of granting permi ssive res idence to Irian Jaya refugees . 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Austra lian Financia l Review 18 August 1 97 2 .  
See HAD I I I ( l S ) : 18 3 1- 3 ,  1840-4 , 1 8 , 1 9  June 1 9 7 3 .  
The agreement i s  reproduced below a s  appendix 1 .  
Address by the then Chief Mini ster (Mr Michael Somare )  to the Australian 
Institute of Internat ional Affairs , Melbourne , June 1974 (quoted in 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1976 : 17 ) . 
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But while in  o ff icial s tatements the Papua New Gui nea 
government was unreserved in i ts expre s s ions of friendship towards 
I ndonesia and its acceptance of I ndonesian sovereignty over Irian Jaya , 
i n  s tatements outs ide diplomatic circles the cons tant re ference to the 
relative si ze of populations and armed forces and to ' sleeping giants ' 
and ' l ions ' and the occas ional acknowledgement of Me lanesian brotherhood , 
left l i ttle doubt that Papua New Guinea ' s position was dic tated by 
expedience ra ther than sympathy . The si tuation wa s not improved by 
Indonesia ' s  invasion of Ea st Timer in 1 9 7 5 . 1 
I t  was perhaps thi s conflict between expedi ence and sympathy 
tha t prompted Kiki , a s  Mini ster for Defenc e , Foreign Relations and 
Trade , in  197 3  to initiate ' secret diplomacy ' designed ' to mediate 
between the rebe l s  and the Indonesian Government and bri ng about 
conditions where the two could have come together for construc tive 
consideration of the means of peaceful reintegration o f  the rebel groups 
, 2  
into the Irianese community . Over a period of years , wi th the ble s s ing 
of the I ndonesian government , Papua New Guinean mi ni sters and se nior 
o f ficials talked wi th rebel leaders from overseas and from the bush 
but they were unable to bring the Indonesians and the Irianese to the 
conference tabl e ,  largely , according to Kiki , because of divi sions 
wi thin the rebel movement . 
In 1976 the position of Irianese refugees aga in came into 
prominence . In February the Dutch based Revo lutionary Provi siona l 
Government of West Papua (RPG ) i ssued a release c laimi ng tha t 5 , 000  
(later the figure became 1 5 , 000 ) I ndonesian troops were involved in 
1 
2 
Papua New Guinea ' s  official conc ern over Indonesian inter vention in 
East Timer wa� elegantly stated by Kiki in a speech to the UN General 
As sembly in September 1976 (Department o f  Foreign Affairs and Trade 
1 9 76 : 4 7 -8 ) . After Somare s vi sit to I ndonesia in January 1 9 7 7 , 
however , the government adopted a more conc i liatory line , describing 
the Timer si tuation ' entirely as a domestic ma tter of Indone sia ' 
(Austra lian Foreign Affairs Record January 1 9 7 7 : 4 7 )  and in December 
1978  i t  opposed a UN resolut ion supporting sel f -determination for 
East Timer . For an account of popular reaction , see Samana ( 1 97 6 ) . 
� demonstration organi zed by the Women ' s  Action Group called on the 
government to take a stand against ' third world imperiali stic 
domi nation ' (Post-Courier 9 December 197 5 ) � 
See Post-Courier 2 3  February 1 97 6 � 
on the negotia tions . 
This  wa s the first publ ic statement 
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an offensive near the border in which napalm had been used and 1605 
vi llagers killed , and that Aus tralian of ficers of the Pac i fic I slands 
1 
Regiment had cooperated i n  sealing the border . The repor t was promptly 
denied by both Kiki and Somare and by the De fenc e Depar tment but Somare 
wa s clearly angered by the publicity it had received and to ld a pres s  
conference tha t the government would prosecute Papua New Guineans caught 
active ly suppor ting Irian Jaya freedom fighters and deport Iriane se 
permi ssive residents supporting them . ' We do not recogni ze rebe ls ' ,  
he said , ' We recogni ze I ndone sia ' s  sovereignty • . 2 In re sponse to thi s , 
a spokesman for the I rianese community i n  Port Moresby
3 
i s sued a 
s tatement saying that ' The threats o f  Government action against dis s idents 
must not go uncha llenged ' ,  tha t the Irianese may be forced to seek 
Communist aid , and tha t they would make representa tions to the UN High 
Commi ssioner for Re fugee s .  However , after Kiki had accused the group 
of breaching the condi tions o f  their residency and threa tened deportation 
4 the communi ty ' s  spoke sman re trac ted and the sub j ec t  was dropped . 
Later in  the same year the re fugee i s sue again became a poi nt 
of contention , thi s time as the result of an I ndones ian press  repor t .  
I n  December ,  shortly be fore a p lanned vi s i t  to I ndonesia by Somare , 
Papua New Guinea ' s  Nationa l  Broadca sting Commi s s ion relayed a report 
from the official I ndonesian newsagency Antara (apparently emanating 
from the Indonesian emba ssy in Port Moresby )  that talk s had begun 
between the Papua New Guinea and I ndonesian governments over the 
extradi tion of five hundred Irianese residents in Papua New Gui nea . 
Although the report was denied by Somare , the subj ect wa s ra i sed as 
a matter of public importance in the National Parliament where severa l 
speakers critici zed I ndonesia and the UN , recalled the invasion of 
1 
2 
3 
4 
See Post-Courier 18 February 1976 . 
Post-Courier 20  February 1 9 76 . 
According to the Pos t-Courier 24 February 1976  a community organi za tion 
had been e s tablished earlier for proposed round table talks wi th 
the I ndonesian and Papua New G uinea governments and repre sented 
about 200 people . 
Post-Courier 26 February 1976 . 
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East Timar , and demanded i ndependence for Irian Jaya . The member for 
Maprik Open , Pita Lus , told the House 
. . .  the United Nations is not doing its j ob to recogni ze 
the Wes t  Ir ian cause . I thi nk i t  i s  made up o f  lazy 
buggers ! I f  only thi s country could send me to the 
United Nations . . . I would tell  the Uni ted Nations to 
giye Wes t  Irian i ts freedom 
and the member for Manus , Michael Pondros , sai d ' i f we cannot reach 
any agreement , we should go to war . ' Nor were I ndonesians likely to 
have taken much comfort from the a ssurances o f  Kiki that ' The Wes t  
Irianese are our nei ghbours and friends 
1 
intention o f  sel ling our brothers . '  
The Governernnt ha s no 
Relations between the Papua New Guinea government and the 
I ndonesian emba s sy in Port Moresby were s ti l l  a li ttle uneasy when in 
January 1 9 7 7  the head o f  the RPG , Brig-General Seth Rurnkorem, cro ssed 
into Papua New Guinea and was flown to Port More sby for talks wi th 
the government ;  the Indonesian embas sy ' expre s s ed concern about the 
Government making avai lable facili ties to the rebels . • 2 And relations 
between the Papua New Guinea government and I rianese di s sidents were 
not improved fol lowing reports that the liberation movement would use 
terrori sm in the Pac i fi c  to gain recognition for i ts cause . 3 
Relations betwe en Papua New Guinea and Indonesia over the border 
continued to deteriorate from around May 1 9 7 7  when hundreds of Irianese 
began cros sing into the Western and Wes t  Sepik Provinces . The movement 
o f  I rianese across the border was known to be associated wi th an 
i ntensi fication o f  confli ct between OPM sympathi sers and Indone sian 
mil i tary forces in the period leading up to Indonesia ' s  national 
e lections .
4 
But when Kiki expressed concern at the border s i tuation 
1 
2 
3 
4 
See NPD I ( l 8 )  : 24 00 - 10 , 9 December 1976 . 
Post-Courier 6 ,  1 0  January 1 9 7 7 . 
See Post-Courier 29  April 1 9 77 . The report was subsequently 
denied (Post-Courier 3 May 197 7 ) . 
See , for example , Canberra Times 3 1  May 1977 . 
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I ndonesian Foreign Mi nister Malik told him , curtly , that the recent 
' tribal fi ghting ' in Irian Jaya was a domestic a f fair and that 
I ndonesia would not tolerate those who at tempted to exploit the tribal 
1 
c lashes for po li ti cal purposes . 
At the end o f  May 1 9 7 7  there were reported to be over two hundred 
refugees at Suki in the Wes te rn Province and several hundred more a t  
other points along the border . There were a l so reports that a Papua 
New Guinean vi l lager had been shot by an Indonesian patrol on the 
2 
Papua New Guinea side of the border . 
The gove rnment thus found i tse l f  i n  the uncomfortable pos i tion 
of having to reas sure Indonesia that it was not providing a harbour 
for opponents o f  the Indonesian regime , while at the same time 
attempting to meet the considerable local pres sure s ( incl udi ng pre s sure 
from the representative of the UN High Commi s s ion for Re fugees ) to 
dea l sympathetically wi th the border cro s sers and not to let itself 
be pushed around by Indonesia - and thi s at a time which the Post­
Courier ( 3  June 197 7 )  deli cate ly re ferred to as  ' the sens i tive pre­
e lection phase ' .  
I n  June the secretary o f  the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade , Tony Siagur u ,  told reporters that the refugees had returned 
to Irian Jaya a fter be ing told of Papua New Guinea ' s  policy on 
border crossings .
3 
I rianese sympathizer s , however , suspected that 
undue pressure had been put on the refugees and Langro , as deputy 
leader o f  the opposi tion , i ssued a s tatement accusing the Somare 
4 
government o f  appeasement .  During the ensuing e lec tions the Somare 
government wa s frequently attacked for i ts handling of the Irian 
Jaya i s sue ; among those who took up the i s sue were Langro , Pondros , 
Noe l  Levi ( forme r De fence secretary who was a succe s s ful candidate 
in New Ireland ) and John Jaminan ( former head o f  the securi ty 
1 
2 
3 
4 
See Poat-Courier 8 ,  13 , 15 June 1 9 7 7 . 
See Post-Courier 30 May 1977 . The reports were subsequen tly denied by 
inte l ligence source s .  
See Post- Courier 2 June 1 9 7 7 . 
Sydney Morning Hera ld 1 June 1977 . 
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intelligence branch who was a succes s ful candidate in the East Sepik 
e lectorate o f  Yangoru-Saus s i a  and became , for a while , opposi tion 
spoke sman on foreign a ffairs ) .  
Nor did Somare fi nd , on hi s return to office i n  August , that 
the is sue had gone away . During the se cond hal f  of 1977  and early 
1978  it became abundantly clear that what Malik had di smi s sed as 
' tribal clashe s ' was in fact a series o f  wide spread confrontations 
between Indone sian troops and I ri anese dissidents . I t  was in thi s  
context that in November 1 9 7 7  the Mini ster for De fence , Donatus Mola , 
informed Parliament
1 
that 
Recently government policy has been to take a 
tougher line with all  border crossers . People who 
ente r  Papua New Guinea i llegally can now expect 
to be arre ste d  and may be put in gaol or handed 
ove r to Indonesian authoriti e s . 
During 1 9 7 8  thi s  si tuation became more . complex and the government 
found i tsel f  squee zed on three sides : by the I ndone sians , who sought 
a firm commi tment against I ri anese rebe l s ; by an i ncreasingly vocal 
grou p wi thin the country whi ch demanded sympathy towards Iriane se 
freedom fi ghters ; and by OPM leaders ,  who threatened mi litant action 
against Papua New Guinea if it attemp ted to c lose the border . 
I n  Apri l the government was embarrassed by the publication o f  
a n  OPM press release naming the members of the newly appointed 
mini stry of the de facto government of We st Papua . Of the e i ghteen 
name s on the list six were Papua New Guinea c i ti zens , two were 
permissive re sidents , and two were serving gaol sentences for i l le gal 
entry but had given notice of their intentions to apply for political 
asylum .  I n  a statement pending a full enquiry , the Mini s ter for 
Foreign Affai rs and Trade , Ebi a Olewale , said that he vi ewed the matter 
wi th the ' utmost gravi ty ' and threa tened to cancel the entry permi ts 
of those named ; ' we wi ll oppose any minori ty which seeks to involve 
Papua New Guinea in the domestic a ffai rs of Indone sia ' ,  he sai d . 2 
However thi s  did not prevent the I ndone sian embassy from making 
1 NPD I I ( 4 )  : 38 1 ,  10 November 1 9 7 7 . 
2 Post-Courier 19 Apri l 1 9 7 8 . 
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strong repre sentations to the government and calling o n  the named 
rebe ls to declare thei r  loyalti e s ; moreover Indonesian first 
secretary Siregar was reported as  accusing Papua New Guinea of 
having double standards and saying ' If we wanted to invade Papua New 
Guinea we would do it now when Papua New Guinea i s  weak . '
1 
The 
Indonesians a l so requested tighter contro ls over journa l i s ts . Olewale 
reacted sharply to these pressures and wa s reported to have a sked 
the Indonesian ambas sador to consider reposting Siregar .
2 
In  the week following publication o f  the OPM cabinet l i s t  i t  
was announced that Olewa le , Mona and Defence Force Commander Diro had 
he ld talks in Port Moresby with OPM leaders Jacob Prai and Seth 
Rurnkorem . Prai and Rurnkorem were told to remove camps wi thi n the 
3 
West Sepik Province or have them burnt . According to the Post-
Courier ( 28 Apri l  1 9 78 ) , ' They were told PNG did not want to act 
against "other Melanesians " ,  but , at  the same time , the Government 
could not a f ford a fal l  out wi th Indonesia . '  Journalist  Mark Baker 
described the ultimatum as ' the s tronge st stand PNG has ye t taken 
a gainst the gueril la s ' but reported that it  had been firmly rej ec ted .
4 
In May Olewa le made an official vi sit to Indonesia . I ndonesian 
officials succeeded in communicating their doubts about the strength 
of Papua New Guinea ' s  commi tment to i ts obl
.
igations under the 197 3 
5 border arrangements and at the conclus ion of his vi sit Olewale told 
reporters that Papua New Guinea was now mounting ' cons tant patrols ' 
6 along the border . 
1 
Post-Courier 19 , 2 6 , 2 8  Apri l  1978 . 
2 Sydney Morning Hera ld 2 May 1978 . 
3 See Post-Courier 2 8  Apri l  1978 , 1 May 1978 and Age 29  Apri l 1978 . 
4 Age 29  Apri l  1 9 7 8 . 
5 See Post-Courier 26  May 1 9 7 8  ( ' Indonesia i s  suspic ious ' }  .. 
6 Sydney Morning Hera ld 18  May 1978 . 
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Ac tivity along the border further intensi fied in late May 1 9 7 8  
following the kidnapping of Indonesian officials  by a rebel group 
south of Jayapura . At the end o f  the month the Post-Co7.-Wier ( 3 1 May 
1 97 8 )  repor ted that a large scale I ndonesian mil i tary operation was 
in  progre s s . Shortly after , Somare announced his government ' s  dec i sion 
to deploy addi tiona l  troops and police a long the nor thern sec tor of 
the boundary in order to prevent rebe l s  from crossing ; 1 according to 
Olewa le , any rebe l s  encountered by Papua New Guinea border patrols 
would be dealt wi th in a ' Melanesian Way ' : they would be told to go 
2 
back and if  they refused they would be arres ted . However , although 
there was liai son between the two governments , Papua New Guinea firmly 
3 res i s ted repeated Indonesian reque s ts for j oint patrols . 
In the following weeks there wa s at least one ma j or border 
i ncursion by an Indonesian patrol which was reported to have raided 
a Papua New Guinea vil lage and destroyed gardens , bringi ng an official 
4 
protest from the Papua New Guinea govP-rnment . Early in July I ndonesian 
operations escalated ; vi l lage s  were strafed and plastic bombs dropped . 
in  the border area . In Papua New Guinea the government expre ssed to 
the Indonesian ambas sador i ts fears for the sa fety o f  Papua New Guinea 
citizens near the border but requests to Indonesia to confine bombing 
raids to an area not less  than 8 km from the border were refused . 
Conscious of the pos s ibi lity o f  an accidenta l  clash between Indonesian 
and Papua New Guinean patrols , the Papua New Guinea government began 
wi thdrawing i ts troops from the area . Once again hundreds o f  Irianese 
vi l lagers moved across the border into Papua New Gui nea . At a meeting 
1 
2 
3 
4 
By mid June Papua New Guinea had about 500 army and police personnel 
in  the border area . According to Sydney Morning Hera ld reports ( 14 ,  
2 1  June 197 8 )  Indone sia had four batta lions (about 2800 men )  plus 
police parami litary uni ts and other anc i l lary force s  in Irian Jaya , 
wi th about 700 men patrol ling the border . 
Post-Courier 13 June 1978 . 
See Post-Co7.-Wier 12 , 13 , 2 1  June 1 9 7 8 . 
See Post-Co7.-Wier 2 2 ,  2 3  June 197 8 ;  Age 2 2 , 2 5  July 1978 . 
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of the UPNG law faculty Papua New Guinea was de scribed as  ' s lowly 
entering a s ta te of war with I ndonesia . •
1 
In September the Indonesian 
hos tages were released and Indonesia began to scale down its mi li tary 
operations , but not be fore there had been some s train in Papua New Guinea ­
Indone sian relations and a considerable s timulus to anti Indone sian 
feeling outside the government .
2 
On top of thi s ,  the arrest o f  Prai and Otto Ondowame in the 
Sandaun (We st Sepik ) Province in late Sep tember came as a bonus to 
Indonesia but provided an addi tiona l headache for the Papua New 
Guinea government - e special ly when the per s i s tent Siregar announced 
( incorrectly , as i t  turned out ) tha t Indonesia would seek their extradition 
to s tand trial for trea son . 3 
I n  November 1978  a s tatement by I ndonesia ' s  De fence Mini s ter , 
Genera l Jusuf , gave notice o f  a shi ft in  Indonesia ' s  po licy towards 
Irianese di ssidents ; under a new ' smi l i ng policy ' it would not be 
4 necessary for the army to p ursue rebe l s . In  December the new policy 
was outlined to Papua New Guinean mini sters during an official vis i t  
to Papua New Guinea by I ndone sia ' s  Foreign Mini ster , Mochtar Kusurnaatrnadj a , 
who prai sed the Papua New Guinea government for its Tes traint and good 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Post-Courier 7 July 1 9 7 8 . 
Thi s  account o f  the events o f  mid 1 9 7 8  di ffers somewha t from the 
interpreta tion of Has tings ( above p .  4 ) . If in fact the I ndonesian 
' overki ll ' was intended to provoke Papua New Guinea ' s cooperation 
(as Has tings suggests ) ,  and was not s imply a response to the May 
kidnapping , it was a dangerous ploy of dubious effect , since Papua 
New Guinea ' s  eventual response was to withdraw i ts troops and since 
i t  considerably exacerbated anti Indone sian sentiment .  
Circumstances surrounding the capture o f  Prai and Ondowame remain 
somewhat my sterious . Prai claims to have entered Papua New Gui nea 
in the bel i e f  tha t the government wanted to talk to him . (On five 
previous occasions he had vis i ted Papua New Guinea wi thout a visa 
and wi th the government ' s knowledge . )  Prai be lieves there may have 
been a plot to remove him from leadership ( see Age 1 December 1 97 8 ) . 
Levi c laims they were ' captured by Austra lian and Indone sian intelligence 
operatives ' (Our News 2 1 ( 4 )  2 8  February 1979 ) .  
The two were re fused permi s sive residency in Papua New Guinea 
and , wi th three other OPM leaders , were eventually granted asylum 
in Sweden in March 1979 . 
Far Eastern Economic Review 24 November 1 9 7 8 ; 
12 December 1 9 7 8 . 
Sydney Morning Herald 
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leadership ' in cooperating with I ndonesia . 1 
Wi th the scaling down of mi l i tary opera tions and a certain 
am::>unt of goodwi ll generated by Mochtar ' s  vi si t ,  relations between the 
two countries at the official level seem to have improved . After 
Mochtar ' s. vi sit the two governments commenced di s cus sions preliminary 
to the renewa l of the 19 7 3  border agreement . The first round of 
discus sions was completed in March without signi ficant disagreement . 
The a t.nosphere of renewed cordiali ty even survived the publication 
in February 1 9 7 9  of a doc ument purporting to be a p lan for an Indonesian 
takeover of Papua New Guinea . Papua New Guinean security experts 
dismi ssed the document as  a fake and there appears to have been 
vi rtua l ly no public discus sion o f  i t . 2 
On the other hand relations be tween the Papua New Gui nea government 
and both OPM leaders and the Irianese communi ty i n  Papua New Guinea 
appear to have deteriorated markedly during 1 9 78 . In  part thi s  was 
the inevi table consequence o f  the government ' s  tougher a tti tudes 
towards border crossings and towards vi sible support for the OPM wi thi n 
Papua New Guinea . But i t  also reflec ted the dif ficulties o f  dea ling 
wi th a movement sharply divided wi thin i tself and o f  coming to terms 
wi th a leadership which , at lea st verba l ly , looked increas ingly towards 
terrori sm .
3 
After the capture of Prai and Ondowame severa l membe rs 
of the government received threa ts of violence and at a cabinet mee ting 
in Wewak , usua lly a very ca s ua l  a f fair , mini s ters were heavi ly guarded 
by police wi th arrnali te ri fle s . Al so , the removal of two I rianese 
refugees in an OPM raid on the refugee camp at Yako in April 1979 
brought a very strong reaction from Somare , who said the incident could 
. . 4 lead to a hardening of the government ' s  atti tude towards the separatists � 
1 
2 
3 
4 
See Sydney Morriing Hera ld 11 , 1 5  December 1 9 7 8 . 
See Nation Review 1 February 1 9 7 9  and Post-Courier 8 ,  12 February 1979 . 
See , for example , Post-Courier 2 9  Apri l 19 7 7 , 2 ,  3 May 197 7 ,  2 7  
September 197 7 , 1 0  November 1 9 7 7  (but see 14 November 197 7 ) , 2 3  
October 1 97 8  and Age 1 3  June 1 9 7 8 . 
Canberra Times 4 April 1979 . 
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In  retrospec t ,  then , the principal outcomes o f  the intensi fied 
activi ty along the border in 1 9 7 7 - 78 seem to have been , first , the 
demonstration o f  a firm commi tment by the government to preventing 
the use o f  Papua New Guinea as  a base for dissident activi tie s  and to 
di scouraging large scale movement across the border , whi le a t  the same 
time taking a firm s tand against I ndonesian pres sures on ma tter s of 
day to day policy ; secondly , the deteriorat ion o f  relations between 
the Papua New Guinea government and the OPM and its supporters , and , 
thirdly , an apparent growth of popular support for the Irianese which 
has increased the sali ence of the border is sue in Papua New Guinea ' s  
domestic politics . 
1 
It  i s  to the last o f  these that we now turn . 
Domestic pressures on the Irian Jaya issue . 
I n  recent years there has be.en an increasing popular awareness 
in  Papua New Guinea of ' the Irian Jaya problem ' and growing sympathy 
for ' our Melanes ian brothers ' .  I n  some cases , inc luding public 
servants and members of the government , such sympathy i s  influenced 
by personal contacts wi th Irianese and i s  often linked wi th antipathy 
towards I ndonesia or wi th a feeling of resentment that Papua New 
Guinea ' s  policy i s  dicta ted by I ndones ia or Australia . But for the 
most part i t  i s  a vague and largely uninformed sympathy . To di smi s s  
the suppor t for I rianese freedom fighters simply as  evidence o f  
' Indophobia ' i s  to grossly oversimpli fy the complex of sentiments on 
whi ch it draws . 
Notwi thstanding the widespread sympathy for the I rianese , it  
i s  unlikely tha t domestic pressures could bring about any radical 
shi ft in  Papua New Guinea foreign �olicy . They could , however , 
affec t the quality of Papua New Guinea ' s  re lations with Indonesia 
and they could have a considerable e ffect on dome s tic pol i tics -
2 e specially i f  there i s  truth in the recent report that the government 
1 
2 
A crude i ndica tor of thi s  i s  the number o f  times Irian Jaya or 
Indonesian-Papua New Guinean relations occur in the Post-Courier as 
a news item or in  letters to the editor . Annua l figures are as  
follows : 197 2 , 26 ; 1973 ,  40 ; 1974 , 8 ;  1 9 7 5 , 11 ; 197� 5 0 ; 1 97 7 ,  71  
(of which 61 were after 1 May ) ; 1978 , 2 2 0 . ( Source : Post-Courier 
indexes , IASER , Por t More sby . ) 
Sydney Morning Herald 25 May 1979 . 
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i s  currently preparing legi slation to stop ci tiz ens actively supporting 
the Irian Jaya gueri l la movement . 
In  view o f  thi s  it i s  worth having a c loser look at the 
composi tion of the ' Irian Jaya lobby ' . 
The Irianese communi tu . Nobody seems to know how many 
Irianese-born people there are in Papua New Guinea or where they live . 
1 
The usual estimate of Irianese residents i s  about 2 , 000 to 3 , 000 , of 
whom 2 17 2 have been granted Papua New Guinea c i ti zenship . 
Some of these migrated from West New Gui nea be fore 196 2 ;  the 
rest are either refugees with the s tatus of permi ssive res idence (or 
citi zensh�p ) or people who have s lipped across  the border and taken 
up residence in  vi llage s or towns but are technically i l legal immigrants . 
The number i n  the latter category (particularly in the Wes t  and Eas t  
Sepik Provinces ) i s  possibly qui te large . 
I n  broad terms the government ' s policy on border cro s sing has 
not changed sinc e  196 2 .  
3 
People crossing the border are required to 
repor t  to one of the several patrol pos ts along the border and s tate 
their reason for crossing . I f  their purpose i s  ' tradi tiona l ' ( the mos t  
common i s  sago making ) they are normal ly al lowed to s tay until they 
have finished what they came to do and are then expec ted to return 
across  the border . I f  they apply for pol i tical a sylum they are held 
until a dec i sion is  taken and then either granted permi ssive residence 
4 or told to return . In  all  other cases they are told to return . I f  
1 
2 
3 
4 
Nyamekye and Premdas put the figure a t  10 , 000 ( see above p .  68 ) .  
Thi s figure i s  sub j ect to confirma tion . In  December 1 9 76 , 1 5 7  Irianese 
were granted citi zenship and in June 1977  another 60 . I n  November 
1978 it was reported that the government wa s imposing a freeze on 
ci ti zenship to Irianese (Post-Courier 13 November 1978 ) . 
For early explana tions of thi s  pol icy see HAD I I ( 2 ) : 359-60 , 4 
September 196 5 ; I I ( 3 ) : 589-90 , 2 0  November 1968 ; I I ( 5 )  : 11 3 1- 3 , 17  
June 1969 . Al so see van der Veur ( 1965-66 ) .  
The government ' s  policy was summari zed as  follows in 1 9 7 3 : ' In general 
the Papua New Guinea Government wi ll not recommend permi ss ive 
residenc e  for il legal migrants from any other country unle s s  there 
i s  c lear evidence that they would suffer extreme danger or hardship 
if returned to their home land ' .  (Post-Courier 20 July 1 9 7 3 . )  
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they refuse , they are arrested and charged as  i llegal migrants , after 
which they may be deported . In prac tice ,  however , the adminis tra tion 
of thi s  pol icy has varied considerably . For most of the 1 960s and early 
1970s permi ssive residency seems to have been granted fair ly readily , 
though border patrols were often very proficient at ' escorting ' border 
crosse�s back to the border .  On numerous occasions groups o f  people 
have been al lowed to stay i n  temporary camps
1 
until the condi tions 
which caused their move have abated ; whil e  in  such camps they have 
been given food and medical attention . I n  at lea s t  one instance , in 
197 7 , the Papua New Guinea government has sought Indonesia ' s  as surance 
that those returning wi ll  not be harmed . In  the pas t  it would seem 
tha t poli tical a sylum ha s been granted fairly readi ly to those who 
could plausibly c laim that they would suffer persecution i f  they were 
returned to Indonesia , but in  the recent cases o f  Prai , Ondowame , 
Maury and Indey the government was obviously re luc tant to grant asylum 
to people whose pre sence could pre j udic e  rela tions with I ndonesia . 
There i s  no extradition treaty between the countries .. 
Those granted permi ssive residence mus t  accept two condi tions : 
that they wi ll  settle wherever they and their fami lies are di rec ted 
( in practice , where j obs are available away from the border ) ,  and that 
they wi ll  ' never directly or indirec tly get involved in political 
activi ties which caused [ them] seeking for a sylum in Papua New Guinea' 
(Verrier 1976 Appendix F )  . The first of the conditions ha s had the 
effec t o f  di s tributing the Irianese communi ty fairly widely throughout 
the country and mostly in towns (par ticularly in Manus - where in the 
1 960s and 1970s large numbers o f  permi ssive re sidents were accommoda ted 
temporari ly - and Port Moresby ) . The second condi tion ha s not been 
very strictly enforced . The c ircums tance s  of gaining permi s s ive 
1 
At present there are three holding camp s , at Yako and Oksaprnin in 
the Sandaun (We st Sepik ) Provi nce and Weam in the We stern Province . 
There has been talk of establi shing ano ther camp at Wabo in the 
Gul f Province . In 1 9 7 7 - 78 the cost of maintaining refugees at 
the se camps was quoted variously at between K800 and K2000 per day .. 
100 
residency vir tually ensure that the Ir ianese communi ty will be 
antipathetic , if not ac tively hos ti l e , towards Indones ia and even 
without engaging in formal pol i tical activity some I riane s e  are likely 
to find sympathe tic voices among their Papua New Guinean neighbours 
(one prominent Papua New Gui nean spoke sman for Irian Jaya ha s joint 
business ·interes ts wi th Irianese ) .  Many I rianese now hold senior 
posi tions in  government , private enterprise and the church and there 
is no doubt that some have used their posi tions to publici ze the 
gri evances  of the Irianese people . Moreover since 1962  the Irianese 
corranunity has provided an e ffective underground channel for OPM 
propaganda and the exi s tenc e  of l i nks between Irianese in Papua New 
Guinea and the OPM organization i n  I rian Jaya and overseas was 
evidenc ed , to everyone ' s  embarrassment , by the release of the de fac to 
West Papuan cabinet in 1 9 7 7  ( though some o f  those named disclaimed any 
i nvolvement ) . In  the mid 19 70s there was an Irianese communi ty 
organi zation within Papua New Guinea ( see fn . 3 p . 38 ) but in  1 9 77 there 
were factions wi thin the communi ty re flec ting the divi s ions within the 
i nternational movement . I n  January 1978  an organi zation calling i tsel f 
the South Pac i fi c  Group opposed an official ly sanctioned vis i t  by 
1 Jouwe . 
However the government has prevented overt expressions o f  support 
for OPM , and for those Irianese tempted to expre s s  openly their opposition 
to Indonesia the threa t of deporta tion has provided a powerful 
di sincentive , and one which the government has not hesitated to employ . 
Moreover , a s  a result o f  the confronta tions between the government and 
the Iriane se communi ty during 1 9 7 7  and 1978 i t  i s  likely that in future 
the government wi l l  exerci se even tighter control over them . 
The border vi l lages . 2 For the mo s t  par t the border area i s  not 
heavi ly popula ted , but where there are concentrations o f  popula tion 
there are usua l ly tradi tiona l ties , social or economic , between Irianese 
and Papua New Guinean vi l lages . Hence when Irianese began to cross 
1 
2 
See Post-Courier 12 , 2 4 , 25 , 30 January 1978 . 
The posi tion of the border vi llage s i s  di scussed in more de tai l in 
He rlihy ' s  paper . 
1 0 1  
into Papua New Guinea after 1 9 6 2  they were generally wel l  received -
e specially since many o f  the border vi l la ge s  saw themselves as  
s tanding to gain from a s sociated border deve lopment plans . I t  i s  
no coincidenc e that the mo s t  prominent early spokesman for the 
I rianese ( apart from Gui se )  were Kenu and Langro and the expa tr iate 
member - for the Madang-Sepik special elec torate (all  from electorates 
adj oini ng the border ) .  It is di fficult to say whether the scale of 
recent activi ty along the border and frus trated expectation of development 
in the border areas have diminished thi s  sympathy . However Diro i s  
quoted a s  sayi ng in April  1978 that support among Papua New Guineans 
near the border is  so strong that no mil i tary campaign by Papua New 
Guinea against the gueri llas could succeed ( Sharp 1 9 7 7 : 105 , quoting 
) f .  h '  
1 
the ABC and reports o f  operations in  July 1 9 78 tended to con irm t i s . 
Among other evidence o f  local suppor t  for the freedom fighter s , in 
December 1978 a lette r  appeared in the Post-Courier signed by ' the 
Bush People , Bewani ' which a sked the government to return Prai and 
Ondowame to the West Sepik 2 and on the UPNG campus the West Sepik 
Students ' Assoc iat ion ha s maintained an ac tive interest in  the border 
i s sue . 
The sense o f  brotherhood appears to extend into the East Sepik 
Province where , it  seems , a number o f  i l legal border crossers have 
set tled over the years . In  late 1978-early 1 9 79 there wa s in the 
East Sepik a cargo c ulti sh movement , in which ' freedom fighters ' 
stripes and epaulettes were being sold to vi l lagers for amounts ranging 
from K2 to K20 , though the reasons for acquiring the insignia were 
not clear . (A similar movement had been evident in the Wes t  Sepik in 
the early 1 9 7 0s . ) Ea st Sepik pol i tic ians Tony Bai s and John Jaminan 
have taken up the cause of the Irianese refugees in the second parliament 
and in early 1979 , when di f ficulty was being experi enced in finding 
a home for Prai and Ondowame , Bais  said over the NBC that hi s vi l lage 
would provide them wi th a home . 
1 
See Sydney Morning Hera ld 1 3  July 1 97 8 .  
2 Post-Courier 20  December 1 9 7 8 . 
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The e xi stence o f  such local sympathies may rai se new problems 
for the national government as powers are progressively trans ferred to 
provincial governments .  The pos sible signi ficance of thi s i s  
i ndicated by the fact that Langro , having lost hi s seat i n  the National 
Parliament , is now provincial secre tary of the S andaun Province . 1 
The Church.  The church exe rcises a strong infl uence over 
public opinion in Papua New Guinea . On the I rian Jaya que s tion i ts 
concern over human rights i s  perhaps reinforced by sympathy for a 
predomi nantly Christian movement i n  a predominantly I slamic s tate . 
Having been relatively qui e t  on the sub j e c t  since 1 969 1 recently 
several church bodies have made strong s tateme nts on the I ri an Jaya 
que stion . I n  June 1977  the National Catho lic Counci l called on the 
Indonesian gove rnment ' to refrain from acts of savagery against 
2 
Me lanesians in I rian Jaya ' . I n  October 1978  the Mel ane sian Counci l 
o f  Churches ( MCC ) (which represents the Anglican , Bapti st , Catholic , 
Lutheran and Uni ted Churches and the Salvation Army ) e stabli shed a 
Corruni ttee on Melane sian Re fuge e s  to protec t the rights o f  I rianese 
re fugees and to rai se public awarene ss ; soon after i ts e s tabli shment 
the corruni ttee cri tici zed the government ' s handling o f  refuge e s  in the 
West Sepik . In  February 1 9 7 9  the MCC told the government not! to 
deport Prai and Ondowame , that such ac tion would be unchristian . 3 
Also , in recent months the Wantok newspaper , the nation ' s  
weekly pidgin newspaper publi shed under the direction o f  a board 
compri sing representative s  of the Catholic , Angl ican , Lutheran and 
Uni ted Churches , has maintained a close and sympathetic coverage o f  
4 
the I rianese refugee problem. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Thi s  point was brought out during di scussion by Bi l l  Standi sh . 
Post-Courier 1 June 1 9 7 7 . 
See report i n  vlantok 17 February 1979 . 
See , for example , 9 Dec ember 1978  ( ' Jacob Prai na Wes I ri an ' ) ,  2 0  
January 1 9 7 9  ( ' Tarangu Prai ' ) ,  1 0  February 1 9 7 9  ( ' Fridom Pai tman ' ) ,  
and 1 7  February 1 9 7 9  ( ' Mipe la i no laik indai ' ) .  
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Students and inte l lectua l s .  In 1969 the then recently establ ished 
Politics Club at UPNG became the first predominantly Papua New Guinean 
organi zation (apart from the House of Assembly ) to take up the Irian 
Jaya cause . Par tic ipant comme ntator Davi s ( 19 7 0 : 29 5 ) compared Papua 
New Gui nean s tudent involvement over Irian Jaya at thi s  time to 
Aus tralian s tudent involvement over Vietnam , though the former proved 
to be relatively short lived . 
Indone sia ' s invasion of Eas t  Timer provided another occa sion 
for an anti Indonesian demonstration by s tude nts and in prese nting 
p etitions to the Indonesian embassy and the Papua New Guinea government 
f . 
1 
re erence wa s made also to the demand for freedom by the Irianese . 
During 1977  and 1 9 7 8  s tudents again ide ntified wi th their Melanes ian 
brothers and critic ized the government ' s handling of the i ssue ; in 
July 1978 there wa s another march on the I ndonesian embas sy and in 
November s tudents offered a s s i s tance to Prai and Ondowame .
2 
Other notable expressions of suppor t for the freedom fighters 
have come from John Ka saipwalova , Bernard Narakobi and Utula Samana . 
Kasaipwalova , former s tudent and vil lage leader , poe t , playwright 
and businessman , wrote in an artic le in the Post-Courier ( 28 July 
1 9 7 8 ) , ' a s a na tion we are but dancing fools for I ndonesian foreign 
policy ' but he went on to sugges t  that ' we three bro ther s '  ( Papua New 
Guinea , Indone s ia and Irian Jaya ) sit  down together to argue our 
differences . Shor tly after , and almost p rophe tically , Ka saipwa lova 
presented a new play , ' My Brother , My Enemy ' , the subj ec t of which i s  
the capture and incarceration o f  an OPM leader who ha s crossed into 
Papua New Gui nea . Although the play is e s sential ly a sa tire against 
the Papua New Guinea government , the I ndonesian ambas sador felt moved 
to walk out of the first  performance . 
1 
2 
Narakobi , lawyer ( former chairman of the Law Reform Commi s sion ) ,  
For an account of the s tudent prote st ( during which a replica of 
the I ndonesian flag was trampled ) see Samana ( 197 6 ) . 
Post-Courier 26 June 1978 ; 10 , 11 July 19 7 8 ;  2 ,  10 November 1978 . 
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writer , phi losopher and prospective Ea s t  Sepik politician , has on a 
number o f  recent occasions attacked the government for not supporting 
the Irianese freedom fighters1 and recently pre sented a petition on 
the subj ect to vi si ting US ambas sador Andrew Young . Young is repor ted , 
i n  a government news let ter , to have said that he ' would bring the 
matter to groups which are sympathetic to the Wes t  Irian cause to bring 
i t  up at the Uni ted Nations for di scus sion . • 2 
Samana , a provincial o fficial and former student leader , who 
had taken an active part in the 1 9 76 demonstration over Eas t  Timer , 
was arre s ted in December 1978 when he attempted to hand a pet i tion to 
Mochtar ; he was at the time he was arre s ted a member of the o f ficial 
welcoming party in Lae . 
The volume o f  pro Irianese letters to the Post Courier (and 
according to the paper ' s  edi tor those publi shed represent only a fraction 
of those received ) sugge sts that the views expres sed by Churches ,  
s tudents and the individuals  mentioned here are representative of  a 
grea t mas s  of  popular sentiment . 
Parliamentary opposition . Between 1969 and 1 9 76 Irian Jaya 
was not a prominent i ssue in dome s ti c  pol i tics . Apart from ques tions 
by Langro , Chatterton and Pondros , the subj ect was seldom rai sed and 
when it was there was no systematic di fference of opinion between 
government and opposition . As we have noted , however , the government ' s  
handling o f  the border situation became a signi ficant i ssue during the 
national elections in 1977  and it has been a recurring subj ect for 
question and deba te in the second parliament . 
Although Langro was a casualty of  the election hi s concern over 
government policy on I rian Jaya has been taken up by severa l new 
members on both sides of the House - notably Levi , Jami nan and Bai s  -
as we l l  a s  by Gui se , Pondro s , the present opposi tion leader Iambakey 
1 
2 
See , for example , Post-Courier 28 June 1978 , 24 July 1978 ; Canberra 
Times 2 1  July 1978 . Al so see hi s warning against ' I ndone sian 
imperialism ' ,  Post-Cou:Pier 9 December 1 9 7 5 . 
Papua New Guinea News letter 4 7 , week ending 4 May 1979 . 
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Okuk , and Papua Be sena member James Mopio . To date oppos i tion members 
do not appear to have come up wi th any p lausible alternative policy 
but , e special ly under the new confrontationi st style of oppos i tion 
politics pursued by Okuk , they have been qui ck to make pol i tical capital 
out of  the I rian Jaya i s sue , accusing the government of  being weak in 
its de�lings wi th Indonesia and wrong i n  its dec i s ion to deport Prai 
1 and his colleague s . 
The army . Towards the end of 1977  much public i ty was given to 
the fac t  that Defence Force commander-in-chi e f , Ted Dire , was sununoned 
to a cabinet meeti ng and reprimanded for havi ng had contact wi th 
rebe l leaders . I t  wa s even reported that there were demands from wi thin 
cabinet to remove Dire from the pos ition of  commander -in-chi e f  but that 
these demands were overruled when i t  became c lear that the Defence Force 
stood firmly behind Diro . 2 Then in December 1978 a senior o f ficer of 
the Defence Force , Lt - Col . Tom Poang , was forced to re sign because 
o f  his involvement in negotiations between the OPM and an arms dea ler 
3 from Senega l for the purchase of  weapons .  In  both cases personal 
antagoni sms seem to have played some part in the government ' s  handli ng 
of the si tuation but the i ncidents have rai sed que s tions about the 
4 extent o f  accord between the government and the army and lent 
wei ght to a commonly held view that there i s  a good deal of  antipathy 
towards I ndones ia among army o f ficers . 
1 
2 
3 
4 
See e special ly Draft Hansard 7 ,  1 7  August 1978 . Okuk ' s own posi tion 
has fluctuated . Up ti ll October 1978 he appeared mostly as a 
champion o f  Irianese re fugees (e . g .  see Post-Courier 9 June 1978 , 
7 July 19 7 8 ,  2 0  October 197 8 )  but at the end of  that month he ret urned 
from Indone sia wi th glowi ng reports of Indonesia ' s admi nis tration of  
Irian Jaya and East Timer (Post-Courier 1 November 1978 ) . Since then 
however ,  hi s posi tion seems to have shi ft ed again ( for example see 
Papua New Guinea News letter 46 , week ending 27 April 1979 ) . 
See Post-Courier 30 September and 6 ,  1 0 , 1 2 ,  14 October 19 7 7 . 
See Sydney Morning Hera ld 19 December 1978 . 
It i s  also notable that in October 1 9 7 7  Police Mini ster Patter son Lowa 
( formerly Di ro ' s second-in-command ) sugge sted that ' border patrols rightly 
be longed to the police , not the army ' (Hiri Oc tobe r 197 7 : 3 ) . 
106 
Finally , a brief word might be said about Indonesian i ntelligence 
operations . It i s  generally acknowledged in Papua New Guinea that 
I ndonesia has an e ffici ent intelligence network wi thi n the country , 
some o f  whose members are I riane se ' refugees ' .  Among the country ' s  
educated elite it i s  widely be lieved that in a number o f  instances  
( some include Poang ' s  di smi s sa l  and Prai ' s  arrest)  the Papua New Guinea 
government ' s  hand has been forced by i ntel ligence pas sed on to it by 
the Indonesians . Whether or not thi s is true is l e s s  important than the 
fac ts that the belie f is widely held and that it has had the e ffec t of  
increasing Papua New Guinea ' s suspicions of Indonesia ' s  intentions . To 
thi s extent Indonesian intelligence operations wi thin Papua New Guinea 
may we l l  prove , in the long run , to be counter produc tive . The same 
might be said of attempts to buy goodwi l l  through dip lomatic hosp i tality 
and other means . 
Conc lusion. 
Deve lopments along the border in 1 9 7 7  and 1978  not only strained 
relations between Papua New Guinea and Indone sia ; they led to a 
cooli ng o ff in relations between the Papua New Gui nea government and 
the Irianese and they created new tensions in Papua New Guinea ' s  
domestic pol itics . Whethe4 in the medium term , I ndonesia ' s  ' smiling 
policy ' i n  Irian Jaya , together wi th the recent defect ion and deportation 
of  OPM fi eld leaders , wi l l  bring about a new cordiality in re lations 
between the two countries , and whether Papua New Guinea ' s  popular concern 
over the i s sue wi l l  be sustai ned , remain to be seen (my gue sses are 
respectively a heavily qualified yes, and no ) . I n  the meantime , it i s  
unlikely - even with a change o f  government i n  Papua New Guinea (which 
also seems unlikely in the near future ) - that Papua New Guinea wi l l  
ini tiate any change in i ts policy on Irian Jaya , though i t  might respond 
to dome stic pressure s to attempt to resume the unwe lcome and probably 
hopeless role o f  mediator betwe en the Indonesian government and the 
1 rebe l s . 
1 C f .  Draft Hansard 7 August 1 9 7 8  p .  1 1/1/1 . 
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I n  the shor t term , what may prove to be a more signi ficant 
outcome of the events of  1 9 7 7  and 1978 is the obvious irritation whi ch 
OPM support wi thin Papua New Guinea has caused Somare . The reconci l iation 
of  public atti tudes and private feelings has always posed a delicate 
problem for the Papua New Guinea governme nt , and it wi ll  continue to do 
so . I f  Somare proceeds with heavy handed measures to suppre s s  
expre ssions of popular support for the I rianese h e  may b e  courting 
poli tical disaster . 
BORDER DEVELOPMENT : 
A ' POL I T I CAL NECES S ITY ' AGA I N  
J . M .  Her l i hy 
Mos t  speakers at thi s semi nar have been cautious ly optimistic 
about the recent government-to-government rapport and the proposed new 
border agreement between I ndone sia and Papua New Guine a . From what has 
been said ,  e specially with regard to rebel activi ty , it is fai rly 
c lear that the re sponse wi thin the border zone i ts e l f  wi ll  be a crucial 
determinant o f  the succes s  or fai l ure o f  the new gove rnmental initiatives . 
I n  thi s  context two aspects o f  the propo sed new approach are parti cularly 
signi fi cant : first , the ' hard l i ne ' taken by Papua New Guinea against 
rebel sympathi zers , and secondly , the i ssue o f  border deve lopment . 
Thi s  paper outli nes brie fly , for the Papua New Guinea side o f  the 
border , some of the si tuationa l fac tors likely to affect vi l lage re sponse 
to government i ni tiatives and to influence governmental capacity to 
institute e f fective change wi thin the border zone . On the bas i s  of 
these factors i t  i s  sugge sted that achievement o f  government ' s 
obj ective s  wi th regard to the communi ties  i n  the vicinity o f  the border 
wi l l  be a complex and cos tly task , the di fficultie s  of whi ch could wel l  
outwei gh the time and resources the Papua New Guinea government i s  able 
to divert to i t .  Previous expe ri ence and pre sent cons traints indicate 
a high probabi lity that the current concern for border deve lopment wi l l  
b e  a transient phenomenon which survi.ves only as long as the border i s  
a national pol i ti cal i s sue . 
The relevance o f  a border deve lopment programme to the pre sent 
politics of the border depends large ly on the validi ty o f  several 
a s sumptions . These are , first , that a decline in  rebe l activi ty , whi ch 
i s  confined to a relative ly small area , wi l l  ease the international 
and internal tensions now as sociated wi th the border ;  secondly , that 
sympathy and support for the rebel movement among border communi ties 
wi ll show an inverse correlation with development of the area ; thirdly , 
that government wi ll be able to supply the type and quanti ty o f  i nputs 
neces sary to imp lement an e ffective development programme ; and fourthly , 
that the border corrnnuni tie s  wi ll  be able and wi lling to take advantage 
of the programme . Though thi s  paper concentra tes on the last two as sumptions , 
each i s  debatable . 
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The border zone . 
The term ' border zone ' i s  used here to refer to the 3 2  km 
( 20 mi le ) quarantine strip or cordon sanitaire which parallels the 
actual borde r across  Papua New Guinea , and withi n whi ch border 
considerations have a di rect impact on the dai ly l ive s of the people -
even though many have little knowledge o f  or interest in the poli tical 
i ssue s  i nvolved . The terrain wi thin the cordon sanitaire varies from 
the lowland swamps o f  most o f  the Wes tern Province , through the 
i nacce ssible central cordi l lera to the Sepik River lowlands , the Bewani 
and border range s , the swampy al luvial reache s of the Neumeyer Plain , 
and across the Oenake Mountains to the coastal lowlands near Vanimo . 
Average population densi ties for the two border provi nces , at an 
2 2 e stimated 0 . 82 persons per km for Western Province and 2 . 8 per km 
for Sandaun (West Sepik ) Province in 1976 , are very low . Densities a long 
the Sandaun side of the cordon sanitaire on a breakdown by census divis ion 
range from 0 to 4 persons per km2 for mos t  of the zone wi th approximate ly 
6 per km2 in the Amanab area , but due to the di spersed settlement pattern 
and uneven distribution these figures are merely i ndicative . Physi cal 
and demographic charac teri stics are re flected i n  marked cultural 
di fferences between border communi ties , whi ch inter a lia i nhibit across­
the -board planning for the border zone . With the pos sible exception 
o f  the Wutung-Vanimo people , most border communi ties  have in common 
their i solation from each other and from o ther areas of Papua New Guinea , 
relatively low s tandards of living and e conomi c opportunity , and a 
hi story o f  admini strative neglect and unre liabi l i ty which has left deep 
but usually hidden resentments . 
Mos t  tradi tional communication and trade route s , for the border 
zone , such as  they were , ran east-we s t  rather than north-south , so that 
for a number o f  communities contacts across the borde r were more 
important than linkage s on the same side . Though some vi llagers as 
a re sult sti ll  have kinship ties and land or hunting rights on both 
side s  of the border , their range i s  fai r ly l imi ted . Formal linkages 
inland on the Papua New Guinea side around the main crossing points 
of the Bewani -Ki lime ri area rarely extend beyond a few kilometre s .  Far 
more extensive , and of far greater political signi fi cance , are the 
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re sidue of  contac ts e stabli shed through previous exchanges and 
movement to and from Hol landia and a loose identi fication o f  mutual 
i ntere s t  i n  the di fficul ties that both s ides o f  the border have 
experienced as a result of the manoeuvre s of the ir respective governments . 
Despite the apparent contigui ty between cross-border sympathi e s  and the 
' Me lane s ian brotherhood ' theme on whi ch some members of the educated 
elite , including parli amentarians , have based the i r  support for the 
I ri anese cause , the latter i s  of little importance on the border .  Many 
vi llagers in fact regard such eli te articulation of border i s sues as  
poli tical opportuni sm . As the 1 9 7 7  e lection re sults demons trated , 
the I ri an Jaya si tuation per se has very little electoral pull by 
compari son wi th pragmatic parochi al concerns . 
A large proportion o f  border commun i ti e s  i s  basi cally hunter­
gatherers . Though the maj ority , e specially in the mountains , also 
cultivate small gardens , and although the swamp dwe l lers depend 
heavi ly on natural or cultivated stands o f  sago , cul tivation usually 
i s  regarded as a se condary activi ty ( see also Ge l l  1 9 7 5 : 16 ) . Thi s means 
that cash cropping , the mai n  element of Papua New Guinea deve lopment 
progranune s , i nvolves a double transition : first to permanent or semi 
permanent subsi s tence cultivation and secondly to produc tion for the 
monetary economy . I t  has also resulted in a relatively high degree 
of i ndividuali sm .  As in other areas of the Sepik , vi llage elders can 
advi se and exhort , but cannot control ( Thurnwald 1916;  Huber 
1 97 7 ) . Mobi li zation for a conununal activi ty i s  di fficult and i nfrequent . 
Especially i n  areas which operate on a narrow survival margin ,  wel fare 
matters such as care for the s i ck and elderly are usually a personal 
or familial  concern rather than a conununal re sponsibi lity , and those 
wi thout immediate re lative s  may be le ft to fend for themse lves . 
Notable among the c ultural fac tors which reinforce i solationi sm 
and inhibit deve lopment in the border area are a multiplicity o f  
language s , the dominance of si ster exchange mari ta l al liance , and , for 
Ki lime ri in parti cular , sangwna , a form of assault sorcery . 
The S epik provi nce s con tai n  approxima te ly one thi rd o f  Papua 
New Guinea ' s l i s ted language s .  The population to language ratio i s  
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about hal f  the average for the rest o f  the country , and drops to 
approximately 5 00  speakers per language i n  the border area ( Laycock 
1 
1 9 7 3 : 54- 5 ) . In 1 9 7 5 - 76 a sample o f  Ki limeri people had very li ttle 
contact and no fami liarity wi th neighbouring l ingui stic patterns, though 
96 per c ent o f  males and 7 5  per cent o f  females could communicate to 
some e�tent in pidgin .  Exceptiona lly low leve l s  o f  li teracy ( only 4 
per cent o f  the Ki limeri sample could read or wri te even at an 
elementary leve l )  meant that e ffective communi cation had to be by word 
of mouth , but oral i n formation flows were severely restricted by the 
physical and cultural i solation and by the pauci ty of government 
patrolling and outside contact . 
S i ster exchange marriage i s  almo st entirely endogamous , 
di s sociated from the cash economy , and enforces the dependence of 
young people as a whole on the i r  vi llage elders . Under si ster (or 
daughter ) exchange a man who wi she s to marry must provide a female 
re lative as wi fe for a male member of the fami ly or clan from whom 
he seeks hi s wi fe . Though the system tradi tionally was fai rly flexible , 
the resul tant social structure i s  one characteri zed by older men married 
to one or more young wive s , young men o ften married to widows many years 
their senior , poor marital cohe sivene ss , and a very narrow spread o f  
kinship ties . In the Ki limeri sample al l adults had married wi thin thei r  
own area , about fi fty p e r  cent to someone from the same vi llage and the 
bulk of the remainder into a neighbouring vi llage . As most vi llages 
contain less  than 150  people , marriage -derived contacts are very c losely 
cons trained . Vi llagers are there fore very limited in the extent to 
whi ch they can substi tute kinship obli gations for cash to gai n  access 
to development opportuni tie s  outside thei r  range . When opportunistic 
vi llagers near Bewani station began to impose such charge s as land rents 
for school chi ldren ' s  food gardens ,  many Ki limeri vi l lagers were unable 
to uti lize the school . S imi lar problems arose when they wi shed to use 
land outside the cordon sanitaire to graze cattle , as  the rent demanded 
was equal to fi fty per cent of the beast ' s  sale va lue ( then equivalent 
to approxima te ly $40 per annum for about two hec tares of unimproved 
�asture ) .  
1 The Ki limeri data quoted i n  thi s paper i s  drawn from fi eldwork carried 
out by the author between 1975 and 1 9 7 7 . 
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Though warfare was a recurrent pre contact haz ard , border 
vi llages on the whole do not have the tradition of endemic violence 
that characteri zed other parts o f  Papua New Guinea . Possibly as a 
re sult , very few have become ac tively i nvolved in the OPM guerilla 
campaigns or  exhibited s igni ficant intere s t  i n  mi l i tary defence o f  the 
border . On the other hand , covert violence through sanguma re tains a 
s trong hold , though sanguma practices vary along the border from the 
rituali zed execution of the Ki limeri to the ' death threat ' or magic 
forms fami liar in other parts o f  Papua New Guinea . Ki limeri vil lagers 
c laim that , unti l the suppre ssion of warfare , sanguma was a ' la s t  resort ' 
method of social contro l , rarely used , but that now ' we are afrai d  
to talk strong , we are afraid to try anything new , i t  i s  sanguma that 
holds us back ' . While sanguma i s  o ften used as an ex ros t rationali zation 
for i nac tivi ty , i ts i nhibi tory e f fect on societal cohe sivene s s , 
entrepreneurial i nnovation and response to external stimuli i s  a major 
problem for deve lopment o f  the area . Estimate s o f  the strength of 
sanguma activi ty by government , mi s sion and other observers i n  1976 
ranged from ' very little ' to attributed re sponsibi lity for about eighty 
per cent of deaths in the area , a range matched only by the wi ldly 
fluc tuating es timate s  of support for the OPM . As the vi llage re sponse 
to o fficial discouragement o f  i nvolvement in sanguma or OPM activities 
has been a marked reluctance to di scus s e ither , articulated vi llage 
opi nion provides a very unre liable i ndicator , and the actual strength 
o f  the se two important vari able s for the new border policy i s  sti l l  
unknown . 
For mos t  o f  the border area , problems of i solation and access  
are compounded , and capac i ty for deve lopmental responsivene ss and self­
help reduced , by very serious leve l s  of ma lnutri tion . A s tudy in 1962 
i denti fied nutritional de ficienc i e s  in the Bewani area which were more 
severe than those of the Wosera and other known problem areas of Papua 
New Guinea (McLennan n . d . ) , but its  findings were not fol lowed up . A 
1 decade later other studies , based primari ly on clinic re cords , found 
1 A compari son of vi llage data wi th c li n i c  records i n  1 9 7 6  i nd i ca ted 
that the latter underestimated the degree of malnutri tion , largely 
as a result of poor or irregular clinic attendance , the lack o f  
concern among many vi llagers about nutri tional de fici encies , and 
the tendency of some mothers to hi de malnouri shed children from 
health sta ff to avoid cri ti cism or i nter ference . 
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that malnutri tion was a problem for the ma j ori ty of inland border 
stations , wi th an average for the province as  a whole o f  6 3  malnouri shed 
children per 100 at tending c linic s , and in some areas up to eighty to 
ninety per cent of chi ldren under two years ma lnouri shed ( Sa l field 
1 9 7 3 : 2 5 ;  Korte 1974 ; Korte and Kamki lakai 1 9 7 5 ) .  I n  the Ki limeri area 
the poor nutri tion and general health care was reflec ted in 1 9 7 5-76 in 
a crude death rate o f  3 . 8  per cent . One thi rd o f  these deaths was among 
women of child bearing age .
1 
Over one third of chi ldren died before 
they reached maturi ty , with 69 per cent of chi ld deaths in the under 
six months age bracket and 83 per cent under two year s . To some extent 
the high morta l i ty was di sgui sed by a relatively high birth rate , 6 . 7  
per cent , which held the rate o f  natural increase , 2 . 8 per cent , at 
approximately average levels for the country , but the resultant age-
sex struc ture made survival , and development,  a much more arduous task 
than in mo st parts of Papua New Guinea . Though improvement of nutri tion 
has been a perennial aim of the West Sepik admini stration and recently 
has become a nat ionwide development prior i ty ,  for the border area i t  
has proved very di fficult to implement . Partly thi s  ha s been due to 
the spasmodic and o ften i nappropriate nat ure of official attention to 
the problem , partly to the maj or d1.anges i t  has required to the exi s ti ng 
subsi s tence system , and partly because malnutri tion i s  the norm and 
there fore is not perceived by vi llagers as a problem . 
Border development . 
The early phase . Though border i ssue s , including border 
development , have been a recurrent governmental concern for mos t  o f  
thi s  century , the border i s  sti l l  one of the mo st backward and 
admi ni strative ly neglec ted areas of Papua New Guinea . I roni cally thi s  
can b e  attributed, to a large extent, to official preoccupation wi th the 
political ramifications of border admi ni s tration , whi ch has re sulted 
in short term deci sion maki ng and inat tention to the problems and 
local idiosyncracies reported regularly by field staff . Of ficial 
di fficulti es i n  reconci l i ng observed needs wi th avai lable resources 
1 DDA , Page i , Patrol Report 2/ 75-76 . 
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have created a marked gap between policy obj ective s  and practice . I n  
1947  the then di strict officer stres sed the importance o f  border deve lop­
ment for ami cable border po litics and the need for ' continual urging 
to improve their living and health conditions ' ,  but felt unable to 
1 
divert staff to the area . I n  later years government o fficials regularly 
evaded th� logi sti cal difficult ies  of cash crop development by announcements 
that they would concentrate on improvement of subsi s tence , an even 
more difficult task and rarely followed through . 
The i nhibiting effects on border development o f  the government ' s  
policy probably commenced with the trans fer from German to Aus tralian 
control a fter World War I .  Thi s  reduced the Sepik area from a proposed 
' centre for future agricultural development ' (Whittaker et al � 1 9 7 5 : 26 3 )  
to a peripheral administrative di s tri ct . The westward spread of 
developmental demons tration e f fects from the only signi ficant centre , 
at Aitape , was almo s t  entirely stopped a fter the war by the removal o f  
all settlers o n  the coast between Ai tape and the border in an at tempt 
by the di stri ct officer to prevent i l l i cit communciation , via the Dutch , 
between German settlers and their home country ( Rowley 1958 : 4 2 ) . Unti l 
Wor ld War I I  European influence on the border area came mainly from 
Netherlands New Guinea , though a border survei llance pos t ,  opened at 
Vanimo in 1 918 , provided (when staffed ) desultory supervi sion of trade 
and contac t across  the border . Restrictions on border movement tightened 
after World War I I , when a patrol o ffi cer was pos ted to Vanimo ' mainly 
to prevent Indonesia ns from crossing the border ' .  At the same time rumours 
that the Dutch i ntended to establi sh a city at Hol landi a tri ggered 
proposa ls for development of the New Guinea side , ' otherwi se they 
[ border] vi l lagers may tend to pre fer the Dutch adminis tration to ours . • 2 
The pos sibi l i ty o f  an Indonesian takeover in the West brought fu�ther 
re stric tions . Though the Aus tralian government in the 1950s officially 
favoured ' side-by-side ' development o f  West and East New Guinea ( Has luck 
1 9 76 : 36 2 ) , a 195 3 report of proj e cted Indone sian activi ty in the Dutch 
territory was followed in 1954 by a directive that ' native s  from across 
the border ,  or vi llage s now regarded as  under Dutch influence were not 
I l '  ' d  
3 
permi tted to enter employment on the Austra ian si e .  
1 
2 
3 
Sub-di strict o ffice (SDO ) , Wewak , fi le 30/2 - 2 3 ,  12 May 194 7 . 
Ibid. 
Department of Di strict Services and Na tive Affairs ( DDS & NA ) ,  fi le NLB 
3 1/1- 14 0 7 , 6 December 1954 . 
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After the trans fer of control over Netherlands New Guinea to 
I ndonesia i n  the early 1960s , the Austral ian admi ni s tration mounted a 
massive deve lopment programme along the border . New patrol posts were 
opened , school s  and health centres bui lt , loca l government counc i l s  
introduced ,  and a n  intensi fied ' po l i ti cal education ' campai gn commenced . 
Money was poured i nto the area to win the support of local peole who 
in many cases had exhibi ted a preference for the material bene fi ts of 
Hollandia under the Dutch . As a re sult , one patrol offi cer complained , 
. 1 h the people afte rwards expected to be paid for everything . At t e 
same time , however , an instruction to border offi c i a l s  that ' border 
surveil lance i s  to be mai ntained as  a priority over a l l  other activities '
2 
ensured that borde r deve lopment was e f fe ctive ly subordinated to poli tical 
considerations . For some time official attention focussed on the small 
community o f  Sekotchiau ( later Skotiaho ) , whi ch was the centre o f  most 
movement across border tribal lands in the early to mid 1960s  and which 
shrewdly played one government against the other to considerable 
material advantage . 
I n  the late 1960s the veripheral border vi llage s began to comp lain 
of their exclusion from border development and admini s trative attention . 
Direct bene fits , such as  education and health fac i l i ti e s , and flow-on 
bene fits such as income earning opportuni ties from the Bewani pa tro l 
pos t ,  accrued mainly to the nineteen per cent of the admini strative 
area in i ts immedi ate vicinity . Vanimo and the border po sts were a 
poor subs ti tute for Hol landia as a source o f  trade goods and had 
i nsuffici ent attractions to . overcome the distance constraint . At the 
same time vi llagers became more sensitive to the inferiori ty o f  their 
catechis t  s chools and unrealiable health fac i l i ties vi s-a-vi s  the new 
' certi fi cate ' primary s chools and government health centres , and 
uti lization of the former declined . Resentments grew afte r an order 
that shotguns , the most coveted possession of a hunting communi ty , were 
3 
to be kept to a mi nimum on the border . They i ntensi fied when cash 
cropping activities , which had been encouraged in parti c ular through 
1 
Division o f  Di strict Administ ration (DDA ) , Wewak , patro l report 5/69- 70 . 
2 Di strict Commi ssioner ( DC ) , Wewak , fi le A 2 - 2 - 10/ 3 7 6 , 6 September 196 3 . 
3 DDA , Wewak , file 6 7 - 3- 7 , 5 Apri l 1965 . 
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the mi s s ion network and by the new counci ls , were di scouraged by 
government official s . ' Be extreme ly wary on the introduction o f  crops ' ,  
the di strict commi s sioner advi sed hi s staff in 196 3 ,  • I do not want 
these people to ge t a cash-crop ide a , we wi l l  never get the stuff out . • 1 
Admini strative problems in the area were compounded by a very 
rapid turnover of s taff , spasmodi c use of border s tations as ' e xi le ' 
or training posts for ' di f fi cult ' or  inexperienced offi c er s , and 
e specially in recent years by the youth and i nexperience of many 
i ndi genous o ffi cial s . De lays in departmental funding , irregular 
avai labi l i ty o f  s taff , and the burden o f  office obl i gations were 
re flec ted regularly in postponement of patrols . In  addi tion , the simple 
logi stics o f  patrolling a large , sparsely populated area meant that 
over a given period the c lient coverage whi ch staff in the border area 
could achieve was less than hal f  the national average . The subsequent 
lumpine s s  o f  admin i s trative operations created a vicious cyc le of 
dimini shed government e ffe ctivenes s  at vi llage leve l  and dimini shing 
vi l lage enthusiasm for government intervention . At the same time a 
number of factors , including lack o f  po litical sophisti cation , scarc i ty 
o f  alternative sources o f  development assi stance , and official di scourage ­
ment of vi s i tors to the sensitive border area , meant that power was 
i ncreasingly concentrated i n  a narrow admini strative spectrum . 
The cordon sanitaire . The maj or government- ini tiated cons traint 
on economic development of the border area , both for government officials 
and for vi llager s ,  undoubtedly has been the cordon sanitaire . The bulk 
of the population within the border zone live ten or more ki lometres 
away from the actual border , and have l i ttle contact wi th the border 
patrol posts or comprehension of border i s sue s . Due to the land tenure 
system, for all practi cal purposes these vi l lagers are locationa lly bound 
into a si tuation from which they gain li tt le i f  any advantage but as 
a re sult of which they subsidi ze development elsewhere . They bear a 
large part o f  the costs o f  quarantine protection for crops and herds 
in other areas of Papua New Guinea , and s ince the I ndone sian side has 
no equivalent arrangement they also provide a buffer zone whi ch enables 
Indonesia to evade responsibi l i ty for containment o f  i ts communicable 
1 DDA , Wewak , fi le 6 7 - 3-8 , 12 July 196 3 .  
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di seases and pests . I ncidental ly , thi s  has eased the border s ituation for 
the Papua New Guinea and the Indone sian governments by reduci ng the 
potential for conflic t  between them . In addi tion , maintenance of the 
quarantine strip has al lowed agri cultural and health s taff on the Papua 
New Guinea s i de to avoid the expense and difficulty of regular fie ld 
patrols ·  and active quaranti ne supervi sion . I t  has a l so provided a 
blanket excuse for neglect of border deve lopment . Vi l lagers have been 
told that in the absence of cash crop and livestock pro j ects regular 
vi si ts by agri cul ture staff are superfluous , but that assi stance would 
be forthcoming when they established economically viable pro j ects . 
When the Indonesian takeover aborted moves , begun in the early 
1950s , to e stabli sh uni form quarantine regulations and procedures on 
both side s of the border (Hasluck 1976 : 36 0 ) , controls on the Papua New 
Guinea side were tightened . The e ffects of the cordon sanitaire were 
thus felt most severely at a time when the border deve lopment programme 
and the accelerated pace o f  cash crop and pastoral development 
in other parts of Papua New Guinea had aroused wide spread intere st in 
the economic a spects o f  deve lopment among border vi l lage s . Responsibi li ty 
for the zone devolved primari ly upon the Department of Agriculture , 
Stock and Fisheries (DASF , later DPI ) , a speciali st and somewhat 
autonomous department , singularly i l l-attuned to the poli tical needs 
of border management but by virtue of i ts control over quarantine and 
s tock movement a powerful pol i ti cal force i n  the area . Confusion in 
DASF ranks for some time led to a serie s  o f  confli c ting di rective s as 
to what could and could not be grown or kept within the zone , as  a 
consequence of which vi llagers hesitated to accept fie ld staff guidance . 
Further confusion arose from policy conflicts , as when DASF proposed 
to al low pig and poultry proj ects , though in general policy and sta f f  
traini ng it di scouraged these be cause o f  their low economi c returns , 
need for close supervi sion , and use o f  foodstuffs required for human 
consumption . Many vi l lagers came to regard the zone as a ' tota l  
deve lopment ban ' (West Sepik Province 1 9 7 6 : 16 ) . 
Re cognition in the 1970s o f  the futi li ty o f  a ban on cattle 
and coffee , which could be control led , when di sease could be carried by 
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dogs , pigs , deer and people ,  who se border cro ssings could not be 
policed , led several o ffi c ials  and pol i ti cians to pre ss  for a relaxation 
of the pol i cy . A number of a lternat ives was mooted ,  inc luding e s tabl i shment 
of senti ne l  he rds and realignment of the perimeter , but were rej e cted 
by agriculture and health o ffi cials in Port Moresby . Quoting inte rnational 
precedent , .  DASF advi sed that they considered that twenty mi les was the 
minimum acceptable for a cordon sanitaire and that pre ferably the zone 
should be widenea . 1 Thi s  intransigence reflected adv�rsely on vi l lage 
relations wi th other official s , in parti cular Divi sion of Di strict 
Admini stration (DDA )  fie ld staff , who were fore.ea to j usti fy a 
government stance whi ch many personally opposed . Though there have been 
some indications recently that Papua New Guinea , Indonesia and Australia , 
for various reasons , see certain advantage s i n  a syndicated approach 
to the quarantine problem , there i s  l i ttle evidence to date that thi s 
wi l l  re sult i n  signi fi cant improvemen t  of the s i tuation for border 
communities , or a dimi nution o f  the potenti al o f  the cordon sanitaire 
to become a maj or poli ti cal i ss ue i n  the long term . 
2 The Ki limeri samp le .  For the Ki limeri , as  for much o f  the border 
population ,  regular cash earning activi ty i n  the mid 1 9 7 0 s  was almost 
non exi stent . Though sixteen per cent o f  the sample reported copra 
plantings ( two thirds of whi ch were immature ) and three per cent had 
cultivars such as  cocoa , chi l l ie s , coffee or spi c e s , mostly i n  very 
sma l l  quanti tie s  and o ften the untended remnant of experiments many 
years earlier , none had received any return from their holdings . Two 
claimed a share i n  a cow or dome sticated feral pig and ten in a trade­
store , though in seven o f  the ten cases the store was temporari ly or 
permanently c losed , and the remaining three were reported a s  ' j ust 
starting ' and at the time of the 1 9 7 5 - 7 6  survey had done li ttle if any 
bus ine s s . Twenty-seven per cent o f  the sample kept chickens , whi ch 
originally had fi ltered into the area from Hollandia ,
3 
but the se were 
generally regarded as the nuc leus o f  an economi c enterprise and too 
1 DAS F ,  Port More sby , fi le 1- 14-1 0 3 , 2 7  Decembe r 1 9 7 2 . 
2 See fn . 1 on p 1 1 1 . 
3 DDA , Ai tape , patrol report 6/48-49 .  
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valuable for dome sti c consumption . Vi llagers could not afford to 
purchase chi ckens from each other , as the standard asking pri ce was 
based on DASF charge s for imported breedi ng stock and many owners 
feared an o f ficial rebuke i f they set their own price . Three men in 
1 9 7 5 - 76 had sold poultry to passing government patro l s , whi ch was enough 
to maintai n  the asking price and general i nterest . Tota l income for 
the area from all  the se source s i n  twe lve months was $ 34 ,  whi ch amounted 
to an ave rage of $ 5 . 67 for the six income earne rs , or approximately 
nine cents per capita for the sample . 
The only other signi fi cant non-wage source o f  income , used by 
about twenty per cent o f  the sample , was the in frequent sale of game , 
sago grubs or other wi ld produce at the nearest s tation . Some border 
areas , such as  Oksapmi n , whi ch produced European vegetable s ,  and Green 
River , which at one stage started a rice proj ect , received occasional 
assistance wi th marketing i n  Wewak or Vanimo from patrol offi cers or 
mi ssionaries , but thi s was di scontinuous , hi ghly personali zed and 
heavi ly subsidi zed . Though a wide variety o f  income earning activities 
have been proposed or tested along the border , in part i cular by 
concerned government offi cials  and mi s sion personne l , the di ffi culti e s  
o f  access , high fre i ght costs , staff turnove r and local pre ference s 
gave such attempts a re lative ly brie f average l i fe . 
By far the mo st important contribution to the area ' s  income 
was wages . From World War I I  unti l the end o f  the contract labour 
period in the 196 0 s , wage labour on p lantations provided a steady 
trickle of goods and cash for the area , an e scape from the hardships 
of the home envi ronment and a much more re liable source of income 
than the dubious development prospec ts o ffered on the borde r .  As 
thi s source dried up , the hori zon for wage migration narrowed and 
employment re lated moves outside the Wes t  Sepik dropped from approximately 
80  per cent to 5 0  per cent of total movement between 1965 and 1 9 7 5 . 
More men began to compete for the few j ob opportunities c loser to 
home . For a few years they were able to earn enough for their  
basic  needs from predominantly casual labour in Vanimo or at 
gove rnment , counci l  or mi s sion centres nearby , but these sources also 
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dimini shed in the 1970s . New nationa l i stic regulations imposed by the 
Nationa l Investment and Deve lopment Authority {NIDA )  drove Goldore 
Timber Company , the We st Sepik ' s  large st private employer , out of the 
province . Increases in the basic  wage made othe r employers more 
selec tive , and the localization of public servi ce posi tions followed 
by general financial stringencies after 1974 severe ly reduced the 
amoun t of money re leased to the casua l  or unskilled labour force . At 
the same time , monetary requirement s  for counci l  rate s , education and 
purchase o f  trade store goods i ncreased . Acquis i tion o f  saleable ski ll s , 
ei ther through formal education or i n formal channe l s  such a s  j ob 
experience , had never been �i gh and be came much more di fficult as the 
employment situation tightened across  the country and the national 
education system was adj usted to limi t the numbers o f  unemployed dropouts . 
The post 1 9 75 pha.se . In 1975-76  4 9  per cent o f  total cash 
income for the Ki limeri sample came from the earnings of two un skilled 
labourers . A further 3 3  per cent came from casual labour , rare ly o f  
more than two weeks ' duration , and from quasi wage sources such as  
stipends and al lowance s .  Since the sample had an annual median and 
modal per capita cash income of zero and an annual mean per capita cash 
income o f  only $ 5 . 4 2, for most vi l lagers even the lowes t  wage or stipend 
represented enormous riche s . This  was reflected in the ve ry high 
proportion , 79 pe r cent , o f  adult ma les be tween age s 2 0  and 4 5  .who in 
the previous year had active ly ,  albeit unsucce s s fully , sought employment . 
By compari son , very few were prepared to walk the same di stance to 
receive medi cal treatment , and none had done so to seek advi ce or 
assistance from government officials . 
Unti l the inve sti gations into the Star Mountain copper deposi ts 
in the late 1 960s , government offici als  regarded the timber stands o f  
the Vanimo and Pual Rive r area a s  the West Sepik ' s  main hope for maj or 
economi c deve lopment . De spite the po licy shi ft to rura l improvement , 
vi llage parti cipation and equali zation for less  deve loped areas , whi ch 
occurred under the first Somare government , by 1 976 official hopes for 
the We st Sepik once again rested on possible timber and copper p roj ects 
( Hinchcli ffe 1 9 76 : 11 ) . In the course of  investigations into these proj ects , 
a number o f  supplementary analyses was made o f  vi llage agri cul tural 
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potential and capaci ty to bene fit from the proposed large scale 
developments . The se reported that the likelihood o f  significant 
advantage from copper mining , even for the Mi n people in the immediate 
vicinity, was ve ry small ( Rendel & Partners 1 9 7 5 : 1 1- 16 ) , and that the 
population o f  the Vanimo-Pual timber area was insufficient to deve lop 
the de fore s ted area . For the border people ,  who had been inundated for 
a decade by consultations and o fficial requests for coope ration , backed 
by promi ses of enormous returns at an ever-re ceding future date , hope s 
of  development from timber or minerals were weari ng thin . Vi llagers  
such as  the Ki limeri , who had leased thei r  timber ten years earlier 
when the matter was officially regarded as ' urgent ' ,  were parti cularly 
di sgruntled . Under the contract timber lease land could not be cleared 
for commercial purposes , most of the land not leased was marginal or 
not sui table for cash cropping , and the purchasing power of the six­
monthly interest payments , whi ch when divided up varied between 10� 
1 
and $ 1  per re cipiant , had declined marked ly . As wi th the cordon 
sanitaire , inadequate explanations and weak rationali zations severe ly 
damaged the government ' s  credibi lity in the area . 
In  1975-76  I ndonesian moves in  East Timor brought a revival of  
governmental conce rn for border deve lopment . At the insti gation of  
the secretaries of  the Prime Mini ste r ' s  Department and the Deparbment 
o f  De fence during a vi sit to the area , and wi th the support of Sir 
John Guise , a new set of  ' border development proposals ' was drawn up . 
This  document , whi ch purported to ' represent the views of  all  sectors 
of  the border communi ty ' (We s t  Sepik Province 1976 : 1 ) but whi ch was 
large ly the work o f  one expatriate admini strator , concentrated mainly 
on upgrading the border stations and on improving admini strative 
condi tions and capaci ty .  I n  e s sence i t  was a repetition and extens ion 
of  the 1960s development programme . As with the earlier programme , the 
e lements of it whi ch were implemented over the next few years had li ttle 
posi tive impac t or spread for border vi llagers . 
Though the dearth o f  adequate time series data renders any 
attempt to assess dynamic processes on the border large ly subj ective , 
1 
The background o f  the proposed multi mi llion do llar deve lopment o f  
one of  Papua New Guinea ' s  large st timber resources i s  given in 
Herlihy 1976 . 
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there are some signs that conditions for border vi l lagers are 
deteriorati ng . The decline in employment opportunities and cash 
income s , especially marked since 1 9 7 4- 7 5 , brought a reduction o f  modern 
supplement s to subsi stence . Mos t  Ki limeri households in 1 9 76 were using 
worn utensi ls which had been brought back in the 1950s  and 1960s by 
returned ·labourers , and were unable to replace i tems such a s  axe s and 
saucepans which previously had been regarded as bone ( e s sential ) .  
Unwi lling or unable to return to arduous traditional methods of 
manufacture for such i tems a s  salt , many simply di scontinued their use . 
The range o f  foods tuffs regularly consumed a l so appears for various 
reasons to have dimini shed . In Ki limeri the most common morning and 
evening mea l  consi sted of boi led sago and tulip ( the flavoursome and -
for a leaf - relative ly nutri tious Gne twn gnemon tips ) � One vi l lage , 
whi ch used to consume surplus garden produce i t  cultivated for sale 
to a nearby boarding school , ceased consumption o f  the introduced 
crops when the boarding school became a day school and its  market 
collapsed . Anothe r group j oined the Seventh Day Adventi s t  Church , 
relinqui shed most of i ts hunter-gatherer protei n  sources and re fused 
to assist  i n  communal pig hunts , whi ch in the absence o f  cultivated 
dietary alternative s  marginali zed their own diet and to a les ser extent 
alte red the communal balance . Wi th the dec line in other cash earning 
opportuniti es many vi l lagers re tained a greater proportion o f  saleable 
bush products such as game , wi ldfowl eggs and sago grubs for market or 
for the gi ft exchange s with town contacts whereby they obtained cloth 
and a few other coveted t rade goods . As the costs of education and 
the standard requi red for regular wage employment rose , interest in 
primary and vocationa l education declined and schoo ls reported a drop 
in attendance . In 1976 31 per cent of Ki limeri adults interviewed had 
received some basic  education , but only 2 7  per cent of their chi ldren . 
Seventy-seven per cent of school age chi ldren at the time o f  the survey 
were not attending s chool and only three vi llagers in the sample area 
had compl eted primary education . Of those who had some schoo ling mo st 
chi ldren , like their parents , had dropped out by Grade 3 despi te the 
improvement to primary fac i l i ties in the area . Adult employment hi stories 
showed a marked reduction in  the range and duration of out side experience 
since the mid 1960s , which was matched by a decline in outside contac ts 
and in the informal access to information and modern opportunities that 
they had provided . 
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Conc lusion 
The recurrent di lemma for governmen t  in development o f  the 
border area , as its  past attempts have demonstrated , is that programmes 
which have been considered admini stratively feasible have been 
handicapped by situationa l constraints , whi le a broad attack on border 
underdevelopment would be a hi gh cost , low return and long term operation . 
To upgrade government services and standards o f  living on the border 
rrerely to a standard comparable wi th the Papua New Guinea average would 
in i tse l f  be expensive in terms of monetary re source s ,  s ta ff quantity 
and calibre , and possible pol i ti cal repercussions from other areas . To 
continue to di vert resources indefini te ly to the maintenance o f  such 
levels , when the per capi ta cos ts of doing so are inflated vi s-a-vi s  
other areas by di stance , low population densi ties and di fficult terrain , 
i s  not likely to be economical ly or poli tically feasible . The provincial 
governmen t  experiment has already indicated that the more a dvanced 
regions are not prepared to subsidi ze the l e s s  deve loped a reas to the 
extent that would be required , and nei ther the We stern nor the Sandaun 
Province s have the capaci ty to mount a campai gn o f  such magni tude 
without assistance . 
Nonetheless , as  far as the Sandaun Province i s  concerned , the 
present Somare government is in a better position to intervene than 
was the first ( 19 7 2 - 7 7 ) Somare government . In 1 9 7 2  four of the five 
West Sepik parl iamentarians , prompted by the widespread fear that 
Independence would be disadvantageous to the province , al igned themse lves 
wi th the opposi tion Uni ted Party . On several occasions their parliamentary 
game smanship antagoni zed coa li tion member s and reduced the government ' s  
scope for a concerted attack on development problems in the ir electorate s .  
The consequent lacuna at na tiona l pol i ti ca l  level , and the irrrpuissance 
of the local counc i l s , left border development for five years to public 
servants who on the who le were profes sionally and locationa lly in­
experienced and ill -equipped to tackle the problem . At the 1977  elections 
1 representative turnover was 100 per cent . The three large st electorates 
1 
Thi s  re fers to the membe rs who represented the We st Sepik in the 197 2 -
7 7  Assembly . The extent of ac tua l change in electoral support wi thin 
each electorate is  di ffi cult to asses s , as electoral boundaries in 
the border area have been redrawn between every elec tion to date . 
This  ha s also limi ted the abi l i ty o f  border vi llagers to pre ss their 
case consi stently in the na tiona l pol i ti cal arena . 
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voted Pangu and the two border repre sentative s cros sed the floor to 
1 
Pangu in the Oppos i tion reshuffle o f  early 1 9 7 8 . Though the lack o f  
development o n  the border i s  sti l l  re flec ted in the re lat ively weak 
parliamentary representation which handi capped the area in earlier 
house s ,  the new poli tical alliance give s reason to hope for the first 
time that · national and border intere sts can be reconci led constructively . 
1 Post-Courier 2 1  March 1978 . 
APPENDI X  I 
AGREEME NT B E TWEE N  THE GOVERNMENT 
OF AUS TRAL IA 
( AC T I NG ON ITS OWN BEHA LF AND ON 
B E HALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF 
PAP UA NEW GU I NEA ) 
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF I NDONE S IA 
C ONCE RNI NG ADM I N I S TRAT IVE BORDER 
ARRANGEMENTS 
AS TO THE BORDER BETWEEN 
PAPUA NEW GU I NEA 
AND I NDONE S IA 
THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA ( on i ts own beha l f  and on beha l f  
of the GOVERNMENT O F  PAPUA NEW GUINEA ) and the GOVERNMENT OF 
INDONES IA , 
Reca l ling the Agreement be tween the Australian and I ndone sian 
Gove rnments date d the twel fth day o f  February 197 3 which , among other 
things , demarcate s more preci sely in certain re spects the land 
boundari e s  on the i sland of New Guinea ( Irian ) and de limi ts territorial 
sea boundaries off  the northern and southern coasts o f  that i s land 
Recognizing the need to prote ct the tradi tional rights and customs 
o f  people living in proximi ty to the borde r cons ti tuted by those 
boundaries 
Recognising a lso the spiri t of co-operation , understanding and goodwi ll 
that already prevai l s  wi th regard to the administration o f  the border 
and border areas and the exi s ting arrangements between Governments 
for liai son and other purposes in  re lation thereto 
Recognising a lso the desirabi li ty o f  fur ther fos tering co-operation , 
goodwi ll and understanding and further s trengthening and improving 
e xi s ting arrangements and to thi s end of formulating a broad frame ­
work within whi ch the borde r and border areas sha l l  be admini stered 
in the future 
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Having in mind Papua New Guinea becoming an independent nation 
Recognising a lso that unti l independence the border arrangements in 
re lation to the Papua New Guinea side o f  the border wi l l  be carried 
into e ffect by the Government o f  Papua New Guinea wi th the under­
standing that after independence Austral ia sha l l  cease to be re sponsible 
in re spect of such arrangements . As good nei ghbours and in a spi ri t 
o f  friendship and co-operation HA VE AGREED as fol lows : 
Artic le 1 
For the purpose o f  thi s Agreement the border area on each 
s ide of the border shall be those a reas noti fied by letters and 
shown approximately on maps to be e xchanged on or befo re the date of 
the e xchange o f  instruments of rati fication of thi s  Agreement . The 
border areas may be varied from time to time by an exchange of letters 
and maps a fter mutual consul tations . 
Artic le 2 
Liai son Arrangements 
The establishment o f  liai son on matters re lating to the border 
is full accepted . Arrangements should be made for regulating the 
functions and working procedures for each leve l  of liaison . 
2 .  Unti l otherwi se mutual ly arranged , exi sting liai son arrange ­
ments shall continue and liai son mee tings shall be he ld : 
( a )  by senior officials o f  the Government of Papua New Guinea 
and of the Provincial Government of Irian Jaya when reque sted 
by ei ther Gove rnment on reasonable notice , and at least once 
a year , to review and deve lop border co-operation ; 
(b ) by o ffi cials o f  We st Sepik and Weste rn Di stricts and the 
Jayapura , Jayawi j aya and Merauke Kabupatens at regular 
inte rvals but at least every two months ; and 
( c )  by o fficials of the sub-di stricts and kecamatans concerned 
at regular inte rvals but at least every two months , the 
location to be locally decided . 
3 .  The main pm:poses of the l i ai son arrangements sha l l  be : 
( a )  to e xchange in formation on all deve lopments in the border 
areas which are o f  mutual i nterest to the Governments ; 
(b ) to devi s e , amend or establ i sh arrangements to faci li tate 
the practical operation , particularly at local and di s trict 
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leve l s , o f  the  provi sions o f  thi s  Agreement ; and 
( c )  to ensure that Governments are kep t i nformed o f  developments 
of signi ficance relating to the border areas and that thei r  
attention i s  drawn to any matters whi ch may requi re consultation 
in accordance wi th thi s Agreement . 
Artic l� 3 
Border Crossi ng for Tradi tional and Customary Purposes 
1 .  The tradi tional and customary practi ces of the peoples , who 
re side i n  a border area and are c i ti zens o f  the country concerned , 
of c rossing the border for traditional activi tie s  such as  social 
contacts and ceremonies i nc luding marriage , gardening and other land 
usage , collecting , hunting , fi shi ng and other usage o f  waters , and 
traditiona l  barter trade are recogni sed and shall continue to be 
re spected . 
2 .  Such border crossings based on tradition and custom shall be 
subj ect to spe cial arrangements , and normal inuni gration and othe r 
requirements shall not apply . 
3 .  The special arrangements shall be formulated on the principle 
that such crossings shall be only temporary i n  character and not for 
the purpose o f  settlement . 
Artic le 4 
Cros s Border Rights to Land and Water 
The tradi tional rights enj oyed by the citi zens o f  one country , 
who reside i n  i ts border area , i n  relation to land in the border 
area of the other country and for purposes such as fi shing and other 
usage o f  the seas or waters in or in the vi cinity o f  the border area 
of the othe r country , shall  be respected and the other country shall 
permi t them to exerci se those ri ghts on the same condi tions as apply 
to i ts own ci ti zens . The se rights shall be exerci sed by the persons 
conce rned wi thout settling permanently on that side of the border 
unless such persons obtain permi s sion to enter the other country for 
residence in accordance with the immigration laws and procedure s of 
that country . 
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Artic le 5 
Set tlement 
It sha ll be an agreed obj ec tive to di scourage the construc tion 
of vi llage s or other permanent housi ng wi thin a two kilometer zone 
on each side of the border . 
Article 6 
Border Cros sing Other Than For Traditional and Customary Purpo ses 
1 .  The crossing o f  the border by persons not coming wi thin 
Article 3 above i s  to take place through des i gnated points of entry 
and in accordance wi th the norma l  laws and regulations re lating to 
entry . 
2 .  I n formation sha l l  be exchanged wi th re spect to the migration 
laws and policies operating on each side of the border to maintain 
more e f fective control of the border areas . 
3 .  Persons who cross the border other than in accordance wi th 
the practices  recognised by Artic le 3 above or the normal laws and 
regulations re lating to entry shal l  be treated as i llegal immi grants . 
4 .  In  admi nistering i ts laws and policies relating to the entry 
of persons into i ts terri tory across  the border ,  each Gove rnment shal l  
a c t  in  a spiri t o f  friendship and good neighbourline ss bearing i n  
mind re levant principles o f  international law and establi shed inter­
national practice s and the importance of di scouraging the use o f  
border cross ing for the purpose o f  evading j ustice and the u s e  of i ts 
terri tory in a manner inconsi s tent with the preamble or any provi sion 
of thi s  Ag!eement . Each Government shal l a l so take into account , 
where appropriate , the desirabi l i ty o f  exchanging in formation and 
holding consultations wi th the other . 
Artic le 7 
Securi ty 
1 .  In  a spiri t o f  goodwi ll and mutual understanding and so as to 
maintain and strengthen the good neighbourly and fri endly relations 
already exi sting , the Governments on ei ther side o f  the border agree 
to continue to co-operate wi th one another in order to prevent the 
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use o f  the ir respective territories in  or in  the vicinity o f  their 
re spective border areas for hosti le activi ties against the o the r . 
To thi s end , each Government shall maintain i ts own procedure s of 
noti fication and control . 
2 .  The Governments sha l l  keep each other informed and where 
appropriate consult as to deve lopments in or in the vicinity o f  thei r  
re spec tive border areas , which a r e  re levant to their securi ty . 
Artic le 8 
Border Trade 
The Governments agre e to exchange information concerning cross­
border trade and when appropriate to consult in relation thereto . 
Artic le 9 
Citi zenship 
The de sirabi lity is recogni sed of having a regular exchange 
of re levant i n formation regarding laws and regulations on nationali ty 
and citi zenship and each Government agree s ,  i f  so requested , to have 
consultations on any problem being encountered in re lation thereto . 
Artic le 1 0  
Quaranti ne 
1 .  The co-operation already exi sting in the field o f  health and 
quarantine , inc luding mutual vi sits of officials and exchange o f  
information and pe riodi cal reports , sha l l  b e  co ntinued and deve loped .  
2 .  I n  the case o f  an outbreak or spread o f  an epidemi c in a border 
area , quarantine and health re stri ctions on movement across the border 
may be imposed , notwi thstanding Arti cle 3 above . 
Artic le 1 1  
Navigational Faci l i ties i n  Boundary Waters 
Arrangements sha l l  be made as appropriate in order to facilitate 
navigation o f  tra f f i c  in mai n  waterway s  in boundary waters ,  especially 
the " Fly River Bulge " .  
Article 1 2  
Pol lution 
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The Governments agree that when mining , industrial , forestry , 
agricultural or other proj ects are being carried out in the re spec tive 
border areas the neces sary precautionary measures shal l  be taken to 
prevent $erious pollution o f  rivers flowing across the border . There 
shall be consultations , i f  so reque s ted , on measure s to prevent 
pollution , ari sing from such activi ties , o f  rive rs on the o ther side 
o f  the border . 
Article 1 3  
Consultations and Review 
1 .  The Governments shall , i f  so reque sted , consult on the implementation ,  
operation and scope o f  thi s  Agreeme nt . 
2 .  Thi s  Agreement shall be reviewed upon the expiration o f  five 
years from the date o f  exchange o f  the instruments o f  rati fication . 
Article 1 4  
Signature and Rati fi cation 
1 .  Thi s Agreement i s  sub j e c t  to rati fication in accordance wi th 
the consti tutional requi rements of e ach country , and sha l l  enter into 
force on the day on whi ch the instruments o f  rati fication are 
exchanged . 
2 .  I t  i s  understood that the concurrence o f  the Government o f  
Papua New Guinea in thi s Agreement i s  a condi tion thereof and such 
concurrence is evi denced by the signing of thi s Agreement on i ts 
behal f  by Maori Kiki , Mi nister for De fence and Fore ign Re lations o f  
Papua New Guinea . 
APPEND I X  I I  
WE S T  PAP UA NATI ONAL I SM :  
AN I NS I DE VIEW 
" No right anywhere exi s ts to hand people 
about from sovereignty to sovereignty as  i f  they 
were property . "  Woodrow Wi lso n , 2 8 th Pre sident 
of United Sta te s  o f  Ameri ca , l l th February 1918 . 
1 .  Introduction 
A number of scien ti sts who have been fortunate or lucky 
enough to be al lowed to enter that sacred backyard of Indonesia , a 
mini -siberia o f  the Pacific called Irian Jaya , have pre sented qui te 
impressive reports on thei r  findings . These might be the mos t  up to 
date information wri tten about We s t  New Guinea ever-since the area was 
sealed off from the free world in 1 96 3 . Wi th a bureaucratic 
admini s tration and suspicious army s taff in  office plus secre t  police 
keeping an eye on vi si tors ' activi ti e s , I gues s  the cooperation tha t 
these scienti s ts received in I rian Jaya might go as  far as  looking a t  
partly propaganda reports and observing the general li fe in the country . 
I do appreciate thei r  reports and in thi s  paper I pre fer not to challenge 
their findings but to rai se some more cri tical points in regard to 
the topic "Papua Nationa l i sm"  which was also mentioned in the above 
quoted reports . 
One more point I would like to make i s  that the foreigners , 
Indonesians , Dutch , Aus tralians and Ameri cans alike , seem to adopt the 
a tti tude o f  knowing the si tuation be tter than we do � Even they te ll us 
who we are and what we want for our future . I f  we di sagree wi th them 
they claim that we are s ti l l  primi tive , we are communi sts or subversives . 
Where e l se in today ' s  world would the dic tum be accep ted tha t a people 
were too primi tive even to be free?  
2 .  The roots of the Anti -Indonesia sentiment 
There was almost nothing wri tten in the modern li terature about 
our relationship wi th Indone sia be fore the Europeans came to thi s  part 
o f  the world . But from s tories passed on from generation to generation 
we do know that our people were treated as slave s by the Asians . The 
general image of Indone sians , buried deep in the minds o f  our people 
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for centurie s , was that they were untrus tworthy people . We ca ll  them 
amberi ( a  Biak word ) . The image behind amberi wa s " foreigners who 
can talk extra sweet but have bad plans in mind . " When the mi s s ionaries 
came in the 1 8 th century and the Dutch Colonial Admini s tration two 
centurie s later , they brought wi th them Indonesian teachers , clerks , 
police and carpenters who again like their ancestor s mis treated our 
people . Such punishments like forcing people to drink their own urine 
and bloody beatings were part of the so cal led education to civi l i ze 
the "primi tive Papuans . "  They were in fact the first coloniali sts . 
3 .  The roots o f  the claim 
The whole di spute over We s t  New Guinea i s  based on terri torial 
c laims made by I ndonesia on the one hand and the Dutch claim of 
lega l i ty and the rights o f  the Papua peop le on the other hand . In his 
book ti tled Perdjuangan Irian Barat atas dasar Proklamasi * Profes sor 
Mohamed Yamin of I ndonesia tried to put forward as many arguments as 
pos s ible to materialise Indonesia ' s  c laim that the whole New Guinea 
i s land was part o f  Modj opai t ' s  Empi re since the 8th century . The name 
given to this i sland was D j angi . On page 2 4  he went on saying that 
in the years o f  7 04 , 716  and 7 2 4  Dj angi gir l s  were offered to Palaces 
of Cai sars in China . He was too careful to avoid mentioning that these 
girls  were in  fac t part o f  the thousands of slaves sold to Asia by the 
Indonesians . The o ther claim made by Indonesia was that because West 
New Guinea was coloni sed by the Dutch , it  should be included in the 
Republi c  of Indonesia proclaimed i n  1945 . 
The Dutch however would not accept thi s . As the coloni sers they 
knew very well that West New Guinea was never inc luded e ffectively in 
the machinery o f  the East Indi a Company . Wha t is  more , We st New 
Guinea was excluded in the Proclamation Act announced by the Indonesian 
leaders in 1945 (Naskah Persiapan Undang Dasar 1 94 5 , page 204 by Prof . 
Moh . Yamin* * ) . More convincingly , the West New Guinea people do not 
* Buki ttinggi and Dj akarta : Nusantara . Second edi tion , 1956 . 
* *  Vol . 1 .  Dj akarta : Ja j asan Prapantj a  1959 . See also pp 191-4 . 
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want to become part o f  Indone sia ( "Politi cal Awakening in West New 
* 
Guinea " ,  page 5 8 , by P . N .  van der Veur ) . Wi th the impossible 
demand from the I ndonesian side , the Dutch proposed that the matter 
should be taken up wi th the I n ternational Court o f  Justice , that was 
in 1 9 5 2 , but Indones ia refused to cooperate . 
The Dutch could be right in wanting to protect thei r  Papuan 
interests but Indone sia regarded the colonial pre sence in We st New 
Guinea as a serious threat to the newly created republic . Even some 
o f  our leaders had ques tioned Dutch de termina tion to pro tect our rights , 
especially when Dutch coloni s ts were allowed to se ttle in West New 
Guinea . 
4 .  The pol i tical awakening 
Political activi ties in West New Guinea could be traced as far 
back as 1942 . Long before the Americans arrived a group of leaders 
in Biak , among them a lad y  by the name Anganetha Menufandu , proclaimed 
that the whole of Wes t  New Guinea should be liberated from the Japanese 
oppressor . This  revolt ended up wi th hundreds o f  lives lost and the 
leaders themselves had their heads chopped o ff . 
Irrane diate ly a fter the war in 1945 another group ca lled the 
People ' s  Voice Movement was founded in Biak and demanded a hal f  
independent Country , up to 2 5  years under USA rule . The Dutch , hoping 
that they would re sume control over Indonesia , ignored thi s demand , 
which made the group become more radi cal . The anti-amberi campaign led 
by the Kai si epo brothers in  1 946 from the above group had a good 
re sponse and spread qui ckly throughout the country . Everywhere people 
demanded their own local teachers , kiap s , police , carpenters e tc . 
The Dutch did replace Indonesians wi th Dutch or Papuan officers and 
recruited more locals to be trained for these posi tions . The recrui ts 
from all  over the country who were undergoing training in Hollandi a 
fe lt strong and uni ted and used thi s  good opportuni ty to put on a 
bigger show . They sent Frans Kai siepo to the Ma lino conference near 
Makasar as representative of We st New Guinea people to te ll Dutch and 
* Pacific Affairs 36 ( 1 ) , Spring 196 3 .  
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I ndonesia that the We st New Guinea People  would have nothing to do wi th 
the I ndonesian Republic . He a l so reque sted the Dutch Government a t  
this conference to rule West New Guinea separa tely from Indones ia . He 
was the one who a l so sugge sted the name ! RYAN (not I RIAN )  to replace 
Papua or We s t  New Guinea . 
Mos t  leaders were sati s fied wi th these deve lopments and wanted 
to cooperate wi th the Dutch , but a few , unders tandably from the People ' s  
Voice Movement , demanded that the Dutch too should go . The Dutch would 
not tolerate thi s  of course and put them in j ai l . Soon they found 
themselves i so lated and forced to join I ndone sia in their struggle to 
throw the Dutch out of West New Guinea . I t  wa s c lear then , that there 
was two vi ews developed among these two fac tions since 1946 . 
( 1 )  The first group , which didn ' t  want anything to do 
wi th Indonesia and were wi lling to cooperate 
with Dutch , was led by N .  Jouwe and M .  Kai siepo . 
( 2 ) The second group , which re j ec ted by the Dutch # saw 
Indonesia as  a potentia l  partner to get the Dutch 
out of We st New Guinea , was led by L .  Rumkorem , 
M .  Indey and s .  Papare . 
Regardles s  of the se di fference s ,  the two groups had one obj ec tive 
in �.onunon : "A free Papuan State , wi th the same rights as any sta te 
in the world . "  Some leaders from the second group fled the country 
and continued on thei r  fight together wi th I'ndone sia . 
Other known organi sations were the young Iryan Movement founded 
in Sorong in 1949 , and two years later the New Guinea Uni ty Movement 
in Manokwari . About the same time the Prote s tant Labour Organi zation 
was formed . I n  1956 the Protes tant Churche s 1 which ran most o f  the 
schools and maintained an admini stration network throughout the country 
were recognized as an independent organi zation known as Geredja Kristen 
Indji li or Evange lical Chri stian Church . The running of thi s national 
organi zation ti ll  today ha s proved that Papuan people can •· t be down 
graded from Dutch or Indonesian admini strators . 
The first political party , cal led the People ' s  Democratic Party , 
was founded in 1 95 7 . The Party ' s  platform was for greater autonomy under 
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Dutch supervi sion , leading to proposed uni ty wi th Papua New Guinea in 
a Melanesian Federation . During thi s  time the Dutch and the Austral ian 
Governments were encouraging c loser cooperation between the two 
territories . The new era of i ncreas ing political awarene s s  started 
in 1960 . Some more pol i tical parties were formed , all demanding 
development and future self-government or independence . 
The c l imax of Papua National i sm could be seen in 1 961 . The 
response to the elec tions for the West New Gui nea Counci l  was great : 
2 2  out of 28 seats were held by Papuans . They selec ted national symbols , 
a flag and coat of arms , and a national anthem , and put to use the name 
of the country and the peopl e .  The entire population was proud of these 
national symbol s . The ten years deve lopment plan proposed by the 
Government ( the origina l  plan was from the Na tiona l Par ty ) wa s accepted 
by a l l  parties and the people . Everybody knew tha t by the year 1970  
West Papua would become independent and people were prepared to work 
hard towards that goal . However I ndonesia on the other hand was 
watching all  these deve lopments wi th discontent , and c lung to her 
ambi tious terri torial claims . Thus there was no other alterna tive than 
an invasion to s top the creation o f  a wes t  Papua Na tion . The fighting 
between Dutch and the I ndone sian forces erupted in January 1 96 2  and 
continued on for severa l months unti l the USA persuadep the Dutch to 
sign a hand-over agreement , known a s  New York Agreement , wi th I ndonesia 
in  August 196 2 , over the heads o f  our people . 
Thi s  sudden change didn 1·t give much time for our leaders and 
parties to consider their stand . A sma l l  mi ssion to several African 
countries had created a good impact but wa s a lready too late . The 
pol itical leader s spli t  into two groups , one group dec ided to leave 
the country and the other group remained . Whether staying or leaving , 
everybody 1 s  hope was tha t in 1969 wi th the help of U . N .  we would be 
on our own again . 
5 .  Can Papua Na tiona l i sm Survive ?  
The depar ting Dutch officia l s  had asked the same que stion i n  
1 96 2 ,  "Can Papua National i sm Survive? " Probably unaware of thi s  concern , 
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June Verrier had dug out an answer to i t . I n  her report ( " I rian Jaya 
197 5 : The West New Guinea Question Phase Three " * ) she indicated tha t 
there was a young passiona te 1969 generation , future looking and more 
reali stic than the 196 2 genera tion . Having exper ienced thi s  proce s s  
myself I would like t o  add tha t the 1 9 6 9  generation was compri sed o f  
two factions mentioned ear lier in  thi s  paper . 
Being brainwashed by their poli tical agi ta tors the ordinary 
I ndonesian men and soldiers believed that the Wes t  New Guinea people 
really needed I ndonesia to liberate them from the Dutch coloniali sts . 
We felt sorry for them ; they were being foo l i sh to sacr i fice themse lves 
for their Generals , not for West New Guinea . They regarded themselves 
as  liberators ,  they came in force so proud hoping tha t they would be 
welcomed wi th flowers and free hosp i ta l i ty . Wha t they found wa s di smay , 
rej ection and hos ti l i ty . I can sti l l  recall the usua l gos s ips : " Look 
at them or , here they come or , watchout for the bandi ts wi th their 
guns . " 
Angry wi th thi s  si tuation the I ndonesians conducted terror 
activi ties which were in line wi th Dj akarta ' s policy to force the 
population to submit to their direc tive rules and accept their guided 
democracy . There was looting , intimida tion , raping , s tealing , beatings , 
torture and arbi trary arre s ts o f  the civilians . There was no law to 
preserve j ustice ; even re ligion was a s tate a ffair . All pol i tical 
ac tivi ty was banned , heavy pre s s  and news media censorship impo sed , 
and prohibi tion of travel soon became common in the country . They made 
re solutions and s tatements one after another to condemn and a sk for 
the wi thdrawal of the 1969 plebi s c i te and forced our leaders to agree 
to this . Dj akarta announced to the world tha t the Wes t  New Gui nea 
people had already decided to remain wi th I ndonesia , and tha t therefore 
the plebi scite in  1969 was not necessary . 
For the population who once enj oyed democratic freedom , peace 
and j ustice , this  new type of government is  j us t  a " HELL " . De spite 
a l l  these difficulties our underground organi sations and leaders 
secretly smuggled reports of the rea l si tua tion to our l eaders overseas 
and the Uni ted Nations in  New York . The common tactic wa s ,  " let the 
* 
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Indonesians have the doubt , and w e  wi ll  come back in 1969 . " Previously 
pro-Indonesian leaders like E .  Bonay (The first Governor appointed by 
Indonesia 196 3 ) , Moses Weror ( now in PNG ) , Lu cas Rurnkorem , Martin Indey 
and Cem Iba ( now in PNG ) , had turned bi tterly against Indonesia . Thi s 
made I ndonesia come to rea l i ze that , whether Pro or Anti , a l l  the 
Papuans are the same and should receive the same puni shments , either 
exi led to other provinces , j ai led or shot ( from an Indonesian document 
in 1966 , signed by Drs . Sud j oko , head of Police in D j a j apura ) .  I ndonesia 
knew for sure , according to the above men tioned document ,  that a free 
e lection in 1969 would turn against Indone sia . The only solution wa s 
using force . 
Beli eving in Human Rights , Democracy and the New York Agreement , 
our leaders s tra tegy was , " not usi ng viol ence '' , and they repor ted all 
the truth about Indonesia ' s  mi sdeeds to the U . N .  and the world so that 
in 1969 , the world might accuse I ndonesia and vote against her . True 
there was sporadic fighting in several places around the country since 
1965 but thi s was not coordinated as  a nationa l campaign under one single 
command . The na tiona l i s ts were primari ly direc ted towards liberation , 
but hoped to achieve this by forcing I ndonesia and the world to seriously 
consider our rights , guaranteed in the New York Agreement . Our people 
also strongly bel ieved that Aus tralia and the Dutch defini tely would 
not let us be crushed by Indonesia . Wi th thi s  fai th the Australian 
securi ty officers placed along the border were always fed wi th up to 
da te informa tion . 
Our first pla�ned demons tration on the 24th August 1968 to welcome 
the Uni ted Na tion ' s  representative Dr Fernandes Orti z Sanz , wa s crushed , 
the leader Mr Torey was eliminated , and o thers were j ailed by the 
Indonesians . However we came back again armed wi th banners to see 
Dr . Fernandes Orti z Sanz off to the U . N .  i n  1969 . Despi te the strict 
security measures ,  on the early morning o f  Apri l  llth ,  1969 the U . N .  
representative wa s presented wi th a peti tion a t  hi s home by a crowd 
of more than 2000 demonstrators . Indonesia used armored cars to crush 
this demonstration a fter it had met wi th the U . N .  representa tive . 
The so-cal led act of free choice came and ended wi th much publicity 
and cri ticism the world over . Wi th all  the facts reported by the U . N .  
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representative and many observer s our people were hoping that U . N .  
General Assembly would condemn I ndonesia . Our hopes were high tha t 
Aus tralia , the Dut ch and African Nations would lead the o fficial prote s t . 
A number o f  African countries did but were beaten in the voting . Another 
hard blow was tha t Austra lia had not supported our de legation of two 
men ( now living in PNG ) sent to the U . N .  through PNG . 
The U . N .  decision in favour o f  Indone sia was the harde st blow 
and one that our people wi ll  never forge t . In  that very moment i f  there 
were guns reaching everybody , religious l eaders , men ,  women , young 
and old could have dec lared an open war against what they believe i s  
SATAN . They critically gues tioned , the va lue of their re ligious beliefs 
in j u s tice , human rights , democracy and mutual understanding . Hopefully 
some of our leaders over s eas , enjoying more freedom than we do , would 
have come up with a more constructive solution , but they haven ' t  done 
better e i ther . Slowly we come back to our sense of reality . We have 
to s i t  down and evaluate everything and think of other pos sibi lities 
or al ternative s . An answer mus t  be found anyhow , but one thing is  
c lear : we  wi ll never give up . 
6 .  A new struggle for the Liberation of West Papua . 
I f  the reader has fol lowed me correc tly , I did mention tha t our 
people have done everything possible as fai thful Chri stians to avoid 
violence and wi ll  do so wi th much sacri fice . Thousands of  lives were 
los t ;  a ve ry few died in fighting but the re st were murdered in cold 
blood by the ruling Coloniali sts . Tha t was the price of honouring 
human rights and j ustice , the price of our good wi ll  and understanding 
to seek a peaceful solution ( the same road tha t Sir Maori Kiki is now 
undertaking ) ,  but the re sult was too painful . I do not be li eve that 
the people are fooli sh enough to repeat this bi tter experi ence a l l  
over again . Armed struggle wi ll  be more likely the choice of the people 
for the next start . 
All i s  no t los t .  One good thing we discovered in 1969 was the 
strength of Papua National i sm and deep fee ling of uni ty . Suspicious 
139 
atti tude s towards di fferent organisations have vani shed . I was moved 
to hear the followi ng s tatement made by Mr X,  a we ll known pro­
Indone sian leader , when he addres sed his group called SRIWA to give 
ful l support to the Apri l  11 , 1 969 demons tration : 
"For a long time we have been hated as traitors 
by our own brothers , j us t  because we choose a 
struggle different from what they believe i s  
right . Now the time has come for u s  to show them 
that we have been fighting for the same end . " 
The 1969 generation was the machine and mai n  source o f  information , 
supplied to the groups operating overseas . The first group was known 
as National Liberation Counc i l , led by Nicolas Jouwe , a known pol i tical 
leader since 1945 . The second group , cal led the High Court of the 
Chamber o f  the Repre sentative o f  West Papua , is led by M . W .  Kai siepo , 
founder of the People ' s  Voice Movement in 1945 and o f  the People ' s  
Democrati c  Party in 1957 , and a l so a known pol i ti cal leader . The 1969 
generation expected the leaders of the 196 2 generation to re j ec t  the 
unj ust result of " act o f  free choice " by proclaiming a Wes t  Papuan sta te 
before the opening o f  U . N .  General Assembly , but nothing happened . 
Realising thi s fai lure , the 1969 generation took ful l responsibi l i ty 
by forming a Provincial Government and made Z .  Rumkorem , an army o ffi cer , 
the Pre sident . 
The o fficial proclamation was announced on July 1 ,  197 1 ,  j us t  
before the I ndonesian Na tional elections . Soon after , the Provi sional 
Government e s tabli shed an Information Office on the African continent 
in the country o f. Senegal , a long s tanding supporter of We st Papua . I f  
the · Provi sional Government i s  providing the neces sary leadership to 
a liberation struggle , there i s  no doubt that everybody wi ll  follow . 
Take the central highlands revolt in 1 969 (after the elections ) for 
example . In  very short notice , thousands o f  tribesmen were ready to 
fol low their leader to battle . The people have been wai ti ng for this moment for 
for a long time . 
Paci fic People ' s  Action Front (PNG Section ) 
May 1976 . 
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